Macroeconomic models for inflation targeting in economies with financial dollarisation by Vega, Marco
MACROECONOMIC MODELS
FOR INFLATION TARGETING
IN ECONOMIES WITH FINANCIAL DOLLARISATION
Marco Antonio Vega
The London School of Economics and Political Science
A thesis submitted for the Ph.D Degree in Economics
London, July 2006
ABSTRACT
After an introductory chapter, the thesis is divided in three parts. In the first
part, chapter 2 includes domestic financial dollarisation into an otherwise standard
DSGE model of a small open economy. Domestic financial dollarisation implies
that some of the assets of households and some liabilities of financial intermediaries
are denominated in a foreign currency. The main implication is that exchange rate
swings affect the financial wealth of households and disrupt production. The chapter
also derives a New-Keynesian Phillips curve augmented with agency costs. Chapter
3, sets up a framework whereby demand substitution occurs when cheaper imported
goods appear and trigger a propagation mechanism in non-tradeable prices. As in
the previous chapter, Chapter 3 disentangles the dynamics of inflation exploring
yet another effect that explains how the fall in world inflation might drag down
non-tradeable inflation in a small open economy.
The second part of the thesis deals with operational issues; notably the
inflation forecast and instrument setting. Chapter 4 proposes a Bayesian method to
combine model-based density forecasts with policy makers’ subjective priors. Next,
Chapter 5 estimates forward-looking interest rate rules by quantile regressions. The
advantage of quantile regressions is that we can learn about the likely feedback from
forecasts to instruments, not only on the mean value but on different quantiles of
the inflation forecast distribution. Thus, we can gain some added information about
monetary authorities’ risk balance or the nature of their loss function.
In the last part of the thesis, Chapter 6 provides an econometric evaluation
of the effects of inflation targeting adoption on the dynamics of inflation. This
evaluation covers developed and emerging-market inflation targeters alike.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ever since monetary policy authorities in New Zealand embraced Inflation Targeting
(IT from now on) back in 1990, many countries have followed suit. Currently,
twenty-one central banks in the world conduct monetary policy under the guidelines
set by this framework (ITers from now on). Remarkably, more than a half of all
ITers are catalogued as emerging market economies.
This thesis presents research on monetary policy under the IT framework in
small open economies with special emphasis on emerging-market and Latin Amer-
ican countries. Models of varying degree of complexity are put forward both to
tackle key elements of small, emerging-market economies relevant for policy making
and to better understand the features of IT in this environment.
The research has benefited from the interplay between theory and practice
provided by my years at the London School of Economics and my fieldwork at
the Central Bank of Peru. Although the primary concern of the thesis is to draw
practical monetary policy implications for Peru, the issues studied are broad and
cover aspects concerning IT in general and monetary policy in small open economies
in particular.
The thesis contains three parts. The first part introduces dynamic models
aimed at understanding two key issues that have shaped the monetary policy debate
in recent times. The first is the role of exchange rates in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy and the second is the role of increasing competition in goods
11
markets because of expanding trade globalisation. The thesis approaches these two
topics in chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
The second part concentrates on operational issues of IT. Chapter 4 con-
siders an approach towards applying an inflation density forecast and then chapter
5 estimates forward-looking instrument rules for Latin American ITers. In the third
and last part, the thesis provides a novel empirical evaluation of whether IT affects
inflation dynamics.
In standard small-open economy models, the monetary policy transmission
mechanism considers the exchange rate channel. The dynamics of the exchange rate1
affects prices and inflation by both; the pass-through and the aggregate demand.
The extent of the pass-through depends on the exchange-rate regime and the relative
size of the tradable and non-tradeable production, while the aggregate demand
impact originates from the expenditure switching effect owing to real exchange rate
swings. Studies like Sutherland (120), Svensson (124) and more recently Devereux
and Engel (38) and Gali and Monacelli (52) distinguish between total CPI inflation
and non-tradable inflation2 as targets for monetary policy, as well as the degree of
pass-through. The relevant trade-off faced by policymakers, given the degree of pass-
through, is to induce lower exchange rate fluctuations (associated with lower CPI
inflation variability) at the expense of higher ”non-tradeable” inflation volatility.
The policy conclusions that arise from this literature implicitly assume that
central banks do know the tradable and non-tradable price components3. Never-
theless, for reasons of transparency, accountability, and opportunity, central banks
base their targets mostly on observable measures like the Consumer-Price-Index
1Throughout the thesis, the nominal exchange rate, unless stated otherwise, will be understood
to be the effective exchange rate, i.e. the domestic price of a weighted basket of foreign currencies.
2Also known as ”domestic inflation”.
3In practice this exercise is not easy, the definition of what is tradeable or not, in a statistical
sense, is not standard. Measures of tradeable and non-tradeable inflation share the same feature
as definitions of underlying and non-underlying inflation. They are unobservable and indirectly
estimated with errors.
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(CPI) inflation4. Therefore, exchange rate swings concerns IT practice in small
open economies insofar as the degree of exchange rate pass-through is high. The
documented decline of the degree of pass-through in developed and developing
economies5 have eased IT practice in this particular issue.
However, against the backdrop of emerging-markets, there is another funda-
mental concern; the tradeoff between exchange rate flexibility and financial stability.
This is especially the case in financially dollarised economies where exchange rate
risk is not properly hedged.
In extreme cases6 of financial fragility7, sizeable unexpected exchange rate
depreciations against the dollar8 increase the burden of dollar-denominated debts,
weakening balance sheets, and increasing the risks of financial distress. Policy mak-
ers living in this dangerous environment cannot afford to neglect exchange rates.
The practice of IT in emerging markets has therefore been shaped by the dilemma
imposed by financial fragility. This is for example outlined in Amato and Gerlach
(1) which points out that on the path towards fully-fledged IT, many countries kept
exchange rate targets and only slowly relinquished them. In fact, abandonment of
exchange rate targets has usually not been undertaken until measures to mitigate
financial vulnerability have been put in place.
The purpose of chapter 2 is therefore to include domestic financial dollari-
sation into an otherwise standard DSGE model of a small open economy. Domestic
financial dollarisation implies that some of the assets of households and some liabil-
ities of financial intermediaries are denominated in a foreign currency9. The main
4Sometimes they might also target wholesale or retail price index inflation. Though they might
operationally observe a number of underlying and non-tradeable inflation measures.
5See Goldfjan and Werlang (55) and Frankel et al. (49).
6See Mishkin (90) and Calvo and Mishkin (24).
7A high degree of financial dollarisation and currency mismatches in the denomination of assets
and liabilities of agents enhances such fragility.
8A depreciation of the currency means an increase in the domestic price of dollar.
9The dollar.
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implication of this is that exchange rate fluctuations affect the financial wealth of
households and disrupt production. The impact of financial dollarisation on mone-
tary policy has also been studied in a number of papers, most notably in Ce´spedes
et.al (26), Cook (33) and Devereux et.al (39) where explicit balance-sheet channels
are built in. Chapter 2 shares important features of these papers; however, the
scope is different. My aim is to introduce financial dollarisation frictions into the
dynamics of inflation in a structural form. Therefore, the sources of inflation dynam-
ics can be disentangled into their various components. One of them is the agency
costs relevant to a dollarised financial system. The resulting friction-augmented
Phillips curve is relevant to the assessment of monetary policy and inflation, the
key elements in any IT regime10.
Another important development treated in the thesis, is the low inflation
scenario that has characterised monetary policy-making through the 90’s and the
current decade. As suggested by Andersen and Wascher (2), Bowman (19), Rogoff
(107), and Chen et.al (28), several explanations have been proposed: for instance;
institutional factors such as increasing central bank independence, strong commit-
ments to anti-inflationary policies, and the increased competition hypothesis in price
setting behaviour. According to this hypothesis, both the rising trade globalisation
and deregulation witnessed worldwide in the 90s have contributed to the fall in
the market power of price setting firms. As a result, inflation rates have reached
historically low levels both in developed and developing countries11.
In order to undertake an investigation of the increasing competition hy-
pothesis, Chapter 3 sets up a framework whereby substitution on the demand side
occurs when cheaper imported goods appear and trigger a propagation mechanism
10It is worth noticing that the theoretical models in Ce´spedes et.al (26), Cook (33) and Devereux
et.al (39), and the model developed in Chapter 2, are models for tranquil times, not for crisis
episodes akin to a structural regime shift. An important research avenue followed for example in
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (22) does treat financial fragility within such a crisis context.
11Country specific examples can be found in Rogoff (107).
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in non-tradeable prices. This mechanism is conveyed in the claim made in Rogoff
(107, p. 18): “(...) sharp reductions in [tradable goods] prices are bound to create
spillover effects on other sectors. Many traded goods are intermediate goods or, to
some degree, substitutes for non-traded goods”.
As in the previous chapter, Chapter 3 disentangles the dynamics of inflation
exploring yet another type of effect. The resulting inflation equation allows us to
explain how the fall in world inflation might drag down non-tradeable inflation in
a small open economy. This is done by deriving a New-Keynesian Phillips curve
using the assumption of translog preferences12 that allows the price elasticity of
domestically produced goods to depend on foreign price movements. As a result,
the coefficients of the Phillips curve turn out to depend on the real exchange rate.
This chapter is based on Vega and Winkelried (133)13 where translog preferences
are introduced in the same vein.
The second part of the thesis deals with operational issues; notably the
inflation forecast and instrument setting.
The aim for price stability has led many central banks to be keen inflation
forecasters. This has been even more noticeable with the advent of IT. Inflation
forecasts are important in this regime because they are intermediate targets at the
operational level, as proposed in Svensson (121).
Also, inflation forecasts made by central banks, and the formal explanations
of the reasons behind those forecasts, serve as a signalling device for central banks to
communicate how appropriately their actions have been taken. However, forecasts
are in practice subject to a myriad of asymmetric risks that unavoidably affect the
asymmetry of the inflation forecast itself. This has prompted central banks to turn
12As in Bergin and Feenstra (11, 12).
13This paper won the 2004 Rodrigo Gomez Award at the Centre of Latin American Monetary
Studies, a research centre sponsored by Latin American central banks.
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attention to density, instead of point, forecasts14.
IT practitioners rely on model-based forecasts, but also understand the
future is subject to risks that even highly sophisticated models cannot foresee.
In fact, most of the balance of risks, even though they might be rationalised by
models and statistical toolkits on a first pass, are fed by judgements and priors of
decision makers. The purpose of Chapter 4 is precisely to explore this topic. There,
a method, based on Bayesian techniques, is developed to combine model-based
density forecasts with policy makers’ priors.
Density forecast combination is an important area of current research and
of main interest for IT practice. Recently a series of papers by Stephen Hall and
James Mitchell15 propose a powerful method for forecast combination. The method
outlined in Chapter 4 differs from those papers in the definition of what is “optimal”.
In the cited papers, optimality is rightly related to the forecast evaluation view of
forecast error minimisation. In my approach, optimality is taken from a policy-
maker’s perspective: those who are to decide based on a model forecast know the
model is just one input in the decision process. At the time the decision is made,
they might hold priors about the risks likely to unfold in the forecast horizon,
irrespective of the ex-post forecast performance of the model. The final density
forecast then is related to a maximisation of policy-maker’s utility that depends on
a trade-off between his own priors and the model-based density forecast.
Next, in Chapter 5, and following the lead of Chapter 4, I turn to the
interest rate decision, based on the future outlook for inflation16. During policy de-
liberations, policy makers consider the latent risks, the low-probability, high-impact
events and the nature of the shocks17 that shape the probabilistic distribution of
14See Goodhart (56).
15See for example Hall and Mitchell (61), Hall and Mitchell (62) and Hall and Mitchell (63).
16This chapter is based on a version of Vega (131).
17The persistent or transitory nature of the shocks, and the assessment of the shock as supply
or demand driven.
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forecasts. Therefore, I estimate forward-looking interest rate rules first in the same
vein as Clarida et.al (30), Orphanides (98) and Goodhart (58) but next I perform
quantile regression estimations. The advantage of quantile regressions in this con-
text is that we can learn about the likely feedback from forecasts to instruments, not
on the mean value as standard estimations suggest, but on different quantiles of the
distributions18. Thus, I can obtain some added information about the evaluation of
the risks implied in every decision.
Part 3 of the thesis provides an econometric evaluation of the effects of
IT adoption on the dynamics of inflation. The ultimate benchmark of the success
of IT for a country is the delivery of superior outcomes relative to all other pos-
sible monetary policy regimes that might have been adopted instead of IT. The
exercise is complicated because it needs comparison of outcomes with unobservable
counterfactuals.
In the IT evaluation literature, papers like Ball and Sheridan (6), Neumann
and Von Hagen (97), and Levin et.al (83) have performed this evaluation. However,
such exercises are hindered by various reasons: they are mostly concerned with the
evaluation of IT in advanced economies, their choice of counterfactuals tend to be
limited, and they miss robustness checks on different possible IT adoption dates.
In Chapter 6, this exercise is carried out using a technique borrowed from
the programme evaluation literature. First, IT adoption is defined as a treatment,
the ITers are the treated group and all the non-ITers are the control set. Then
the choice of counterfactuals is entirely data-driven from the distribution of coun-
tries which are summarised in a metric called ”propensity score”. The comparison
of outcomes of ITers against their counterfactuals is governed by the propensity
scores, that is, ITers are compared to control countries according to how similar
the countries were before IT adoption. The result of the evaluation confirms the
18Quantile regressions were introduced in Koenker and Bassett (77).
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overwhelming benefit IT has had over the mean and variance of inflation not only
in advanced economies but most significantly in emerging-market countries19.
To sum up, the thesis provides a rigorous treatment of key issues about
IT practice in small open economies. I have introduced models to understand phe-
nomena such as financial dollarisation and the increasing competition hypothesis
in relation to the dynamics of inflation. I have then introduced original modelling
techniques in the monetary policy literature about the implementation of IT consid-
ering the risk embedded not only in the inflation forecast but also in the instrument
decision itself. Finally the thesis provides a preliminary answer of whether IT can
deliver superior outcomes.
As a member of a central bank in an emerging-market country such as Peru,
I am a direct witness of the value of rigorous and model-based thinking as well as
the sheer amount of out-of model analysis of risks in doing policy. It is the aim
of this thesis to contribute to this process bridging the gap between theory and
practice in this type of economy.
19The paper version of this chapter was recently published in the first volume of the International
Journal of Central Banking as Vega and Winkelried (132).
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATES IN A DSGE MODEL OF A
FINANCIALLY DOLLARISED ECONOMY
This chapter presents a DSGE model with financial dollarisation features. The role
of financial dollarisation in this type of models is tantamount to the existence of a
non-trivial role for financial intermediation (through the presence of agency costs)
and therefore to the presence of a general credit channel of monetary policy. The
specific form of this credit channel in the context of New-Keynesian Phillips curves
has not been directly treated in the current literature. One contribution of this
chapter is to provide an inflation equation that takes into account the presence of
agency costs and financial dollarisation.
A second purpose of the chapter is to study the link between agency costs,
financial dollarisation and the restrictions they impose to monetary policy. In par-
ticular, the question the chapter intends to address is to what extent different types
of inflation targets affect the evolution of the economy under the presence of agency
costs.
In the chapter, financial dollarisation is explicit as both the assets of house-
holds and the liabilities of firms that produce and generate non-tradeable income
are dollarised. It is assumed that there are two productive sectors in the home
country; the sector that produces non-tradable goods Yh,t and a sector that pro-
duces an exogenous amount of a ”traditional” tradable good Yf,t. The sector that
produces non-tradable goods is composed of heterogeneous wholesalers who face a
credit-in-advanced constraint as in Cooley and Nam (34) or Carslstrom and Fuerst
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(25). The heterogeneity of wholesalers (borrowers) stems from idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks affecting these firms. The resulting structure allows for the existence
of standard debt contracts between banks and each wholesaler. A particular feature
of this contract is the existence of a mark-up margin in wholesale prices that results
in order to cover the deadweight losses imposed by the existence of agency costs.
In order to model a non-trivial role for monetary policy, sticky-prices are
introduced by assuming monopolistic retailers as in Bernanke et.al (13). As known,
retailer prices will also sell at a mark-up over marginal cost due to the market power
structure assumed. The overall result is a dynamics of prices and inflation influenced
by these two distortions: agency costs and monopolistic competition. In fact, a key
contribution of the chapter is the derivation of the Phillips curve that bears the
same New-Keynesian features as observed in Clarida et al. (31) or Woodford (137)
but incorporates a term that depends on the degree of agency cost distortions.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 provides the general mod-
elling framework, section 2.2 sets up the canonical log-linearised system and section
2.3 performs the assessment of three different types of inflation targeting regimes
under a series of shocks and section 2.4 concludes. Appendix A provides technical
derivations.
2.1 Framework
This chapter presents a small open economy model where imports are traded using
the dollar as a medium of exchange within the boundaries of the domestic country.
In order to have a role for monetary policy the nominal rigidity introduced is a
staggered price setting structure on the part of firms. The broad view is that there
are two productive sectors in the home country. The country produces non-tradable
goods Yh,t and an exogenous amount of a ”traditional” commodity tradable good Yf,t
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whose price is determined exogenously in the world market1. Non-tradable goods
production is made by monopolistic competitive firms that set prices. However, the
setting of prices is made in a staggered way due to the fact that pricing decisions
can not be made continuously. In my framework, this results in a Phillips kind of
curve for the supply of non-tradables with both a backward and a forward looking
component in inflation2.
The next subsections analyse the behaviour of households, firms, foreigners
and the monetary authority. Before doing so, it is convenient to summarise the
model environment:
• A small open economy is analysed. However, domestic consumers do not
have access to internationally traded assets. The country is not financially
sophisticated. In this sense the financial market is fairly incomplete.
• However there is foreign trade in goods. Consumers are offered foreign goods,
firms depend on foreign inputs and there are export-only firms that produce
primary commodities.
• Within the borders of the economy, consumers do have access to assets de-
nominated in both, pesos and dollars. These are offered by domestic financial
intermediaries. This feature captures dollarisation of assets on the portfolio
of domestic consumers.
• Domestic financial intermediaries do have access to foreign borrowing/lending.
1One feature of emerging market economies is precisely the fact that their exports heavily
depend on commodities.
2These hybrid Phillips curves have been analysed in Gali and Gertler (51). A negative assess-
ment is found in Ball et.al (5).
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2.1.1 Households
A typical household maximises the expected present value of utility3 over future
consumption levels and labour.
∞∑
s=t
Et
[
βs−t
(
C1−δs − 1
1− δ −
N1+νs − 1
1 + ν
)]
(2-1)
subject to the following resource constraint
Ds+1+ EsBs+1 = Is−1Ds+ EsIfs−1Bs+ (Es−Es−1Es)Bs+WsNs−PsCs+Ωs (2-2)
For every period s = t, t + 1, ... and where Ds and Bs represent peso and
dollar denominated assets purchased at the beginning of time s − 1 and held up
to the beginning of time s when a new decision about assets holdings is made,
Is−1 = (1 + is−1) is the gross interest rate paid by the peso assets bought at the
beginning of time s−1, likewise Ifs−1 = (1+ ifs−1) is the corresponding gross interest
rate paid by the dollar asset. Es is the nominal exchange rate defined as the peso
price of one dollar. Both types of assets (Ds and Bs) have only a one-period maturity
and can be thought of as deposits in a domestic financial intermediary. Households
in this economy do not trade assets directly with the foreign sector, they are net
savers 4. The term (Es−Es−1Es)Bs−1 captures the accounting adjustment needed to
explain capital gains or losses. This means that if there is an unexpected depreciation
of the currency, then there is a positive peso valued capital gain from holding dollar-
denominated assets.
3Given that monetary policy uses the nominal interest rate rule as instrument, money holdings
from the utility function are left out.
4To ensure that households are net savers in the steady-state, certain conditions on the param-
eters are needed.
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There are two arguments in the above utility function5; an overall consump-
tion index Ct and a measure of labour supply Nt.
The variable Ct is an aggregate Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
consumption index
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
h,t + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
f,t
] η
η−1
(2-3)
Where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods. A large value of η indicates high substitution while a value of η → 1 imposes
almost no possibility of substitution.
In this world, home goods (non tradables) are consumed in a variety of
ways which are aggregated in the index Ch,t which is defined as
Ch,t =
 1∫
0
Ch,t(j)
θ−1
θ dj

θ
θ−1
(2-4)
Here the parameter θ > 1 measures the degree of substitutability among
the different home goods. High substitutability implies lower market power to the
producers of the different types. Let’s define two important relative prices
• The real domestic price ratio is the price of non-tradable prices Ph,t relative
to the consumer based price index Pt (to be defined later)
St =
Ph,t
Pt
(2-5)
• The real exchange rate is defined as the ratio of the peso price of imports Pf,t
to the consumer based price index6
5In this equation the parameters 1/ν, and 1/δ measure constant intertemporal elasticities of
substitution.
6It is perhaps important to define a more accurate measure of real exchange rate; the price of
tradables in terms of non-tradables (sometimes also refereed as terms of trade): Tt = Pf,tPh,t =
Qt
St
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Qt =
Pf,t
Pt
=
EtP ∗t
Pt
(2-6)
Note that from the perspective of the home country, the dollar price of the
imported good abroad P ∗t is given
7, which means that the domestic price of that
good evolves according to: Pf,t = EtP ∗t . The domestic price of the imported good
moves one-to-one with the nominal exchange rate which implies a pass-through
equal to one; however, the pass-through to the consumer price index Pt depends
also on the equilibrium effect of the exchange rate on domestic producer prices set
by firms that sell final goods.
Intratemporal consumption decisions:
Given an optimal choice of Ct in a specific period, the intratemporal con-
sumption decision hinges on the choices of home and foreign consumption that
minimise the expenditure for given prices Pt, Ph,t and Pf,t. The solution is given by
the following decision rules
Ch,t = (1− α)S−ηt Ct (2-7)
Cf,t = αQ
−η
t Ct (2-8)
It is clear from these equations that the home and foreign good consumption
levels depend negatively on the real domestic price ratio and on the real exchange
rate respectively. For a constant overall consumption Ct, an exchange rate spot
depreciation reduces St and raises Qt, thereby there is a substitution in consumption
from foreign goods to home goods.
The consumption based price index summarises the relationship between
Ph,t and Pf,t and it is given by
8
7As usual, starred variables designate variables in the foreign country.
8Note that from the definition of the overall consumer price index:
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Pt =
[
(1− α)P 1−ηh,t + αP 1−ηf,t
] 1
1−η (2-9)
Using the same previous procedure, the demand for the different varieties
of goods produced domestically is given by
Ch,t(j) =
(
Ph,t
Ph,t(j)
)θ
Ch,t (2-10)
These consumption rules are defined given an overall home price index Ph,t,
a price for the specific variety of good (set by the retailer) Ph,t(j) and by the level of
overall home consumption Ch,t. Likewise, the aggregate home price index is defined
by
Ph,t =
 1∫
0
Ph,t(j)
1−θdj

1
1−θ
(2-11)
Knowledge of these equations is important insofar as they depict the evo-
lution of prices, given the retailer’s price setting behaviour to be described in Sub-
section 2.1.4.
Intertemporal consumption decision:
The first order condition for the optimal intertemporal consumption deci-
sion that solves [2-1] subject to [2-2] is
C−δt
Pt
= βEt
[
C−δt+1
Pt+1
It
]
(2-12)
This equation has the standard meaning; the left hand side is the utility
loss of forgoing consumption of 1
Pt
units of the composite consumption basket while
the right hand side is the gain from the extra utility generated by the additional
next period consumption made possible by higher current savings.
(1− α)S1−ηt + αQ1−ηt = 1
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Intratemporal portfolio decisions:
In order for both types of assets to be valued positively in consumer’s
preferences and hence to avoid corner solutions, it must be true that the uncovered
interest parity holds between peso dollar asset returns (see Appendix A1)
It = Et [Et+1]Et I
f
t (2-13)
Intratemporal labour supply decision:
The labour supply decision is made according to a standard condition that
equates the real wage and the marginal disutility of labour
N νt C
δ
t =
Wt
Pt
(2-14)
As with the previous household choice rules, the supply of labour depends
on the aggregate consumption index. The dynamic properties of labour supply
depend upon the dynamics of the aggregate consumption index Ct through the
Euler condition.
2.1.2 Financial intermediaries
They receive deposits from households and foreigners and lend to domestic firms.
The timing of the actions is as follows
• At the beginning of time t they pay the outstanding deposit debt plus the in-
terest rate accrued to households and foreigners for funds offered the previous
period.
It−1Dt + EtIft−1Bt + EtIft−1B∗t + (Et − Et−1Et) (Bt +B∗t ) (2-15)
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of financial intermediary’s actions within any period.
Receive
peso and dollar
deposits
Receive loan
repayments or
seize scrap value
of default firms
↓ ↓
↓ ↓ ↓
Pay outstanding
deposits to
households
Offer peso and
dollar loans to
firms
Distribute
profits
Where: Ift = I∗t Vt. The domestic dollar interest rate incorporates the foreign
benchmark interest rate I∗t and a factor Vt = (1 + νt) that accounts for country
risk9.
• Immediately afterwards, financial intermediaries offer households new stocks
of both types of deposits: Dt+1 and Bt+1. At the same time, an amount of
deposits is offered to foreigners at the return10 Ift .
• Next, financial intermediaries offer loans to wholesale firms. These firms need
to borrow in advance to be able to buy production inputs. The amounts lent
by financial intermediaries in pesos and dollars are Lh,t and Lf,t respectively.
The sources of fund available to financial intermediaries are twofold; the pe-
sos and dollars deposited by domestic consumers plus any amount of pesos
borrowed from the central bank and dollars borrowed abroad. Financial inter-
mediaries have to hold compulsory reserves calculated as a fraction of deposits
made last period.
Lsh,t ≡ Dt+1 +∆Mb,t − ζDDt (2-16)
9This variable can be endogenised like in Ce´spedes et.al (26) or Mendoza (94). However, this
is not done here because the purpose of the chapter is different.
10Due to the country-risk parameter, foreigners need to be paid more than the riskless benchmark
foreign rate Ift > I∗t .
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Lsf,t ≡ Bt+1 +B∗t+1 − ζB (Bt +B∗t ) (2-17)
Here ∆Mb,t is the net position of financial intermediaries assets at the central
bank and B∗t+1 is the net position of financial intermediaries dollar assets with
the foreign sector11. If ∆Mb,t is positive then financial intermediaries take
a short-term loan (to be re-paid in the same period), otherwise they make
deposits at the central bank.
• The loan repayment is subject to agency costs because there is asymmet-
ric information regarding the productivity of firms. Firms learn about their
idiosyncratic shock to productivity before due repayment of their debts. Un-
productive firms are insolvent and cannot pay their debt. Hence, financial
intermediaries sign the same debt contract with all firms so that they can
raise ”enough” expected funds from intermediation.
2.1.3 Wholesale firms
Every period a continuum of firms in the unit interval is born. They all produce a
homogeneous good. They face a credit-in-advance constraint in their purchases of
production inputs. As in Cooley and Nam (34), this means that before production
takes place, they have to borrow an amount equal to their entire input bill.
They borrow pesos and dollars before the idiosyncratic productivity shock
realises and they repay or default after production and sale but before the next
period starts. At the end of each period all firms die; either after setting their
transfers to households or after default.12
11The presence of ∆Mb,t mimics the typical standing facility offered by the central bank at
date t (a marginal lending facility or a deposit facility). In fact, this is the rationale whereby the
central bank can control the short term interest rate of the economy. Though, the specific process
of nominal interest rate setting is not modelled here. Here ∆Mb,t only works as an extra variable
left to clear the market.
12This crucial assumption precludes accumulation of net worth by firms.
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The technology they use to produce these goods is given by
Yh,t(i) = $itAtN
a
itJ
1−a
it (2-18)
Here, $it is an idiosyncratic productivity shock assumed to be i.i.d across
time and firms with density function φ($), c.d.f Φ($), unconditional expectation
E[$it] = 1 and support on the bounded interval [$l, $u]. At is an aggregate
productivity shock. Nit is the labour input and Jit is the imported intermediate
input.
The credit-in-advance constraints for any firm i in pesos and dollars are
given respectively by
Lh,i,t ≡ WtNit (2-19)
Lf,i,t ≡ P ∗t Jit (2-20)
Where Wt and P
∗
t are the peso price of labour and the dollar price of the
imported input respectively.
Figure 2.2: Timeline of firms actions within any period.
Borrow
pesos and
dollars
Production
Firms
are born
↓ Idiosyncratic
shock
↓ Firms
die
↓ ↓ ↓
Purchase
production
inputs
Repay
debt or
default
Transfer
profits to
households
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The nominal value of wholesale production considers the fact that non-
tradeable production is sold at the wholesale home price Pwh,t. Conveniently replac-
ing [2-19] and [2-20] into [2-18] yields
Pwh,tYh,t(i) = Gt$itL
a
h,i,tL
1−a
f,i,t (2-21)
Where Gt = AtS
w
t
(
Pt
Wt
)a (
Pt
P ∗t
)1−a
groups the aggregate determinants of
firm i production and Swt =
Pwh,t
Pt
represents the relative price of wholesale goods.
The design of the financial contract
A key assumption to endogenise financial intermediation is that after loans
are taken and inputs enter into production, each firm i privately observes its id-
iosyncratic shock $it. If any other agent wants to learn about firm i’s shock, that
agent has to incur in auditing or monitoring costs. The existence of asymmetric
information between firms and the rest of the agents and the introduction of a costly
hidden-state verification induces the existence of financial intermediation as shown
in Diamond (41).
The optimal contract that emerges from this type of setup has been solved
in Gale and Hellwig (50)13. For risk neutral firms and financial intermediaries, the
optimal, incentive compatible contract is a risky-debt contract.
The contract14 at each time t and for every firm i hinges on finding the
optimal loan demand levels of Lh,i,t, Lf,i,t, the return to the financial intermediary
I˜t and a cutoff level of idiosyncratic productivity shock $o,i,t that breaks even
performing and non-performing loans. These optimal values are such that a) they
maximise the expected return of the firm (Equation [2-22])and b) they allow the
13And applied in Bernanke et.al (13) and Carslstrom and Fuerst (25) among others.
14The contract in this setup has an intra-periodic nature. Long-term contracting is not possible
given my assumption about the type of borrowers (short-lived and atomistic). Inter-periodic
contracting made by long-lived agents would induce less severe agency costs.
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financial intermediary to get expected returns from intermediation at least as high
as its cost of funds (its participation constraint - Equation [2-23]). Formally,
Max
Lh,i,t, Lf,i,t
I˜t, $o,i,t
$u∫
$o,t
[
Gt$L
a
h,i,tL
1−a
f,i,t − I˜t (Lh,i,t + EtLf,i,t)
]
φ($)d$ (2-22)
s.a: ∫ $u
$o,t
I˜t [Lh,i,t + EtLf,i,t]φ($)d$ + · · ·∫ $o,t
$l
[
Gt$L
a
h,i,tL
1−a
f,i,,t − λGt$Lah,i,tL1−af,i,,t
]
φ($)d$ + Zt ≥ Xt
(2-23)
Gt$o,tL
a
h,i,tL
1−a
f,i,t = I˜t (Lh,i,t + EtLf,i,t) (2-24)
Where
Xt = ItDt+1 + It∆Mb,t + EtIft
(
Bt+1 +B
∗
t+1
)
+ (Et − Et−1Et) (Bt +B∗t )
Zt = ζDDt + ζBEt (Bt +B∗t )
The expected return of the firm is given by the expected production value
minus the loan repayment. Loan repayment is only possible if the firms does not
default. If the firm defaults, it obtains nothing.
On the other hand, the expected return of lending considers the expected
repayment received from firms and the expected residual claims of the financial
intermediary over the firms production in case of default. Monitoring costs are a
proportion of the size of the production value. The constraint [2-23] means that the
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expected return of the financial intermediary plus the zero gross return from holding
”required reserves” have to be at least equal to the funds the financial intermedi-
aries promised to depositors (Xt) which also includes the funds to make up for the
expected capital losses or gains15. On the other hand, Zt is an exogenous amount
of cash that financial intermediaries have to hold (obligatory reserve requirements
as is standard in some emerging market economies). This amount of reserves is
determined as a fraction ζ of the value of deposits made in the previous period.
Appendix A1 follows Gertler et.al (53) to show that this problem can be
written in the following compact form
Max
Lh,i,t, Lf,i,t
$o,i,t
[1− Γ($o,i,t)]GtLah,i,tL1−af,i,t (2-25)
s.a.
[Γ($o,i,t)− λΥ($o,i,t)]GtLah,i,tL1−af,i,t + ζDDt + ζBEt (Bt +B∗t ) ≥ Xt (2-26)
The functions Γ(.) and λΥ(.) represent the expected share of output that
goes to the financial intermediary and the expected monitoring costs16 respectively.
The cutoff point $o,i,t is positive and finite and does not depend on idiosyncratic
factors (hence $o,i,t = $
e
o,t). A variable that rises as an important determinant on
the solutions is the ratio Swt /mct which represents how much higher the real price
of wholesale goods (Swt ) has to be in excess of the marginal financial cost mct that
arises in the absence of agency costs.
The optimal equilibrium loan levels are give by
15The funds to be obtained by financial intermediation treat realised capital gains and losses
alike. Ceteris-paribus, more funds are needed to make up for capital losses and less funds for the
case of capital gains. This does not need be so.
16The properties of Γ(.) and Υ(.) are outlined in Appendix A1 along the lines of Bernanke et.al
(13).
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Lh,t =
a
It
Rr,t
fm,t
(2-27)
Lf,t =
(1− a)
EtIft
Rr,t
fm,t
(2-28)
Where Rr,t represent the provisions to deal with the opportunity cost of
holding non-interest bearing reserves and capital gains or losses. It is defined by
Rr,t = ζD(It − 1)Dt + ζBEt(Ift − 1) (Bt +B∗t ) + (Et − Et−1Et) (Bt +B∗t )
And fm,t is the financial margin defined as the return of the lending activity
in excess of the payment of interests to depositors
fm,t =
[
Γ($eo,t)− λΥ($eo,t)
]( Swt
mct
)
− 1
Both equilibrium peso and dollar loan levels depend positively on the re-
spective share in the Cobb-Douglas production function and on the provision Rr,t,
whereas they depend negatively on the financial margin fm,t. The sign of the de-
pendence of the interest rate is not conclusive because rising interest rates mean
also that the provisions must also rise.
Lastly, the lending interest rate determined by the financial contract is
proportional to both the cutoff productivity point and the ratio Swt /mct. Namely,
the size of the lending rate is directly given by the extent of agency costs.
I˜t = $o,t
(
Swt
mct
)
(2-29)
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2.1.4 Retailers and price setting
Following Bernanke et.al (13) and Gertler et.al (53), the model assumes that there
is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers on the unit range. Retailers
buy the amount Y˜h,t of wholesale goods from firms and financial intermediaries
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at the price Pwh,t and then costlessly differentiate the product. As a result the cost
function results in:
Cost
(
Pwh,t
)
= Pwh,tY˜h,t
(
Pwh,t
)
(2-30)
Importantly, prices are set in a staggered way. So, following Calvo (23) and
Yun (138) the chapter derives a Phillips curve relationship between home inflation
and ”marginal costs” incurred in the acquisition of non-tradables from wholesalers.
It is assumed that, at any time, state of the world and regardless of his-
tory, any firm j has a probability γ to face institutional restrictions that make it
impossible to set current prices in an optimal way18. With probability 1−γ instead,
any firm has the opportunity to choose a new optimal price P oph,t(j) that maximises
the discounted sum of expected future profits. Because each home producer that
chooses its new price in period t faces exactly the same problem, the optimal price
P oph,t(j) is the same for each of them. Hence, in equilibrium, all optimally chosen
prices are equal to P oph,t.
Woodford (137) shows that in order to account for reasonable impulse re-
sponse functions (hump-shaped response of inflation) after a monetary policy shock,
the inflation rate must have some backward looking component. This is achieved
through non-optimal indexation of prices through past inflation. Which implies
17 Given that a fraction of firms default, financial intermediaries get the scrap value of production
after the monitoring cost is incurred. Afterwards, they sell the seized product to retailers. Basically
Y˜h,t < Yh,t.
18So γ is a measure of price stickiness. A high value of this parameter on the unit range means
that the degree of price stickiness is high.
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that the home price index evolves according to
P 1−θh,t = (1− γ)
[
P oph,t
]1−θ
+ γ [Πh,t−1Ph,t−1]
1−θ (2-31)
The dynamics of this price index, is determined recursively by knowing
its initial value and the single new price P oph,t that is chosen each period. The
determination of P oph,t, in turn, depends upon current and expected future demand
conditions for the individual home good. The choice of P oph,t is such that it maximises
the present value of the expected future profit conditional on the price being indexed
through past accumulated inflation whenever it can not be adjusted optimally.
Max
P opth,t
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkβft,t+k
{[
Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
]
P oph,t − Pwh,t+k
}
Y˜h,t+k
]
(2-32)
Subject to a sequence of demand constraints
Y˜h,t+k(j) =
 Ph,t+k(
Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
)
P oph,t(j)
θ Ch,t+k (2-33)
Where βft,t+k is the discount factor of the t+k monetary flows back to period
t. Given that households are the ultimate owners of all type of firms, this monetary
discount factor takes into account the discount factor implicit in the consumption
Euler equation. Namely
βft,t+k = β
k Uc(Ct+k)
Uc(Ct)
Pt
Pt+k
. Maximisation of the above problem yields
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
γkβfirmt,t+k Y˜h,t+k
{[
Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
]
P oph,t − µPt+k.Swt+k
}]
= 0 (2-34)
This condition states that the best retailers can do, given that they cannot
set prices flexibly every period is to set the price such that it incorporates all the
chances that they will keep the chosen price in the future. Instead of setting prices
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P oph,t equal to a mark-up over marginal cost (as a flexible price-setter would do),
these constrained price setters set P oph,t roughly equal to a weighted average of future
expected marginal costs that will prevail given that P oph,t remains unchanged.
2.1.5 Foreigners
The resource constraint in the foreign sector imposes the following equality valued
in dollars.
Pf,t(Yf,t − Cf,t − Jt) + EtB∗t+1 − Ift−1EtB∗t − (Et − Et−1Et)B∗t = 0 (2-35)
2.1.6 Monetary policy authority
Monetary policy is conducted by means of an ad-hoc rule. The instrument is the
gross domestic interest rate It which is assumed to behave according to a rule that
reacts systematically to inflation and output.
It = (It−1)ρ
[(
Πh,t+1
Π˜
)χpih ( Qt
Qt−1
)αχpi
1−α
(
Y˜h,t
Y˜ h
)χy
If
](1−ρ)
exp(ξmt ) (2-36)
Where If is the steady-state domestic dollar interest rate and ξmt represents
monetary policy shocks. The parameter ρ captures monetary policy inertia. Within
the systematic component of the rule χpih and χpi measure the sensitivity of the
instrument to inflation deviations and χy measures the policy makers concern about
economic activity.
The systematic behaviour defines three possible types of central banker. If
the inflation targeting regime is in place, the values of the coefficients χpih, χpi and
χy characterise possible types of inflation targeting.
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The strict home-inflation targeting regime reacts only to deviations of home
inflation from target Πh,t+1, (χpih > 0, χpi = χy = 0). Real exchange rate movements
are only of concern insofar as they affect the marginal cost of firms and hence home-
price setting behaviour.
The strict CPI inflation targeting regime is defined as interest rates reacting
to total CPI inflation only (χpih = χpi > 0 and χy = 0). This implies a concern
for imported goods prices as well and therefore for a stronger concern about real
exchange rate movements than that of the strict-home inflation targeting regime.
The third regime to be considered is a flexible inflation targeting regime
where χpih = χpi > 0 with χy > 0. In this case the monetary authority also
tries to smooth fluctuations in non-tradeable output. In this regime, therefore, the
monetary authority is even more concerned about real exchange rate movements.
2.2 The solution to the log-linear approximation
2.2.1 The steady-state
The deterministic steady-state19 is characterised by values of exogenous variables
equal to their unconditional means: Yf,t = Yf , I
∗
t = I
∗, Ift = I
∗V , Π∗t = Π
∗ = β∗I∗,
At = A and a long-run monetary policy stance that sets the domestic interest rate
such that: I = If . Also, in the long run, the real exchange rate Qt clears the
market for both the imported and exported goods. Given an infinitely elastic world
net demand, it is assumed that the real exchange rate at which world net demand
is infinitely elastic is Q = 1. This assumption is helpful insofar as it allows the real
retail price S = 1 and poph = 1. The direct implication is that aggregate consumption
of non-tradeables and imported goods are Ch = (1− α)C and Cf = αC. Inasmuch
as the monetary authority sets the domestic nominal interest rate in such away that
19The steady-state value of any variable xt will be denoted by x.
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it will not depart from the foreign monetary policy, then the nominal exchange rate
evolution, as defined by the UIP condition (equation [2-13]), will result in a constant
path (Et+1 = Et = E). Namely, the long-run trajectory of the nominal exchange
rate is basically a function of the long-run monetary policy stance.
From the Euler equation the real interest rate R consistent with consump-
tion decisions is assumed to be equal to the long-run US real interest R∗ = 1
β∗
rate adjusted by country risk V. With the real interest rate already pinned down
by preference parameters, the resulting steady-state inflation is conditioned by the
long-run monetary policy stance using I/Π = 1/β. Since monetary policy sets the
interest rate I equal to If = I∗V then the inflation rate achieved in the steady-state
is exactly the same as the steady-state world inflation: Π = Π∗
The households budget constraint in real terms can be determined denot-
ing dt+1 =
Dt+1
Pt
, bt+1 =
Bt+1
P ∗t
and b∗t+1 =
B∗t+1
P ∗t
. After some manipulation of the
households budget constraint (equation [2-2])
d+ b =
(
β
1− β
)
(C − wN − ω) (2-37)
Here, wN + ω denotes the total real wage income and the real value of
transfers households receive from all firms and financial intermediaries. A positive
amount of steady-state real deposits is only possible if C > wN + ω. This is
tantamount to households being able to afford high real consumption given the
steady stream of interest rate gain on deposits.
Tradeable production
Since tradeable production is obtained from a costless and labourless ran-
dom effort, its net production value is transferred to their ultimate owners, the
households, then from equation [a12] in the appendix
ωf = Yf (2-38)
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Non-tradeable wholesale production
The marginal cost20 of the wholesaler if there were no agency costs is de-
noted by mc
mc =
Λ
A
Ifwa (2-39)
The real wholesale price Sw has been defined as the ratio of the wholesale
price to the CPI price level . The presence of frictions in the financial system implies
that Sw needs to be larger than the real marginal cost mc. Wholesale goods are
sold at a premium due to the deadweight losses imposed by the presence of agency
costs. The ratio S
w
mc
is defined by
Sw
mc
=
A
µΛIfwa (2-40)
The amount of real profits that non-tradeable wholesale firms have to trans-
fer to households (their ultimate owners) is determined by the expected value of
production kept by firms (see Appendix A1, equation [a11])
ωh =
[1− Γ ($o)]
µ
Yh (2-41)
Retailers
The pricing equation [2-34], together with the fact that poph =
(
P oph,t/Pt
)
= 1
imposes the standard result whereby the marginal cost to the retailer Sw has to
equal the inverse of the markup 1
µ
. On the other hand, the equilibrium aggregate
supply of retailer firms has to equal non-tradeable consumption
Y˜h = Ch = (1− α)C (2-42)
Finally, retailers transfer monopolistic profits due to the mark-up of retailer
prices over wholesale prices.
ωr =
(
µ− 1
µ
)
Y˜h =
(
µ− 1
µ
)
[1− λΥ($o)]Yh (2-43)
20See the Definition A1.2 in Appendix A1.
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Financial intermediaries
From equation [a10] in Appendix A1, the transfers from financial interme-
diaries to households amounts to
ωb =
(
If − I
f
Π∗
)
(d+ b+ b∗) (2-44)
Total transfers
Summing up all the transfers in [2-38], [2-41], [2-43] and [2-44] allows us to
obtain the total transfers going to households
ω = Yf +
(
Π∗
β
− 1
β
)
(d+ b+ b∗) +
(
1− Γ ($o)
1− λΥ($o) + µ− 1
)
(1− α)
µ
C (2-45)
Replacing [2-45] in [2-37]
(Π∗ − β) (d+ b) + (Π∗ − 1) b∗ =[
1−
(
1−Γ($o)
1−λΥ($o) + µ− 1
)
(1−α)
µ
]
βC − βwN − βYf
(2-46)
Labour market
The supply of labour is given by N = w
1
νC
−δ
ν while the demand is N = lh
w
.
The demand for labour depends on the real peso loan quantity21 lh which is given
by22
lh =
a
If
(If − 1) ζ
Π∗ (d+ b+ b
∗)(
Γ($o)−λΥ($o)
µ
)
1
mc
− 1
(2-47)
Importantly, this real peso loan quantity is equal to the real peso deposits
lh = wN = d
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
(2-48)
Market for imported input
21 Derived from the equilibrium loan equation [2-27].
22For ease of solution, a convenient assumption is ζD = ζB = ζ
40
In steady-state equilibrium the quantity of imported input is determined
by the real dollar loan quantity which in turn is equal to the real dollar deposits in
the domestic financial system
J = lf = (b+ b
∗)
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
(2-49)
Given this condition, the imported input is determined by
J =
(1− a)
If
(If − 1) ζ
Π∗ (d+ b+ b
∗)(
Γ($o)−λΥ($o)
µ
)
1
mc
− 1
Asset and Liability dollarisation in the steady state
From the previous equations, the asset and liability dollarisation ratios are
the same and equal to the share of imported inputs in the production of non-tradable
goods
ldr =
lf
lf + lh
= 1− a and adr = b+ b
∗
b+ b∗ + d
= 1− a
In steady-state, non-tradable production can be defined in terms of the loan
capacity of the financial system (long run liquidity) (d+ b+ b∗) net of compulsory
reserves, the nominal cost of funds If and the benchmark financial marginal cost
mc. From solving the first order conditions in Appendix A1 and using equations
[2-48] and [2-49]
Yh =
If
mc
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
(d+ b+ b∗) (2-50)
External sector
From equation [2-35] Equilibrium vis-a-vis the rest of the world implies
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Yf = αC + J +
(
1− β
β
)
b∗ (2-51)
Solution procedure
The solution hinges in replacing wN = d
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
and Yf = αC +
(b+ b∗)
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
+
(
1−β
β
)
b∗ within [2-46] to get
(
Π∗ − βζ
Π∗
)
(d+ b+ b∗) =
(
Γ ($o)− λΥ($o)
1− λΥ($o)
)
(1− α)
µ
βC (2-52)
Taking the market clearing condition for retail goods Y˜h = (1 − α)C and
knowing that the amount of retail goods is related to the amount of wholesale goods
via Y˜h = [1− λΥ($o)]Yh
Yh =
(1− α)
1− λΥ($o)C (2-53)
This allows to write [2-50] as
(d+ b+ b∗) =
mc
If (1− ζ
Π∗
) (1− α)
1− λΥ($o)C (2-54)
And combining the expressions for (d + b + b∗) in [2-52] results in an ex-
pression that relates S
w
mc
to the equilibrium cutoff level $o
SW1 : ... S
w
mc
=
1− βζ
(Π∗)2
(1− ζΠ∗ )(Γ($o)−λΥ($o))
(2-55)
Equation [2-55] together with the solution for $o in terms of
Sw
mc
charac-
terised in the intra-period equilibrium analysed in [a6] and [a7]
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SW2 : ... $o = $o(
Sw
mc
) (2-56)
determine the equilibrium values for $o and
Sw
mc
1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45
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ϖ
Sw
/m
c
SW1
SW2
↑
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium values of S
w
mc and $o.
Once these values are pinned down, it is straightforward to disentangle the
other variables.The equilibrium real wage rate is determined using the definition of
mc
w =
(
Amc
ΛIf
) 1
a
(2-57)
In order to determine the steady-state consumption level, the equilibrium
labour has to be solved first. On the labour supply schedule
N = (w)
1
ν (C)
−δ
ν = A1 (C)
−δ
ν (2-58)
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So A1 = (w)
1
ν
On the other hand, the labour demand schedule
N =
a
w (If )2
ζ (1− α)mc
Π∗
(
1− ζ
Π∗
)
(1− λΥ($o))
1[
Γ($o)−λΥ($o)
µ
1
mc
− 1
]C = A2C (2-59)
Where A2 =
a
w(If)2
ζ(1−α)mc
Π∗(1− ζΠ∗ )(1−λΥ($o))
1
[Γ($o)−λΥ($o)µ
1
mc
−1]
Therefore
C =
(
A1
A2
) 1
1+ δν
(2-60)
Once consumption is determined all the rest of the variables are uniquely
pinned down
2.2.2 The log-linear approximation
In the approximation the variables are expressed in the form x̂t = (xt − x) /x,
where x is the steady-state value of the variable xt. The model outlined here can
be approximated by 10 structural equations23
1. The equation for home prices is a typical hybrid Neo-Keynesian Phillips curve
with past and expected next-period inflation. It also depends positively on the
real exchange rate and the wholesale real price (See Section A2.1 in Appendix
A2)
Π̂h,t = (1−B1) Π̂h,t−1 +B1Et
[
Π̂h,t+1
]
+B2Ŝ
w
t +B3Q̂t (2-61)
Where:
B1 =
β
1+β
> 0
B2 =
1
(1+β)
1−γ
γ
(1− γβ) > 0
B3 =
α
1−αB2 > 0
23See Appendix A2 for the derivation of the structural equations.
44
The wholesale real price Ŝwt represents the marginal cost the retailer has to
face. This wholesale real price is affected by agency costs as seen later in
[2-67]. The extent of how Ŝwt affects home inflation is determined by the
parameter B2. When the degree of price stickiness γ is small (more firms can
adjust their prices in every period) then B2 tends to be large and therefore
home inflation is more responsive to changes in Ŝwt
The real exchange Q̂t appears in the equation because it affects the pricing
decisions of those retailers that can optimally choose new prices in period t.
An increase in Q̂t prompts a consumption substitution towards home goods
and therefore affects the demand conditions home-good producers face. The
parameter B3 can be interpreted as a partial pass-through coefficient. Note
that the pass-through coefficient is positively related to the degree of openness
α but it is negatively related to the degree of price stickiness γ
2. The aggregate consumption equation is the standard log-linearised form of
the consumption Euler equation [2-12]. Movements in the nominal policy
rate Ît, insofar as they produce similar movements in the real interest rate24,
affect consumption directly via the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
substitution δ−1. A higher value of δ−1 makes aggregate consumption more
reactive to changes in nominal interest rates
Ĉt = Et
[
Ĉt+1
]
− 1
δ
(
Ît − Et
[
Π̂t+1
])
(2-62)
24Note that [2-62] can be solved forward:
Ĉt = lim
s→∞Et
[
Ĉt+s
]
− 1
δ
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(
Ît+s − Π̂t+s+1
)]
From here, the long-run real interest is Rlrt = Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(
Ît+s − Π̂t+s+1
)]
. Then Ĉt = − 1δRlrt i.e
consumption is affected only to the extent that Rlrt is affected.
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3. The policy rate set by the monetary authority has a simple log-linear form
(See Appendix A2). It is a weighted average of persistent and systematic
behaviour. The systematic behaviour implies interest rates reacting to three
possible components. The way these components are weighted characterise the
types of policy regime under analysis. For example, a strict home-inflation
targeting regime is defined by in χpih > 0, χpi = χy = 0. A strict CPI inflation
targeter is obtained by setting χpih = χpi > 0 and χy = 0 and a flexible inflation
targeter is obtained by setting χpih = χpi > 0 with χy > 0.
Ît = ρÎt−1 + (1− ρ)
[
χpihEt
[
Π̂h,t+1
]
+
(
α
1−α
)
χpi
(
Q̂t − Q̂t−1
)
+ χyĈh,t
]
+ ξmt
(2-63)
Direct isolation of the policy stance from real exchange rate fluctuations is
only possible under the strict home inflation targeting regime.
4. From the non-arbitrage condition between peso and dollar interest rates
Ît = Et
[
Êt+1
]
− Êt + Îft (2-64)
This is the standard uncovered interest parity condition. This equation gov-
erns the nominal exchange rate dynamics25
5. From the definition of the real exchange rate
Q̂t − Q̂t−1 = Êt − Êt−1 +
(
Π̂∗t − Π̂t
)
(2-65)
6. The overall CPI inflation rate is defined in terms of the home inflation and
the real exchange rate change
25Note that [2-64] can be solved forward to get
Êt = lim
i→∞
Et
[
Êt+s
]
− Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(
Ît+s − Îft+s
)]
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Π̂t = Π̂h,t +
α
1−α
(
Q̂t − Q̂t−1
)
(2-66)
7. The wholesale real price Ŝwt depends on two broad terms, the first term in
braces in 2-67 represents the real marginal costs wholesale producer would
face in the absence of agency costs. The second term in braces describes the
additional amount the wholesale producer would have to charge in order to
recoup the deadweight losses imposed by the presence of agency costs
The real marginal cost in turn has two parts. The first terms represents
the ”peso” financial cost of hiring labour. The second term is the ”dollar”
financial cost. Monetary policy has direct and indirect effects on the real
wholesale price: the direct effect stems from the fact that a rise in Ît affects
marginal costs and hence inflation positively through the parameter a which
measures the weight of domestic factors in production, the indirect effects are
manifold. Monetary policy affect Ŝwt through its effect on real wages (ŵt), the
real exchange rate (Q̂t) and the benchmark idiosyncratic productivity level
($̂o,t)
Ŝwt =
{
a
(
Ît + ŵt
)
+ (1− a)
(
Q̂t + Îft
)
− Ât
}
+
{
H2
H1
$o$̂o,t
}
(2-67)
Here the two parameters H1 and H2 depend on steady-state levels of $o and
mc
H1 =
1
[Γ($o)−λΥ($o)](Swmc )−1
> 0
H2 =
[
λΥ”($o)−Γ”($o)
λΥ′($o)−Γ′($o) −
Γ”($o)
Γ′($o) −
Γ′($o)
1−Γ($o) −
[Γ′($o)−λΥ′($o)](Swmc )
[Γ($o)−λΥ($o)](Swmc )−1
]
The effect of variations in the cutoff level $̂o,t upon the real price Ŝ
w
t depends
on the magnitude of H1 and H2 which in turn depends on the specific parame-
terisation of the probabilistic process for idiosyncratic productivity $. In the
solution, the special case of a uniform distribution for $ is considered.
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8. The real wage depends on a direct income effect represented by a term in
consumption and on the level of peso loans.
ŵt =
ν
1 + ν
l̂h,t +
δ
1 + ν
Ĉt (2-68)
If ν is large (i.e. the elasticity of intertemporal elasticity of substitution small),
then labour supply is inelastic. In such a case, real wage changes are driven
by labour demand movements derived from the dynamics of real peso loans.
On the other hand, the elasticity of consumption substitution has to be very
low in order for consumption to have a strong effect on wage dynamics.
9. The loanable funds equilibrium dynamics is governed by equation [2-19] in
log-linearised form. Peso loans are increasing in the amount of reserves that
banks need to hold. The overall effect of the interest rate is negative and the
effect of the cutoff value $̂o,t is determined by the sign of H3.
l̂h,t =
(
If
If−1
) [
adrÎft + (1− adr)Ît
]
+ (1− adr) d̂t + adr
(
Q̂t + b̂t +
1
b
b∗t
)
+ ...
+ adr
ζ(If−1)
(
Êt − Et−1Êt
)
− adrΠ̂∗t − (1− adr) Π̂t − Ît −H3$̂o,t
(2-69)
Where
adr =
b
d+b
H3 =
(
[Γ′($)−λΥ′($)](Swmc )
G1/mc−1 +
G1/mc
G1/mc−1
H2
H1
)
$o
In turn, equilibrium loans denominated in dollars is given by
l̂f,t = l̂h,t + Ît − Q̂t − Îft (2-70)
This equation results from the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production
function. Additionally, the supply of both peso and dollar-denominated loans
is linked to the evolution of both denomination of deposits
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l̂h,t =
(
1
1−ζ/Π∗
)
d̂t+1 +
(
1
1−ζ/Π∗
)
∆mb,t
d
−
(
ζ/Π∗
1−ζ/Π∗
)(
d̂t − Π̂t
)
(2-71)
l̂f,t =
(
1
1−ζ/Π∗
)
b̂t+1 +
(
1
1−ζ/Π∗
)
b∗t+1
b
−
(
ζ/Π∗
1−ζ/Π∗
)(
b̂t +
b∗t
b
− Π̂∗t
)
(2-72)
The policy rate has two type of effects: It will tend to reduce peso loans
as the cost of peso funds increases. However, the increase in the peso cost
of funds means that the relative dollar cost of funds falls. This substitution
effect is partially offset by the production scale effect: As production grows,
the economy does not want to depart from the optimal combination of peso
and dollar loan levels. The extent of the effect is given by the weight of dollar
loans (the parameter adr < 1)
10. Foreign sector equilibrium
J
(
l̂h,t + Ît − Q̂t − Îft − 1b b∗t+1
)
= ηCfQ̂t − Cf Ĉt − 1β b∗t + Yf Ŷf,t (2-73)
Solution procedure
The system of linear expectational difference equations [2-61] to [2-73] sum-
marises the dynamics of the model which can be solved numerically for given values
of the deep parameters. In order to perform the solution exercise a standard solution
algorithm26 is used.
Yt =
[
Ĉt Π̂t Π̂h,t Ît Êt Q̂t l̂h,t l̂f,t Ŝwt $̂o,t ŵt d̂t+1 b̂t+1 î∗t b̂∗t+1
]t
26I use the algorithm described in Klein (76). First I define a set of endogenous state variables
grouped in the vector Yt.
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The solutions will depend on a vector of predetermined state variables called
Xt and a vector of exogenous variables Zt which are defined respectively as
Xt =
[
Q̂t−1 Π̂h,t−1 Êt−1 Ît−1 Et(Êt−1) î∗t−1 b̂∗t b̂t d̂t
]t
Zt =
[
Ât ξ
i
t Π̂
∗
t Ŷf,t ξ
i∗
t ξ
b∗
t ξ
∆mb
t
]t
The system can be written in compact form as:
AEt
 Υt+1
Kt+1
 = B
 Υt
Kt
+ CZt (2-74)
Zt+1 = ΘZt + Ut+1 (2-75)
The solution is given in a state-space representation where the predeter-
mined state variables are updated according to
 Kt+1
Zt+1
 =
 P Q
0 Φ
 Kt
Zt
+
 0
Ut+1
 (2-76)
And the endogenous state is observed according to
Υt =
(
M N
) Kt
Zt
 (2-77)
2.2.3 Calibration of model parameters
To calibrate de model, Peruvian data is used whenever it is possible. The Peruvian
economy is a typical emerging market country with financial dollarisation features,
just what the present model tries to portrait.
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Parameters describing household preferences
• The subjective discount factor β is calibrated such that it implies a steady-
state domestic real interest rate equal to 6% per year, considering that the US
steady-state real rate is considered to be 4% per year. This implies β = 0.9852,
β∗ = 0.9901 and the risk premium factor V = 1.005
• The elasticity of intertemporal consumption substitution measures the degree
of reactiveness of aggregate consumption to real interest rate movements. This
value is set to 1/δ = 1/5 which is relatively low and suggests that this channel
might be weak in emerging market economies.
• The elasticity of intertemporal labour substitution 1/ν is set to 2.2, this value
is however relatively high and reflects the idea that labour demand might be
more responsive to wages in this type of economies.
• For the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of for-
eign goods and home goods a value η = 2 is chosen suggesting an environment
where people find difficult to substitute consumption of foreign goods by that
of home goods.
• The elasticity of substitution across the different varieties of home goods is set
to be θ = 11. This value is consistent with a steady-state mark-up of 10%27
• The proportion of foreign consumption out of total consumption in steady
state is given by the parameter α. This parameter is set to α = 0.25 as
Ce´spedes et.al (26)
Parameters describing the production technology
• Production scale parameter A = 1
27Recall that the mark-up is expressed in terms of that elasticity µ = θθ−1
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• The Cobb-Douglas coefficient a is econometrically estimated to be between
0.6 and 0.8, the mean value of 0.68 is used, which means that the liability
dollarisation ration is about 32%. Official estimates of dollarisation ratios in
Peru are as high as 60%. The value assumed here is a lower bound.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock is assumed to follow a uniform distribu-
tion with unconditional mean equal to one. Specifically the p.d.f is φ($) = 1
2∆
and the c.d.f is Φ($) = 1
2∆
($ − 1 + ∆), with ∆ = 0.5.
Parameter describing the institutional restriction on price setting
• The probability that an individual firm does not change its price at any date
is γ and the average duration of this price quotation is 1/(1 − γ) quarters.
The standard value for a developed, stable economy is γ = 0.75. Instead, a
value γ = 0.5 is assumed, which means that price quotations last two quarters
only, namely, prices are more flexible than the standard case.
Parameters describing monetary policy
• The interest rate smoothing coefficient is set to ρ = 0.7
• The parameterisation of the three regimes is as follows:
Strict home-inflation: χpih = 1.5, χpi = χy = 0.
Strict CPI inflation:χpih = χpi = 1.5 and χy = 0.
Flexible inflation targeting:χpih = χpi = 1.5 with χy = 0.5
Parameters describing the foreign nominal variables
• The US steady-state inflation rate is set to be 2% per year, which means that
Π∗ = 1 + 0.02/4
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• The mean US nominal interest rate is considered to be 6% per year (given a
real rate of 4% and an inflation rate of 2%). Hence I∗ = 1 + 0.06/4
Parameters describing financial conditions
Financial conditions depend heavily on two parameters; monitoring costs
as a proportion λ of the size of borrowers production and the reserve requirement
ration ζ. The value of these two parameters are likely to be high in emerging market
economies and they should be such that the steady-state lending interest rate results
in reasonable values. Hence, these values are set to λ = 0.2 and ζ = 0.2 such that
the lending interest rate is I˜ = 17%.
Parameters describing the data generating process of exogenous vari-
ables
• The exogenous variables of the model contained in the vector Zt are assumed
to follow an AR(1) representation. The respective parameters (AR(1) coeffi-
cients and standard deviations) are grossly estimated from data.
A note about the steady-state solution
The calibrated parameters define a steady-state solution shown in Table [2.1 ]. The
probability of default in steady-state is as high as 78 percent. This number is not
realistic.
2.3 The agency-cost channel and the Phillips curve
The chapter analyses the responses of the model economy to three types of shocks
relevant to an emerging market economy; an aggregate productivity shock, a dollar
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REAL QUANTITIES
Aggregate consumption C 0.745
Home consumption Ch 0.559
Foreign consumption Cf 0.186
Labour N 1.276
Imported output J 0.154
Household’s peso deposits d 0.409
Household’s dollar deposits b 0.192
Peso credit lh 0.328
Dollar credit lf 0.154
Wholesale production Yh 0.649
Retailer production Yhr 0.559
TRANSFERS
From financial intermediaries ωb 0.003
From wholesale producers ωwh 0.014
From retailers ωr 0.051
From tradeable production ωf 0.340
PRICES AND INTEREST RATES
Nominal gross interest rate I 1.020
Real wholesale price Sw 0.909
Real domestic price S 1.000
Real exchange rate Q 1.000
Real wage w 0.257
MARKUPS
Domestic prices over wholesale prices S/Sw 1.100
Wholesale prices over marginal cost Sw/mc 1.201
FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
Idiosyncratic productivity cutoff value $0 1.281
Lending rate I˜ 1.165
Probability of default PD 0.781
Failure rate h 1.141
Table 2.1: Steady-state values.
interest rate shock and a commodity production shock. Then these shocks are com-
pared under three possible types of monetary policy regimes; strict home-inflation
(HIT), strict CPI-inflation (CIT) and flexible inflation targeting regimes (FIT).
A key feature that emerges from this set up is the positive correlation
between unexpected depreciations and the probability that borrowers default on
their loans. Higher default probabilities constitute a heavy burden on wholesale
price setting which is then transmitted to final goods.
Financial intermediaries have liabilities denominated in both pesos and dol-
lars. When an unexpected depreciation occurs, they suffer capital losses against
households. The good news is that financial intermediaries also hold assets denom-
inated in both currencies and that they have agreed on loan contracts stipulating
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that loan quantities are adjusted in the same direction as movements in their liabil-
ities28. However, the amount of loans offered cannot quickly jump to recoup capital
losses, the variable that does adjust quickly is the cutoff productivity value29 that
determines the shares of production that goes to both borrowers and financial in-
termediaries. An increase in the cutoff value due to a an unexpected depreciation
is built in the structure of the contract as an equilibrium outcome; firms that did
not default are better off even though they have a small proportion of the cake
because they were able to produce more and financial intermediaries are not worse
off because they can compensate their capital losses by increasing the share they
can grab from the production process.
The hidden cost of the above mechanism however is the increasing amount
of business defaults that emerge in equilibrium due to an unexpected depreciation
of the exchange rate.
2.3.1 A positive aggregate productivity shock
When a positive aggregate productivity shock hits the economy (See figures [2.4],
[2.5] and [2.6]) the standard result is that the marginal cost of producers firms,
producer prices and final goods inflation all tend to fall, whereas consumption and
output tend to increase.
In this setup, the presence of agency costs can offset or magnify those
standard effects. For example, when the monetary authority is characterised by
the HIT regime, then mechanism that serves to stabilise home-inflation hinges on
inducing a negative correlation between the real exchange rate and the wholesale
real domestic price in equation [2-61]30. A positive aggregate productivity shock
28See equation [2-69].
29The cutoff productivity value moves in the same direction of the lending rate and the proba-
bility of default.
30This mechanism might sometimes imply that real exchange rates are not smoothed at all but
are used as a device to offset domestic home inflationary factors.
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Figure 2.4: Strict home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
productivity shock: (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
tends to reduce producer marginal costs which the HIT mechanism tries to undo by
inducing an real exchange rate depreciation and as a result an unexpected nominal
exchange rate depreciation. This last effect is the link between the productivity
shock and the financial conditions in the economy described above. Both households
and financial intermediaries increase their holdings of assets. As households save
more, they reduce overall consumption. The transmission of the productivity shock
to home inflation is hampered by the fact that the agency markup (the difference
between the real wholesale price Swt and the wholesaler marginal cost mct) increases
due to the more stringent agency conditions. This means that reduction of marginal
costs imply a less than proportional reduction in wholesale prices.
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Figure 2.5: CPI-home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
productivity shock:(Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
Under both the CIT and FIT regimes there is a concern for smoothing
real exchange rate deviations per se and not to use it as an offsetting device. This
implies that disinflationary pressures brought about by a positive productivity shock
are absorbed by a nominal exchange rate appreciation [see equation 2-65]. The
unexpected appreciation in turn, triggers the opposite effects on the financial side
of the economy to the ones under the HIT regime; credit, deposits after some
quarters, the default probability, the lending rate and the real value of households
assets fall whereas consumption increases.
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Figure 2.6: Flexible inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
productivity shock:(Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
2.3.2 A Dollar interest rate shock
An increase in the dollar interest rate has a standard effect of causing a spot de-
preciation of the nominal exchange rate. Though it is not the case under the HIT
regime due to the fact that marginal cost of wholesalers tends to increase due to
higher interest rates and as a result the home inflation stabilisation mechanism calls
for a real exchange rate reduction which triggers a nominal exchange rate appreci-
ation. The results are depicted on figures [2.7], [2.8] and [2.9]. Upon inspection of
the diverse responses to this shock, it turns out that the HIT regime fares better to
smooth inflation and even exchange rates but not home and aggregate consumption.
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Figure 2.7: Strict home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation dollar
interest rate shock(Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
2.3.3 A commodity production shock
A positive shock to commodity production coupled with the fact that the net asset
position with foreigners is bound to remain fixed implies that imports should adjust
in the same direction on impact, in particular imports of production inputs. This
also implies an increase in the demand for labour due to the complementary of the
Cobb-Douglas production function.
In order to be able to hire more labour, the wage rate must adjust upwards,
forcing the marginal cost of wholesale producers to increase. The increase in the
marginal cost represents an inflationary pressure. Again, under the HIT regime this
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Figure 2.8: CPI-home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation dollar
interest rate shock (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
upward movement in the marginal cost is partially offset in equilibrium by a real
exchange rate appreciation that triggers an unexpected nominal appreciation and
all the consequences that follow through.
On the CIT and FIT regimes, the above mechanism is not present. Real
exchange rates hardly change and as a result nominal exchange rates move to com-
pensate higher CPI prices. In this case, the unexpected depreciation triggers the
adverse effects of agency costs on consumption.
These results are depicted in [2.10], [2.11] and [2.12]. In this case, the par-
ticular specification of the model economy also favours the HIT regime to stabilise
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Figure 2.9: Flexible inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation dollar in-
terest rate shock (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the respective
steady-state values)
inflation but at the cost of higher real exchange rate and consumption fluctua-
tions. On the other hand, the CIT and FIT regimes render lower variability of
real exchange rate and consumption but at the cost of generating more inflation
variability.
2.4 Conclusion
The model presented in this chapter tries to capture one element often disregarded
in the analysis of dollarisation in emerging market economies; the fact that both
assets and liabilities are dollarised and that increasing dollarisation might not be
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Figure 2.10: Strict home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
commodity production shock (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from the
respective steady-state values)
necessarily bad for certain types of agents and certain types of shocks, in fact they
result from optimising behaviour of agents.
The key mechanism captured in the model is that unexpected nominal
exchange rate depreciations are closely linked with the probability of default by
borrower firms. Any unexpected movement of the exchange rate turns out to be
a powerful mechanism to move the real value of households’ assets (savings) and
therefore to move aggregate consumption. On the other hand, the default probabil-
ity is a manifestation of whether agency costs become higher or not. When agency
costs increase (increasing probability of default) the markup of real wholesale prices
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Figure 2.11: CPI-home inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
commodity production shock: (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from
the respective steady-state values)
over wholesale marginal costs increases which in turn shapes the dynamics of home
inflation.
Within this environment, three possible inflation targeting regimes are eval-
uated; a strict home-inflation targeting (HIT), a strict CPI-inflation targeting (CIT)
and a flexible inflation targeting (FIT). The core mechanism in the HIT regime is
the use of the real exchange rate as a marginal cost stabilising devise in order to
smooth home inflation deviations. The CIT and FIT regimes are defined such that
the concern about real exchange rate fluctuations are built within the structure
of the equilibrium. In order to assess these three regimes three types of shocks
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Figure 2.12: Flexible inflation target: Responses to a one-standard-deviation positive
commodity production shock: (Responses are measured as percentage deviations from
the respective steady-state values)
dominant in emerging market economies are analysed; an aggregate non-tradeable
productivity shock, a shock to the dollar interest rate and a tradeable commodity
production shock. As is standard in these evaluations, the HIT regime renders in
small inflation fluctuations at the cost of higher real exchange rate and consumption
fluctuations whereas the CIT and FIT regimes produce the converse results. In all
the cases, the sign of the unexpected depreciation is positively correlated to the real
value of assets and negatively correlated to aggregate consumption.
In this chapter, monetary policy is conducted without absolute concern
about the financial health of firms; namely, firms defaults produce no further costs
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to society other than the liquidation costs that financial firms have to incur. In
reality, defaults or a potential systemic failure are seen as a fundamental threat to
central bankers. Further research is necessary to seek for monetary policy regimes
that take into account a loss function for the monetary authority that considers
for example financial stability aspects in addition to the usual inflation and real
activity concerns. In line with this research agenda, a recent contribution of the
author in Bigio and Vega (16) suggest that dirty-floating regimes are optimal even
if the monetary authority is uncertain about the strength of the pervasive effect of
financial dollarisation.
A1 Appendix: Optimal decisions
A1.1 Households
Given the reward function and the budget constraint outlined in the main text, the
households problem can be expressed as
V (Dt, Bt) = Max{Ct,Nt,Bt+1}
{
C1−δt − 1
1− δ −
N1+νt − 1
1 + ν
+ βEt [V (Dt+1, Bt+1)]
}
Where
Dt+1 = −EtBt+1 + It−1Dt + EtIft−1Bt + (Et − Et−1Et)Bt +WtNt − PtCt +Ωt
The standard optimality conditions are:
Consumption : C−δt = βEt
[
VDt+1Pt
]
Labour supply : Nνt = βEt
[
VDt+1Wt
]
Nominal dollar deposits : EtVBt+1 = EtEtVDt+1
Envelope Theorems: : VDt = βEt
[
VDt+1It−1
]
VBt = βEt
[
VDt+1
{
Ift−1Et + (Et − Et−1Et)
}]
Combining the equation for nominal dollar deposits and envelope theorems:
Et
[
VDt+2
(
It −
{
Ift
Et+1
Et +
(Et+1 − EtEt+1)
Et
})]
= 0
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Knowing that It and Ift are known as of time t, then after some algebraic manipulation:
1
β2
C−δt
Pt
Et
[
It −
{
Ift
Et+1
Et +
(Et+1 − EtEt+1)
Et
}]
= 0
Hence the standard UIP condition is obtained
It = Ift
Et [Et+1]
Et
Likewise, equations [2-12] and [2-14] appearing in the main text can be derived
A1.2 Financial intermediaries, firms and financial contracting
Given that φ($) is the density function and Φ($) is the cumulative distribution function
then, the expected return level to the financial intermediaries and firms can be defined
(ignoring time and firm subscripts)
Expected return to the financial intermediary
ERfint =
$u∫
$o
I˜ [Lh + ELf ]φ($)d$ + ...
$o∫
$l
G$LahL
1−a
f φ($)d$ − λ
$o∫
$l
$GLahL
1−a
f φ($)d$ ≥ X
In the problem outlined in the text
G$oL
a
hL
1−a
f = I˜ (Lh + ELf )
Then
ERfint = GLahL
1−a
f
[∫ $u
$o
$oφ($)d$ +
∫ $o
$l
$φ($)d$ − λ
∫ $o
$l
$φ($)d$
]
Here, the following definitions are helpful
Definition 1
Γ($o) is the gross share of output that goes to the financial intermediary Γ($o) =
$o
∫ $u
$o
φ($)d$ +
∫ $o
$l
$φ($)d$. This share Γ($o) has the following features:
It is increasing in $o : Γ′($o,t) = 1− Φ($o,t) > 0
Φ($o,t) represents the default probability
66
Definition 2
λΥ($o) is the expected monitoring cost. λΥ($o) = λ
∫ $o
$l
$φ($)d$
It is increasing in $o : λΥ′($o,t) = λ$0φ($o,t) > 0
And by definition: 0 < Γ($o)− λΥ($o) < 1− λ
Definition 3
h($o) is the firm’s failure (or hazard) rate defined as h($) =
φ($)
1−Φ($)
Using these definitions, the expected return to the financial intermediary as
ERfint = [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]GLahL1−af
Expected returns to the firm
ERfirm =
∫ $u
$o
G$LahL
1−a
f φ($)d$ −
∫ $u
$o
I˜ (Lh + ELf )φ($)d$
Applying the definition of I˜ (Lh + ELf )
ERfirm =
[∫ $u
$o
$φ($)d$ −$o
∫ $u
$o
φ($)d$
]
GLahL
1−a
f
Using the same notation as above
ERfirm = [1− Γ($o,t)]GtLah,tL1−af,t
These expressions for expected returns allow us to formulate the problem in compact form
in the main text
The solution in the general case
The Lagrangian function for problem [2-22] in the main text, with associated multiplier
ψ is
L (Lh, Lf , $o, ψ) = [1− Γ($o)]GLahL1−af + (a1)
ψ
[
X − [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]GLahL1−af − ζ [D + E (B +B∗)]
]
The f.o.c’s are
{1− Γ($o)− ψ [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]}Ga
LahL
1−a
f
Lh
+ ψI = 0 (a2)
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{[1− Γ($o)]− ψ [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]} (1− a)G
LahL
1−a
f
Lf
+ ψEIf = 0 (a3)
[−Γ′($o)− ψ (Γ′($o)− λΥ′($o))]GLahL1−af = 0 (a4)
− [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]GLahL1−af + ILh + EIfLf + ...
ζ
[
(I − 1)D + E(If − 1) (B +B∗)
]
+ (E − E−1E) (B +B∗) = 0
(a5)
From [a4] the equilibrium value of ψ in terms of the cutoff value $o is
ψe =
Γ′($o)
λΥ′($o)− Γ′($o) (a6)
Provided ψ > 0, dividing [a3] from [a2]:
a
(1− a)
Lf
Lh
=
I
EIf
This allows to express both the unconditionally expected product and loan repayment in
terms of Lh only
GLahL
1−a
f = G
(
1− a
a
)1−a( I
EIf
)1−a
Lh
(
ILh + EIfLf
)
=
1
a
ILh
Also, making the following definition
Definition 4
The marginal cost of the wholesale firm for producing one unit of its good in the absence
of agency costs is defined as:
mc = ΛA (Iw)a
(
QIf)1−a with Λ = ( 1a)a ( 11−a)1−a
Replacing these expressions in [a2] or [a3] (actually one of them is redundant) to get
ψe =
[1− Γ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)
[Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)− 1 (a7)
In order to characterise the solution, the following assumptions are needed:
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• Assumption 1: 1 < (Swmc) < 11−λ
• Assumption 2: $h($) is increasing in $.
Solution in the case $ follows a uniform distribution
In this case: φ($) = 12∆ and Φ($) =
1
2∆ ($ − 1 + ∆) with $ ∈ [1 − ∆, 1 + ∆]. The
expressions for Γ($o) and λΥ($o) are given respectively by Γ($o) = 12∆$o (1 + ∆) −
$2o
4∆ − (1−∆)
2
4∆ and λΥ($o) = λ
1
4∆
(
$2o − (1−∆)2
)
The derivatives of the above two functions are given by
Γ′($o) = 12∆ [1 + ∆−$o] and λΥ′($o) = λ 12∆$o
Hence, Γ′($o)− λΥ′($o) = 12∆ [1 + ∆− (1 + λ)$o]
Using these definitions, the corresponding expressions for the Lagrangian multiplier as
outlined in [a6] and [a7] are
ψe =
1 +∆−$o
$o (1 + λ)− 1−∆ (a8)
ψe =
[1− Γ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)
[Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)− 1 (a9)
From the budget constraint of financial intermediaries Transfers are given by
ωbt = Itdt+1 +QtIft
(
bt+1 + b∗t+1
)− It−1
Πt
dt −Qt
Ift−1
Π∗t
(bt + b∗t ) (a10)
Budget constraint of wholesale producers
ωht = [1− Γ ($o,t)]Swt Yh,t (a11)
A1.3 Tradeable production and retailers
Export producer firms: They produce the exogenous exportable good Yf,t at zero cost,
hence the profits generated are given by: Ωft = Pf,tYf,t. These profits are transferred to
households. In real terms
ωft = QtYf,t (a12)
It is assumed that this exportable output follows is i.i.d: Yf,t ∼ N(Yf , σ2yf )
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Retailers: Production of retailers is lower than the expected production of wholesalers
due to agency costs
Y˜h,t = [1− λΥ($o,t)]Yh,t (a13)
Transfers to households
ωrt = (St − Swt ) [1− λΥ($o,t)]Yh,t (a14)
A2 Appendix: The log-linearised approximation
A2.1 The Phillips curve
There are two logical steps in the log-linearisation. First, using the definition of the home
price index, the derivation of a relationship between home price inflation and the optimal
home price ratio, second using the optimality condition [2-34] the determination of an
equation for the optimal price ratio
First Step
From the definition of the home price index Ph,t in equation [2-11] under the assumed
indexation scheme:
Π̂h,t = Π̂h,t−1 +
1− γ
γ
[
ρ̂oph,t +
α
1− αQ̂t
]
(a15)
There is a positive relationship between deviations of the optimal price ratio and devia-
tions of current home inflation. A rise in ρ̂oph,t produces a similar reaction in the domestic
price index (and hence it affects home price inflation in the same way). Also, as the
domestic price index increases, so does the total consumer price index and hence, the
real exchange rate falls for given nominal exchange rates and foreign prices. The increase
in both ρ̂oph,t and Π̂h,t, together with the fall in Q̂t are governed by equation [a15] just
derived. If the probability γ is on the vicinity of 1, then the desired optimal price has a
small effect on both domestic inflation and real exchange rates. On the contrary, when γ
is close to zero, optimal price changes are strongly transmitted to domestic prices and to
the consumer price index.
The sensitivity to the real exchange rate strongly depends on the degree of economic
openness (α); when α is low the economy puts little weight on foreign goods consumption
and therefore purely domestic price changes have a strong impact over total CPI which
at the same time implies larger changes in the real exchange rate
Thus, it seems that low backward-lookingness (high forward-lookingness, i.e.γ low ) of
price setters and an economy relatively closed (α) is associated with strong real exchange
rate movements in response of the set of factors that affect optimal price setting decisions.
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Second Step
Taking the optimisation condition of firms:
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k
Uc(Ct+k)
Pt+k
 Ph,t+k[
Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
]
P oph,t
θ [Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
]
P oph,tCh,t+k

= Et
µ ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(Ct+k)
 Ph,t+k[
Ph,t−1+k
Ph,t−1
]
P oph,t
θ Ch,t+kSwt+k

The following definitions31 are used:
Definition 5
P oph,t
Pt+k
=
Pt
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt+2
...
Pt+k−1
Pt+k
P oph,t
Pt
=
1
Πt+1
1
Πt+2
...
1
Πt+k
ρoph,t =
νoph,t
Πt+1.t+k
Definition 6
Ph,t+k
P oph,t
=
Ph,t+k
Ph,t+k−1
Ph,t+k−1
Ph,t+k−2
...
Ph,t+1
Ph,t
Ph,t/Pt
P oph,t/Pt
= Πh,t+kΠh,t+k−1...Πh,t+1
St
ρoph,t
=
Πh,t+1.t+k
St
ρoph,t
Definition 7
Ph,t+k−1
Ph,t−1
=
Ph,t
Ph,t−1
Ph,t+1
Ph,t
...
Ph,t+k−1
Ph,t+k−2
= Πh,tΠh,t+1...Πh,t+k−1 = Πh,t.t+k−1
Then the above optimality condition can be written as:
Et
 ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(Ct+k)
(
Πh,t+1.t+k
Πh,t.t+k−1
St
ρoph,t
)θ
[Πh,t.t+k−1]
Πt+1.t+k
ρoph,tCh,t+k

= Et
µ ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(Ct+k)
(
Πh,t+1.t+k
Πh,t.t+k−1
St
ρoph,t
)θ
Ch,t+kS
w
t+k

31Note that Πt.t+k represents the cumulative inflation rate from period t to t+ k.
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Working with the term inside the expectation operator in the left hand side of the above
equation and calling it LHSt.
LHSt =
∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(Ct+k)
[Πh,t.t+k−1]
Πt+1.t+k
(
Πh,t+1.t+k
Πh,t.t+k−1
St
ρoph,t
)θ
ρoph,tCh,t+k
The value of this expression in the deterministic steady state is:
LHS =
∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(C)Ch =
Uc(C)Ch
1− γβ
A similar kind of argument can be applied to expression on the expectation operator in
the right hand side:
RHSt = µ
∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(Ct+k)
(
Πh,t+1.t+k
Πh,t.t+k−1
St
ρoph,t
)θ
Ch,t+kS
w
t+k
In steady state:
RHS = µ
∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k Uc(C)ChSw =
µUc(C)ChSw
1− γβ
And hence, a standard result emerges:
1 = µSw
In steady-state monopolistic pricing is embedded in the total domestic price because all
firms have monopolistic power. Hence the ratio of optimal domestic prices to overall prices
is equal to 1 (the left hand side of the above equation). At the same time, this optimal
price ratio has to be equal to a mark-up over marginal cost (the right hand side)
L̂HSt = (1− γβ)

∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k
(
Ĉh,t+k + Ûc,t+k
)
+
{θ(Ŝt−ρ̂oph,t)+ρ̂oph,t}
1−γβ
+
∞∑
k=1
(γβ)k
k∑
j=1
{
Π̂h,t+j−1 − Π̂t+j + θ
(
Π̂h,t+j − Π̂h,t+j−1
)}

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R̂HSt = (1− γβ)

∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k
(
Ûc,t+k + Ĉh,t+k + Ŝwt+k
)
+
θ(Ŝt−ρ̂oph,t)
1−γβ +
∞∑
k=1
{
(γβ)k
k∑
j=1
θ
(
Π̂h,t+j − Π̂h,t+j−1
)}

Taking expectations conditional on information at time t both terms and disregarding
Jensen’s inequality:
ρ̂oph,t
1− γβ = Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)kt+k S
w
t+k
]
− Et
 ∞∑
k=1
(γβ)k
k∑
j=1
(
Πh,t+j−1 − Π̂t+j
)
This is the link between deviations of the optimal price relative to the overall price index
and the expected future values of the real marginal cost and future overall inflation rate
differentials
γβ
(1− γβ)Et
[
ρ̂oph,t+1
]
= Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(γβ)k+1 Ŝwt+k+1
]
+Et
 ∞∑
k=1
(γβ)k+1
k∑
j=1
(
Πh,t+j − Π̂t+1+j
)
On the original expression:
1
(1− γβ) ρ̂
op
h,t = Ŝ
w
t + Et
[ ∞∑
k=1
(γβ)k Ŝwt+k
]
+ Et
 ∞∑
k=1
(γβ)k
k∑
j=1
(
Πh,t+j−1 − Π̂t+j
)
Then, summing both last expressions adequately:
ρ̂oph,t = (γβ)Et
[
ρ̂oph,t+1
]
+ (1− γβ) Ŝwt + (γβ)Et
[
Π̂t+1 − Π̂h,t
]
(a16)
Plugging the definition of ρ̂oph,t found in [a15] and the definition of the overall price index:
Π̂h,t − Π̂h,t−1 = βEt
[
Π̂h,t+1 − Π̂h,t
]
+
1− γ
γ
α (1− γβ)
1− α Q̂t +
1− γ
γ
(1− γβ) Ŝwt
From here:
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Π̂h,t =
(
1
1 + β
)
Π̂h,t−1 +
(
β
1 + β
)
Et
[
Π̂h,t+1
]
+
α
1− α
1
(1 + β)
1− γ
γ
(1− γβ) Q̂t + ...
1
(1 + β)
1− γ
γ
(1− γβ) Ŝwt
Equation [2-58] in the main text is obtained.
A2.2 Consumption dynamics
Log-linearisation of the Euler equation implies
Ĉt = Et
[
Ĉt+1
]
− 1
δ
(
Ît − Et
[
Π̂t+1
])
(a17)
It is straightforward to derive the dynamics of consumption of home and foreign goods
Ĉh,t = −ηŜt + Ĉt
Ĉf,t = −ηQ̂t + Ĉt
The real prices Ŝt and Q̂t are related through
Ŝt = − α1− αQ̂t (a18)
A2.3 Monetary policy
The rule is described as
Ît = ρÎt−1 + (1− ρ)
[
χpihEt
[
Π̂h,t+1
]
+
(
α
1− α
)
χpi
(
Q̂t − Q̂t−1
)
+ χy
̂˜
Y h,t
]
+ ξmt
Replacing the equilibrium condition for home goods
̂˜
Y h,t ≡ Ĉh,t = αη1− αQ̂t + Ĉt
Allows us to obtain
74
Ît = ρÎt−1 +RpiEt
[
Π̂h,t+1
]
+RqQ̂t +Rq1Q̂t−1 +RcĈt + ξmt (a19)
Where
Rpi = (1− ρ)χpih
Rq = (1− ρ)
(
χy
αη
1−α + χpi
α
1−α
)
Rq1 = − (1− ρ)χpi α1−α
Rc = (1− ρ)χy
A2.4 The wholesale real price
In order to derive the dynamics of the wholesale real price, The derivation of the equation
for the frictionless marginal cost has to be done first(from A1.2 in Appendix A1)
m̂ct = a
(
Ît + ŵt
)
+ (1− a)
(
Q̂t + Îft
)
− Ât (a20)
On the other hand, the relationship between the agency cost mark up Swt /mct and the
cutoff level is given by equations [a6] and [a7] in Appendix A
[1− Γ($o,t)]
(
Swt
mct
)
[Γ($o,t)− λΥ($o,t)]
(
Swt
mct
)
− 1
=
Γ′($o)
λΥ′($o)− Γ′($o)
The log-linearisation of the above expression takes the form
Ŝwt − m̂ct =
H2
H1
$o$̂o,t (a21)
Then:
Ŝwt = a
(
Ît + ŵt
)
+ (1− a)
(
Q̂t + Îft
)
− Ât + H2
H1
$o$̂o,t (a22)
Where
H1 =
1
[Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)− 1
H2 =
[
λΥ”($o)− Γ”($o)
λΥ′($o)− Γ′($o) −
Γ”($o)
Γ′($o)
− Γ
′($o)
1− Γ($o) −
[Γ′($o)− λΥ′($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)
[Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]
(
Sw
mc
)− 1
]
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In the special case of a uniform distribution for the idiosyncratic shock
Γ($o) = 12∆$o (1 + ∆)− 12 $
2
o
2∆ − (1−∆)
2
4∆ λΥ($o) = λ
1
4∆
(
$2o − (1−∆)2
)
Γ′($o) = 12∆ [1 + ∆−$o] λΥ′($o) = λ 12∆$o
Γ”($o) = −12∆ λΥ”($o) =
λ
2∆
Defining the following auxiliary variables
G1 = [Γ($o)− λΥ($o)]Sw = [Γ($o)−λΥ($o)]µ
G2 = 1− λΥ($o)
A2.5 Labour market equilibrium and the real wage rate
The interaction between the labour demand and labour supply gives a market equilibrium
representation for wage rates
The supply of labour is
νN̂t + δĈt = ŵt
Labour demand given by
N̂t = l̂h,t − ŵt
Hence
ŵt =
ν
1 + ν
l̂h,t +
δ
1 + ν
Ĉt
A2.6 Loans
From the solution for peso loans - equation [2-27] in the main text
lh,t =
arr,t
Itfm,t
Where, assuming ζD = ζB = ζ
rr,t = ζ
(
(It − 1) dtΠt +
Qt
Π∗t
(
Ift − 1
)
(bt + b∗t )
)
−
(
1− Et−1EtEt
)
Qt
Π∗t
(bt + b∗t )
And
fm,t =
[
Γ($eo,t)− λΥ($eo,t)
]( Swt
mct
)
− 1
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Log-linearisation of the above expressions yields
l̂h,t =
(
If
If−1
) [
adrÎft + (1− adr)Ît
]
+ (1− adr) d̂t + adr
(
Q̂t + b̂t +
b∗t
b
)
+ ...(a23)
+ adr
ζ(If−1)
(
Êt − Et−1Êt
)
− adrΠ̂∗t − (1− adr) Π̂t − Ît − f̂m,t
Where:adr stands for the asset dollarisation ratio
adr = bd+b (with b
∗ = 0 in steady state)
The log-linearised form f̂m,t, considering equation [a21] is given by
f̂m,t =
[
[Γ′($)− λΥ′($)] (Swmc)
G1/mc− 1 +
G1/mc
G1/mc− 1
H2
H1
]
$o$̂o,t (a24)
Plugging equation [a24] into [a23]
l̂h,t =
(
If
If−1
) [
adrÎft + (1− adr)Ît
]
+ (1− adr) d̂t + adr
(
Q̂t + b̂t +
b∗t
b
)
+ ...(a25)
+ adr
ζ(If−1)
(
Êt − Et−1Êt
)
− adrΠ̂∗t − (1− adr) Π̂t − Ît −H3$̂o,t+
Where: H3 =
(
[Γ′($)−λΥ′($)]
(
Sw
mc
)
G1/mc−1 +
G1/mc
G1/mc−1
H2
H1
)
$o
Suitable expressions for the real asset values in terms of the loan quantities are needed.
Consider the log-liberalisations of equations [2-16] and [2-17]
l̂h,t =
(
1
1− ζ/Π∗
)
d̂t+1 +
(
1
1− ζ/Π∗
)
∆mb,t
d
−
(
ζ/Π∗
1− ζ/Π∗
)(
d̂t − Π̂t
)
(a26)
l̂f,t =
(
1
1− ζ/Π∗
)
b̂t+1 +
(
1
1− ζ/Π∗
)
b∗t+1
b
−
(
ζ/Π∗
1− ζ/Π∗
)(
b̂t +
b∗t
b
− Π̂∗t
)
(a27)
From appendix A, the relationship between peso and dollar loan dynamics is given by
l̂f,t = l̂h,t + Ît − Q̂t − Îft (a28)
Equation [a25] to [a28] characterise the equilibrium dynamics in the market for loanable
funds
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A2.7 The foreign sector resource constraint
Log-linearising equation [2-35] and after replacing the expressions for Ĵt and Ĉf,t:
0 = ηCf Q̂t − Cf Ĉt − Jb̂t+1 − 1
β
b∗t + Yf Ŷf,t
Replacing the expression for b̂t+1 results in equation [2-73] in the main text of this chapter.
A2.8 Additional equations
The production of wholesale goods is loglinearised as
Ŷ wholeh,t = Ât − aŵt − (1− a)Q̂t + (1− a) (Ît − Îf,t) + l̂h,t
Non-tradable consumption in equilibrium is equal to the net production of goods, this
comes from equation [a13] in Appendix A1
ln Y˜h,t = ln [1− λΥ($o,t)] + lnYh,t
̂˜
Y
whole
h,t = Ŷh,t −
[
λΥ′ ($o)$o
1− λΥ($o)
]
$̂o,t
Asset dollarisation ratio:
This ratio is defined as:
adr,t =
(
Bt+1 +B∗t+1
) Et(
Bt+1 +B∗t+1
) Et +Dt
which, upon linearisation becomes
adr,t =
d
d+ b+ b∗
(
Q̂t − d̂t+1
)
+
db
(b+ b∗) (d+ b+ b∗)
(
b̂t+1 +
b̂∗t+1
b
)
Households dollarisation ratio:
Hdr,t =
Bt+1Et
Bt+1Et +Dt
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Hdr,t =
d
d+ b
(
Q̂t + b̂t+1 − d̂t+1
)
Real value of assets to households:
rvat = dt+1 + bt+1
r̂vat =
d
d+ b
d̂t+1 +
b
d+ b
b̂t+1
Liability dollarisation ratio:
Ldr,t =
(Lf,t) Et
(Lf,t) Et + Lh,t
L̂drt = Ldr
(
Q̂t + l̂f,t − l̂h,t
)
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CHAPTER 3
INCREASING COMPETITION AND INFLATION
NON-LINEARITIES IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES
This chapter presents a theoretical framework to incorporate increasing competition
effects to the inflation process in a small open economy. This topic is of relevance
in terms of policy because the monetary policy transmission mechanism to drive
inflation changes in ways which can affect its strength.
Increasing competition in traded goods is part of a recent research interest
on globalisation and inflation. The relevance of globalisation stems from the fact
that, by increasing openness and competition, it delivers a rising number of cheaper
goods to consumers which eventually affects the pricing decision of goods within
domestic economies.
Recent literature provides evidence on the importance of increasing open-
ness on inflation. Chen et.al (28) present a theoretical and empirical setup to ex-
amine whether more trade has effects over mark-ups and productivity in the Euro
area, and find evidence supporting the idea that increased openness has significantly
lowered inflation. On the other hand, Dexter et.al (40) show that increasing inter-
national trade is important to identify the forces behind Phillips curve equations,
and in particular they find that a higher availability of imported consumption goods
tends to lower inflation. Kamin et.al (73) study the effect of cheap Chinese exports
on inflation in the US and find a modest but significant impact on US import prices.
Chapter 3 of the World Economic Outlook [IMF (68)] also finds significant effects
of trade openness in the reduction of inflation in a panel of industrialised countries.
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Borio and Filardo (18) as well as Mumtaz and Surico (96) find evidence that global
factors play a stronger role in explaining the decline of the level of inflation than
domestic factors1.
Therefore, the existing evidence points that increasing globalisation has
some bearing on prices2, suggesting that external pressures have gained more im-
portance in determining inflation whereas domestic factors might have become less
important. In virtue of this, a lucid article in The Economist (October 2005) reads,
Increased global competition has thus limited the room for firms to
pass on higher costs. This makes a nonsense of [...] models of infla-
tion, which virtually ignore globalisation and assume that companies set
prices by adding a mark-up over unit costs [...] In reality, when setting
prices firms are increasingly likely to be constrained by global competi-
tion. Given the price the market will bear, they design and make their
products as profitably as they can. As a result, domestic cost pressures
[...] no longer lead automatically to higher inflation.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a formal treatment of this statement
and to study its implications for monetary policy. It is worth emphasizing that the
analysis here focuses on the effect of globalisation on the markets of final goods; I
take the factor markets as given.
The higher degree of competition implied by globalisation affects the bal-
ance of domestic and external factors of inflation. From a macroeconomic perspec-
tive, this suggests a form of non-linearity or state-dependency of the Phillips curve.
The slope of the Phillips curve, i.e. the coefficient associated with real marginal
1In Borio and Filardo (18) a concept of global output gap versus individual domestic output
gaps is used while in Mumtaz and Surico (96) a factor-augmented VAR is used.
2The influential study by Romer (108) shows that more open economies have lower prices.
According to time consistency theories of inflation, monetary authorities in open economies have
less incentives to inflate. However, Temple (127) finds no strong enough evidence about steeper
Phillips curves in more open economies implied but not tested in Romer (108). This chapter does
not imply a flatter or steeper slope but a changing one, depending on world inflation swings.
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costs affecting inflation (associated in turn to the domestic output gap), can be
interpreted as a measure of domestic factors importance in price setting. On the
other hand, the partial pass-through coefficient, i.e. that associated with a measure
of foreign inflation in the Phillips curve, can be understood as a measure of external
influences.
The chapter provides a simple theoretical explanation for these changing
weights due to external factors. This is done by modelling demand substitutability
between foreign and home goods using translog preferences instead of relying on
the widespread constant elasticity of substitution (CES) assumption. CES prefer-
ences would be at odds against the backdrop of increasing global competitiveness.3
The advantage of the translog specification is that it allows the price elasticity of
domestically produced goods to depend on foreign price movements. An approach
that incorporates competition effects on the demand side is that of Chen et.al (28)
where the price elasticity of substitution depends on the number of firms in the
supply side.
Within the context of a model for a small open economy, the Phillips curve
resulting from the translog assumption implies strong strategic complementarities
that render variations in both non-tradable and tradable prices following a world
inflation shock. Importantly, the inflation effect is such that the traditional demand
channel of monetary policy weakens in favour of the external inflation components.
This poses a key challenge for policymakers.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 derives Phillips
curves assuming both CES and translog preferences, section 3.2 performs world
disinflation experiments with a stylised general equilibrium model to study the
effects on the ability of monetary policy to affect inflation and section 3.3 contains
the conclusions. Then, Appendix B is introduced to outline the details of the
analytical derivations.
3Translog preferences on monetary models are introduced in Bergin and Feenstra (11, 12).
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3.1 A simple model
Two types of goods – a home, non-tradable good and a world, tradable good – which
enter into households consumption basket according to either a CES or translog
aggregator. In what follows, lower cases refer to the natural logarithms of the
respective upper cases. Also, the h and w superscripts refer to home and world
variables, respectively. Variables with no superscript are aggregate figures.
The price of the world good is determined by the law of one price. That
is, if P ∗t denotes the international price of the world good and St is the nominal
exchange rate, then the domestic currency price of this good is Pwt = StP
∗
t and its
inflation is piwt = ∆st + pi
∗
t .
On the other side, to model stickiness in home prices, I adopt the cost-of-
changing-prices setup of Rotemberg (112). This approach consists first in finding
desired prices, as if having firms operating in a flexible price environment and then
introducing costs of adjustment to move observed prices towards the optimal ones.
Two simplifying assumptions are made for analytical convenience. First,
linearity in the home good production function is assumed to shut off the direct
demand effect on marginal costs and hence on prices. Since this effect is almost the
same under both aggregators, the gains from working with the standard concave
production function are negligible to my purposes. Also, provided both preference
assumptions do not qualitatively make difference in the sensitive parts of marginal
costs, labour demand is assumed as give. Next, real domestic wages are defined in
terms of the home price rather than the consumption price. This allows us to draw
inflation equations that are easy to handle and interpret, without altering the main
conclusions of the model.
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3.1.1 Inflation dynamics with a CES aggregator
Under the CES aggregator, the consumption of the home good Cht depends nega-
tively on its relative price P ht /Pt and positively on aggregate consumption Ct. In
logs,
cht = ln(1− α)− η(pht − pt) + ct (3-1)
In this equation, η > 1 measures the degree of substitutability between the two
goods and α ∈ (0, 1) is usually interpreted as the degree of openness.
It is easy to show that if the steady-state relative price P h/Pw is equal to
one, the consumer-based price inflation can be approximated by
pit = (1− α)piht + αpiwt (3-2)
Overall inflation does depend on α but not on η. Thus, under CES preferences, the
degree of goods substitutability plays no fundamental role on aggregate dynamics.
Home firms and flexible price setting
The domestic good is produced and sold by a large number of identical monopo-
listically competitive firms. The focus is on a representative firm. Production Y ht
is made with a technology that exhibits constant returns on labour. So, for given
nominal wages Wt, the total nominal costs are defined by Costs(Y
h
t ) =WtY
h
t .
Every period, each producer chooses the price P ht to maximize profits, sub-
ject to the equilibrium condition Y ht = C
h
t . The optimal price decision reduces to
the standard markup pricing over marginal cost. Taking logs to the markup pric-
ing, the working expression appears pcest = ln(µ) + wt, where µ is the flexible-price
markup µ = η
η−1 . As the chapter notes later, the differentiated expression for p
ces
t
is a key variable that feeds into the inflation processes and is simply defined as
∆pcest = ∆wt (3-3)
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Introducing price rigidity
Now suppose that firms cannot set their desired optimal price due to the existence
of adjustment costs, so firms maximize profits net of the loss incurred by inducing
variability in the price path. After approximating the profit function around the
flexible price equilibrium (the optimal price level in the absence of adjustment costs,
pcest ) and introducing adjustment costs, the firms’ problem can be reformulated as
the following cost minimization program
min
phs
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
{(
phs − pcess
)2
+
1
2c
(
phs − phs−1
)2}]
(3-4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the firms’ discount factor, c > 0 is a measure of the speed of
adjustment and Et is the expectation operator.
The optimal price plan obtained by solving (3-4) implies the following in-
flation process
piht =
(
β
1 + β
)
Et
[
piht+1
]
+
(
1
1 + β
)
piht−1 +
(
2c
1 + β
)
∆$t + ξt (3-5)
where ∆$t is the growth of real wages defined as $t = wt − pht . The term ξt
is a combination of iid forecast errors and is treated as a shock. Crucially, the
importance of this derivation is that the shock per se does not affect home prices.4
Aggregate inflation
It is straightforward to plug (3-5) into the aggregator (3-2) to obtain
pit =
(
β
1+β
)
Et[pit+1] +
(
1
1+β
)
pit−1 + (1− α)
(
2c
1+β
)
∆$t + ...
...+ α
(
piwt −
(
β
1+β
)
Et[pi
w
t+1]−
(
1
1+β
)
piwt−1
)
+ (1− α)ξt (3-6)
The result is a standard hybrid Phillips curve with the following features: (i) it has
a dynamic linear homogeneity property implying nominal neutrality in the long run;
4In a general equilibrium setting, domestic inflation would respond to changes in ∆$t gener-
ated, for instance, by a policy reaction to the external shock. This is analyzed in Section 3.2.
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(ii) it depends on the real marginal cost defined by ∆$t and on the expectation
shock ξt; and (iii) it depends on the world price inflation. Here, world inflation
affects the aggregate inflation just by a direct pass-through effect on import prices.
3.1.2 Inflation dynamics with a translog aggregator
With two consumption goods, the aggregate log price pt is defined as
5.
pt = (1− α) pht + αpwt −
γ
2
(
pwt − pht
)2
(3-7)
In this aggregator, the parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0 are such that both goods
enter symmetrically in consumption preferences. Also, homogeneity in the demand
functions is imposed. Since the translog can be understood as an augmented CES
aggregator (if γ = 0), the parameter α is the same as in (3-1).
The log of the compensated demand for the domestic good is then
cht = ln(1− α+ γqt)− (pht − pt) + ct (3-8)
which differs from the demand under the CES specification in an important way:
it depends on the relative price of the world good to the home good, qt = p
w
t − pht .
Differencing equation (3-7) leads to aggregate inflation
pit = (1− αt)piht + αtpiwt (3-9)
This expression resembles equation (3-2) for the CES case. However, the weights
are state-dependent now. In this case αt = α − 0.5γ (qt + qt−1), so the inflation
process is a changing weighted average of domestic and foreign inflation.6 As the
relative price of the world good falls, qt turns negative and therefore, world inflation
gradually becomes more important to determine overall inflation.
5For the general form and properties of the translog aggregator see Bergin and Feenstra (11, 12).
6For the shares of either home or world good expenditure to be bounded between zero and one,
both γ and qt should not to be too large. Empirically and for practical purposes, these conditions
always hold.
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Home firms and flexible price setting
Under translog aggregation, the home firms take into account the fact that the
demand for their good depends on the world good price. Then, the expression for
the change in prices under a flexible-price scenario becomes
∆ptranst = 0.5(pi
w
t +∆wt) (3-10)
Namely, the optimal price change ∆ptranst is an average of world inflation and
marginal costs growth. To prevent consumers from substituting away the con-
sumption of home goods, the home producers will find optimal to follow up the
world trend, so a falling world inflation will drag home inflation. In the opposite
case, when the world price increases, it is on the interest of the profit-maximizing
firms to raise its price against the backdrop of a higher demand for the non-tradable
good.
Introducing price rigidity
In the presence of adjustment costs, the domestic inflation process is
piht =
(
β
1+β+c
)
Et[pi
h
t+1] +
(
1
1+β+c
)
piht−1 + ...
...+
(
c
1+β+c
)
piwt +
(
c
1+β+c
)
∆$t + ζt (3-11)
where ζt is an iid shock.
This equation is quite different from that in the CES case in (3-5). Partic-
ularly, home inflation now depends positively on world inflation.7
7The degree of dependence is captured by the adjustment cost parameter c. When adjustments
costs are high (c is small), the degree of dependence weakens and the situation is close to the CES
case.
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Aggregate inflation
To aggregate the inflation dynamics (3-11) is plugged into (3-9) to get
pit =
(
β
1+β+c
)
E [pit+1] +
(
1
1+β+c
)
pit−1 +
(
c
1+β+c
)
piwt + ...
...+ (1− αt)
(
c
1+β+c
)
∆$t + ... (3-12)
...+ αt
(
piwt −
(
β
1+β+c
)
Et
[
piwt+1
]− ( 1+c
1+β+c
)
piwt−1
)
+ (1− αt)ζt
The above Phillips curve not only has the basic properties of (3-6) but also exerts
more interesting dynamics. The slope (the coefficient multiplying ∆$t) depends
negatively on αt, the share of the imported good in the consumption basket, whereas
the pass-through coefficient is directly related to αt. Since αt increases as the relative
price qt decreases, a drop of external prices (relative to home prices) causes the slope
of the Phillips curve to fall and the pass-through coefficient to increase.
This result has an intuitive interpretation. Recall that in an open economy
Phillips curve, the slope parameter could be roughly interpreted as a measure of the
importance of domestic factors in the formation of prices. A fall in the price of trad-
ables or a rise in the price of non-tradables leads to demand substitution, implying a
higher share of tradable goods in domestic expenditure. Under such circumstances,
foreign shocks disturbing tradable prices would become more important in equilib-
rium determination. As a result, the Phillips curve becomes flatter. This is also
consistent with the negative correlation between qt and the pass-through.
8
Besides and perhaps more importantly, an external shock directly affects
home price-setting, magnifying the response of aggregate inflation. Hence, in this
case the pass-through effect of world price fluctuations is reinforced by the existence
of a further dragging effect.
8This result is in line with empirical findings in Goldfjan and Werlang (55).
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3.2 Implications for monetary policy
In an environment of global disinflation due to globalisation, monetary policy may
lose effectiveness because the fall in the slope of the Phillips curve ends up weakening
a channel whereby domestic shocks affect inflation. Regardless of the expectation or
exchange rate transmission channels, monetary policy also affects inflation through
marginal costs, so the lower the slope is, the weaker this channel becomes. In other
words, the effectiveness of monetary policy to affect inflation is inversely related to
the dragging effect of world inflation.9
The chapter analyses this conjecture formally by including the two inflation
equations derived in Section 3.1 into a stylised model with general equilibrium
features. Then, the system is shocked to study policy implications.
3.2.1 A stylized general equilibrium for a small open economy
The model is quarterly and consists of six equations. The first is the law of motion
of world inflation, which is exogenous and follows a simple AR(1) process,
pi∗t = (1− ρ)p¯i + ρpi∗t−1 + t with t ∼ iid(0, σ2 ) (3-13)
where |ρ| < 1 and p¯i is the steady-state world inflation rate. The second equation is a
Phillips curve derived either for the CES, (3-6), or the translog, (3-12), preferences.
The third equation, (3-14) below, establishes the link between the monetary
policy interest rate instrument it and the growth of real wages
∆$t = Et [∆$t+1]− br(it − Et [pit+1]− r) + $,t (3-14)
where r is the equilibrium real interest rate (assumed fixed) and br > 0. Typically
this equation is specified in terms of the output gap and is interpreted as an IS
9To be more precise, in an open economy the degree of price stickiness is lowered by the presence
of imported goods and nominal exchange rate fluctuations. Since real effects of monetary policy
shocks occur mainly because of nominal rigidities, the decline of monetary policy effectiveness is
a consequence of the decrease of overall price stickiness implied by the model.
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curve.10 However, in the absence of demand effects due to the assumed linearity of
the production function, marginal costs solely depend on the real wage rate. The
important feature of (3-14) is the negative relation between the real interest rate
(gap) and the indicator of marginal cost used in the present setup.
Equation (3-15) describes a monetary policy rule that incorporates a con-
cern about deviations of future expected inflation rates from the target p¯i and the
measure ∆$t
i = (r + p¯i) + fp (Et [pit+1]− p¯i) + f$∆$t + i,t (3-15)
where fp > 1 and f$ > 0.
Equation (3-16) is the definition of the relative price process
qt = qt−1 + 0.25 (piw,t − pih,t) (3-16)
Finally, exchange rate dynamics is embedded into the model in two alternative
forms,
st = st−1 − χqt−1 PPP Model
st = Et [st+1]− 0.25
(
it −
{
r + f ∗ppi
∗
t + (1− f ∗p )p¯i
})
UIP Model
(3-17)
These alternatives are chosen given the fact that there is no consensus about the
correct nominal exchange rate model. However, despite our ignorance about how
exchange rate dynamics actually evolves, this section shows that the dragging effect
is present under both exchange rate specifications.
The two model representations in (3-17) depict two extreme cases regarding
the way the exchange rate adjusts to shocks. In the PPP model, the exchange
rate moves only insofar as the real exchange rate is misaligned (i.e. whenever
there are deviations from purchasing parity or disequilibria in the goods market).
The parameter χ measures the speed of nominal exchange rate adjustments to real
exchange rate deviations from its steady-state value (q = 0). Under this setting,
10See Clarida et al. (31) and Smets and Wouters (118).
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the exchange rate shows smooth and persistent dynamics. Also there will be no
response to shocks on impact, since st depends on lagged values of qt.
In contrast, in the UIP case the spot exchange rate reacts to current and
future expected values of the interest rate differential, so that the non-arbitrage
condition holds. To prevent from undue jumps in the spot exchange rate, I allow
the world nominal interest rate to move in response to world inflation shocks. Insofar
as domestic and world interest rates will tend to move in the same direction, the
spot exchange rate jump will not be magnified. This means that a falling world
inflation will decrease the world interest rate.11 The UIP model renders a more
volatile exchange rate than the PPP model, with a non-zero response on impact.
3.2.2 Calibration
The steady-state real interest rate r is set to 3 percent, which implies a value β =
0.993. The annual steady-state inflation rate p¯i equals 2.5 percent which is about
the actual inflation target for various countries. For the world inflation process,
the autoregressive parameter is assumed to be ρ = 0.5 i.e. the effect of a shock
dies away in about a year, which roughly corresponds to international empirical
estimates.
Regarding the aggregators, for both the CES and translog cases the param-
eter that measures the degree of openness α is set to 0.35, Cook (33) uses a value
of 0.3 while Gali and Monacelli (52) work with 0.4. For the translog case, γ = 112
and the parameter c is set such that the slopes of both Phillips curves are equal in
steady state13.
11In fact, the term in braces in equation (3-17) states that the world interest rate is set by the
policy rule i∗t = (r + p¯i) + fp
(
Et
[
pi∗t+1
]− p¯i) = (r + p¯i) + fpρ (pi∗t − p¯i) so f∗p = fpρ. With this,
I am assuming that both home and foreign policy makers have the same response to inflation
deviations.
12Qualitatively similar results were obtained for γ = 0.5 and γ = 2.
13This means that if I set ctrans in the translog case, then 2(1 + β + ctrans)cces = ctrans(1 + β).
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On the other hand, in equation (3-14), br = 0.2, which is about the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution estimates reported in Smets and Wouters
(118). In the policy rule (3-15), the standard values fp = 1.5 and f$ = 0.5 are
chosen. For the exchange rate PPP equation (3-17) the value χ = 0.2 is used,
which implies a half-life of a misalignment of about a year, consistent with the
mean group estimates reported in Imbs et al. (67). Finally, for the UIP model for
exchange rate the values are f ∗p = fpρ = 0.75.
11
3.2.3 The exercise
This part performs two experiments regarding the way a world disinflation may hit
an economy initially resting on its steady state. First, a one-period-only disinflation
shock 0 that brings world inflation from p¯i = 2.5 to 1 percent on impact is evaluated.
This shock will illustrate the dynamics of the model. Second, world inflation is hit
such that the level of world inflation remains at 1 percent for a year (4 quarters).14
Through this type of persistent shock, the exercise tries to replicate the global
disinflation phenomenon. I then compare the responses of the model variables
under the two Phillips curve specifications for the PPP model and then repeat the
procedure with the UIP model.15
The PPP case
The results for inflation are displayed in Figure 1(a) where the first row depicts
the responses under the one-quarter shock and the second, under the persistent
one-year shock.
14 To do this, I simulate the model subject to the following history of world inflation shocks:
0 = 1− p¯i, 1 = 2 = 3 = (1− ρ)0 and k = 0 for k > 3.
15Additionally, the model was shocked considering different sizes and signs for the shocks in order
to exploit the non-linearities in (3-12). Although some differences were found in the responses of
the endogenous variables, none of them were sizeable enough to be reported.
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The CES specification produces a moderate fall while the translog case gen-
erates a deeper drop in aggregate inflation. The home inflation behaviour provides a
better insight. It remains basically unperturbed in the CES case while the translog
home inflation reacts in the same direction as the world inflation shock. In this
case, the falling world inflation drags the home inflation down, a fact that becomes
even more apparent under the persistent shock.
Figure 3.1(b) shows the effect on other three key variables for monetary
policy: the real wage growth rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal depre-
ciation. Under both types of shocks, the monetary policy rule calls for a stronger,
expansionary response of the policy instrument in the more disinflationary environ-
ment, i.e the translog case. The stronger response of interest rates in turn implies a
stronger effect upon the real wage growth. It is remarkable that although monetary
policy performs in an unduly expansionary way, the effect on inflation is flimsy.
These results are compatible with the two key features observed in the
empirical part. Namely, the existence of a positive correlation between the slope
of the Phillips curve and the real exchange rate on the one hand but a negative
correlation between the pass-through and the real exchange rate on the other hand.
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The UIP case
Figure 3.2 displays the responses of the different variables under the UIP model.
It is important to recall that the main difference relative to the previous results
originates from the response of the nominal exchange rate. The shock causes a
strong depreciation on impact because the interest rate cut is anticipated. The
nominal exchange rate depreciation more than offsets the shock so, world inflation
in domestic currency rises. Under translog preferences, this leads to an increase in
the domestic inflation that eventually turns into a higher aggregate inflation.
Nonetheless, after the shock, the translog effect operates and the results
are qualitatively the same as the ones obtained in the PPP model. Note, however,
that the depreciation on impact under the persistent shock calls for a subsequent
real appreciation that magnifies the dragging effect of the disinflation shock.
3.3 Conclusions
This chapter provides a possible theoretical explanation of how the world disinflation
might drag down domestic inflation in small open economies. It also argues that
globalisation and the increasing availability of cheaper foreign goods make world
prices ever more important to the price setting of domestic non-tradable goods.
A simple Phillips curve based on translog preferences (with state-dependent
elasticity of substitution) arises within the increasingly competitive environment
induced by globalisation. This is due to the fact that the best response from home
price setters to avoid losing market share is to follow up the world inflation trend.
The usual CES preferences cannot generate this strategic complementarity in price
setting. In the disinflation experiments the CES specifications is outperformed by
the translog assumption in explaining the importance of competition effects.
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The existence of this dragging effect of world inflation has important con-
sequences for monetary policy in small open economies. The domestic interest
rate channel of monetary policy loses strength to affect inflation, as the domestic
spending in tradable goods increases relative to that of non-tradables. Therefore, if
globalisation drives an economy to a low-inflation trap, policymakers may find that
inducing a currency depreciation may be the only way out this trap.
A possible extension to this research is to move the model economy towards
a more detailed general equilibrium framework. For instance, it is necessary to
complement the results in this chapter with the study of the labour market and
its relation to marginal costs. In this case, a shock that pushes down the relative
price of tradables to non-tradables might expand the demand in the tradable sector
and reduce that of the non-tradable sector. This could lower non-tradable sector
relative real wages and therefore further reduce home good prices.
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B1 Appendix: Flexible price setting
B1.1 The CES case
The consumption basket is given by
Ct =
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
h,t + α
1
ηC
η−1
η
w,t
] η
η−1
(b1)
where Ch,t and Cw,t denote the quantity of domestic and imported goods respectively.
Standard intratemporal choice condition for the home good implies
Ch,t = (1− α)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (b2)
which is the version in levels of (3-1) in the text. After imposing the conditions Y ht = C
h
t ,
Costs(Y ht ) =WtY
h
t and (b2) we obtain the profit function
B(P ht ) = (1− α)
(
P ht −Wt
)(P ht
Pt
)−η
Ct (b3)
which is maximized by P cest =
(
η
η−1
)
Wt, its percent change being equation (3-3).
B1.2 The translog case
Define the log expenditure function as a sum of log aggregate consumption and log
consumption-based price index, gt = pt+ ct, where pt is defined in (3-7). The demand for
the domestic good can be determined using Shephard’s Lemma (note that Gt = PtCt)
Ch,t =
∂Gt
∂Ph,t
=
∂gt
∂ph,t
(
Gt
Ph,t
)
= (1− α+ γqt)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (b4)
which is the version in levels of (3-8). In this case, the profit function is
B(Ph,t) = (1− α+ γqt) (Ph,t −Wt)
(
Ph,t
Pt
)−1
Ct (b5)
The optimal price level is P transh,t =
(
1 + 1−α+γqtγ
)
Wt which cannot be solved explicitly
since qt depends on ptransh,t = ln(P
trans
h,t ). However we can approximate the optimal price
by taking logs and using the fact that ln (1 + x) ' x for a small number x. Then,
ptransh,t =
1− α
2γ
+
pw,t
2
+
wt
2
(b6)
After differentiation of (b6) we get equation (3-10) in the text.
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B2 Appendix: Price setting with adjustment costs
The quadratic approximation of the profit function around its desired price level P ∗h,t is
B (Ph,t) ' B
(
P ∗h,t
)
+ B′ (P ∗h,t) (Ph,t − P ∗h,t)− ca (ph,t − p∗h,t)2 (b7)
where ca = −12B′′
(
P ∗h,t
)(
P ∗h,t
)−2
> 0. The linear term disappears due to the optimality
of P ∗h,t while the constant term is irrelevant to the firms’ decision-making.
The adjustment costs for price changes are given by cb (ph,t − ph,t−1)2. There-
fore the firm pricing problem can be reformulated as an overall minimization problem
(Assuming c 6= 0)
min
{ph,s}∞s=t
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−t
{(
ph,s − p∗h,s
)2 + 1
2c
(ph,s − ph,s−1)2
}]
(b8)
subject to the transversality condition
lims→∞ βsEt
[(
ph,s − p∗h,s
)
+ 12c (ph,s − ph,s−1)
]
= 0,
where 12c =
cb
ca
> 0. The Euler equation in period t is
2c
(
Etph,t − Etp∗h,t
)
+ (Etph,t − Etph,t−1)− β (Etph,t+1 − Etph,t) = 0 (b9)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on the information up to and including
period t (when the pricing decision is made), hence Etph,s = ph,s for s ≤ t. Due to
rational expectations, the price forecasting error based on this period information set is
an iid sequence of random variable, Etph,t+1 − ph,t+1 = 2cβ ξt+1. Replacing and reordering
yields [
1− (2c+ 1 + β)
β
L+
1
β
L2
]
ph,t+1 = −
(
2c
β
)(
p∗h,t + ξt+1
)
(b10)
where L is the lag operator. The lag-polynomial in brackets can be factorized as (1 −
µ1L)(1 − µ2L), with µ1 + µ2 = (2c + 1 + β)β−1 and µ1µ2 = β−1. The roots are such
that 0 < µ1 < 1 and µ2 > β−1, with µ ≡ µ1 being the sable root. It can be verified that
βµ2 + 1− 2cµ = (1 + β)µ.
Replacing the factorized polynomial and multiplying by (1− µ2L)−1 allows us
to get
(1− µL) ph,t+1 = − (1− µ2L)−1
(
2c
β
)(
p∗h,t + ξt+1
)
(b11)
After expanding (1− µ2L)−1 the expression becomes
ph,t = µph,t−1 +
2c
β
Et
 ∞∑
j=t
(βµ)j−t+1 p∗h,j
 (b12)
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This is the key solution to the problem. To derive an inflation process, we forward (b12)
one period, take time t expectations and multiply by βµ,
βµEt [ph,t+1] = βµ2ph,t +
2c
β
Et
 ∞∑
j=t+1
(βµ)j−t+1 p∗h,j
 (b13)
Then, taking (b12) out of (b13) and rearranging leads(
1 + βµ2
)
pih,t = βµ1Etpih,t+1 + µpih,t−1 + 2cµ∆p∗h,t + iid (b14)
where the optimal price p∗h,t depends on the consumption aggregator used.
B2.1 The CES case
According to equation (3-3), ∆p∗h,t = ∆p
ces
h,t = ∆wt = ∆$t + pih,t, so (b14) becomes
(1 + βµ2 − 2cµ)pih,t = βµEtpih,t+1 + µpih,t−1 + 2cµ∆$t + βµεt (b15)
Considering that βµ2+1−2cµ = (1 + β)µ, allows us to obtain equation (3-5) in the main
text that does not depend on µ as the production function is assumed to be linear.
B2.2 The translog case
Now we replace ∆p∗h,t = ∆p
trans
h,t =
1
2piw,t +
1
2∆wt =
1
2piw,t +
1
2∆$t +
1
2pih,t into (b14) and
get
(1 + βµ2 − cµ)pih,t = βµEtpih,t+1 + µpih,t−1 + cµpiw,t + cµ∆$t + βµεt (b16)
Again, the equality βµ2+1−2cµ = (1 + β)µ allows to simplify equation (b16) into (3-11).
Then, after aggregating with (3-9) we get the time-varying Phillips curve (3-12).
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Figure 3.1: Responses to world inflation shocks, PPP case.
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Figure 3.2: Responses to world inflation shocks, UIP case.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INFLATION FORECAST AND POLICY MAKERS
JUDGEMENTS
The purpose of this chapter is to build a methodology to obtain marginal inflation
density forecasts. The approach lies in estimating a parametric inflation density
forecast where uncertainty, asymmetry and central tendency profiles are brought
about mainly from the exogenous variables through the use of a forecasting model.
The estimated parameters are combined with policy maker’s prior views through an
explicit Bayesian approach. The prior views encompass all other factors of risk and
uncertainty that may strike at the inflation forecast. The formulation postulates
that policy makers weigh their confidence in both; their prior beliefs and their model
via a utility function of the sorts used in information-theoretic design as proposed
by Lindley (85).
This is a more realistic way of combining prior beliefs with model-based
density forecasts. The approach is particularly important, in environments where
macroeconometric formulation of models is hindered by measurement errors and
poor data availability1. Nevertheless, even in stable and developed countries with
quality data rich environments, prior inputs are essential.
The chapter proceeds as follows, section 4.1 outlines the density forecast
framework, section 4.2 illustrates the methodology with a simple example for fore-
casting Peruvian inflation. Finally, section 4.3 draws the conclusions. Appendix C
contains technical derivations.
1Which is the case in most emerging-market economies.
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4.1 Density forecast framework
The forecasting literature has recently turned attention from point forecasts towards
density forecasts2. The reasons to provide complete representations of probability
distribution lie on the failure of the certainty equivalence principle in a world over-
whelmingly characterised by asymmetric risks. This failure is particularly relevant
in the fields of financial risk management and modern monetary policy where deci-
sion theory plays a substantial role.
Some central banks like the Federal Reserve in the USA or the Bank of
England have a long tradition in macroeconomic point forecasts. Only recently, the
Bank of England has pioneered the presentation of density forecast by means of
fan charts. Since then, a number of ITers publish a density forecast with varying
degrees of detail. About twelve out of twenty-one ITers regularly publish a fan
chart3.
Leading density forecast central banks4 have favoured the use of specific
parametric methods to construct their density forecasts. The parameters governing
the forecast densities directly control for uncertainty and the asymmetry of the
distribution. This is the approach taken in the next subsection.
The role of models in the forecasting process has been recognised by aca-
demics and practitioners alike. In a recent survey of central banks practising IT
(Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (115)), basically all 20 surveyed banks refer the use of
some kind of model. The key evidence is that most central banks, specially ITers
endorse the use of one core forecasting model that helps centre policy discussions
within the bank.
2See Diebold et.al (42) and Tay and Wallis (125).
3In alphabetical order: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Norway, Peru, South
Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, and United Kingdom. In Fracasso et.al (47), Israel
appears as not publishing a Fan chat because the inflation report under assessment exceptionally
did not have one. Colombia is not considered in their sample due to “limited information”.
4For the Bank of England the references are Briton et.al (20) andWallis (135). For the Riksbank
the reference is Blix and Sellin (17).
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But the use of models in forecasting does not mean that subjective views
are filtered out in the forecasting process. In fact, a factor also mentioned in the
Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (115) survey is that in most central banks; the pub-
lished forecasts are a “balanced combination” of technical forecasts and decision
makers’ views. The practice of including subjective approaches to macroeconomic
forecasting within central banks is also recognised in Sims (117) and Goodhart (56).
Papers like Hall and Mitchell (61, 62, 63) propose a powerful method for
forecast combination that allows the incorporation of subjective forecasts. The
combination procedure in these works hinges on forecast error minimisation. In-
stead, this chapter proposes a methodology based on the interaction between the
policy decision maker and the producers of forecasts. The central bank staff imple-
ments simulations using a forecasting model and policy makers input priors about
parameters that reflect uncertainty, risk balance and baseline forecast values.
4.1.1 The parametric density forecast
The economists at a central bank own a forecasting process at time t about future
realizations of an inflation sequence up to horizon H. This sequence is generated
by a forecasting model and is denoted by5 {pis}Hs=t+1
pis =Ms(Yt, Xt; θ, It) for s = t+ 1, t+ 2...H (4-1)
In equation [4-1], Yt denotes the known history of endogenous macroeco-
nomic variables yt in the model (including inflation pit) Formally
Yt = {yt, ..., yt−n}
This model-based forecast is conditional upon various factors that can
be controlled in the process. These factors are Xt, θ, and It. The first one de-
notes the history and likely future realizations of the exogenous variables: Xt =
5Hatted variables are forecasts of either exogenous or endogenous variables. In the case of the
instrument setting, it refers to the stance assumed by the policy maker.
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{xt−n, .., xt, x̂t+1...x̂t+H ...}, θ denotes the set of parameters that describes the par-
ticular economic model in use. This set of parameters is included in the broader
set of parameters Θ that defines model uncertainty. The last factor, It denotes the
history as well as the particular stance of the central bank instrument assumed at
time t: It =
{
it−n,..., it, ît+1, ...
}
.
Model M is general enough and need not be explicit as it may correspond
to a rational expectations equilibrium solution. I make the following definition:
Definition 1 A central forecast6 is an inflation sequence {pic,s}Hs=t+1 ob-
tained by conditioning the model to: (a) the most likely sequence of exogenous
variables within the forecast horizon {x̂c,s}Hs=t+1, (b) parameter values θc and (c)
the monetary policy instrument setting Ic,t
Also, the economists at this central bank have to provide a technical as-
sessment of risk and uncertainty about the inflation forecast. This relies on random
realizations of exogenous variables from suitably calibrated probability distribution
functions. The random draws take into account a chosen parameterised standard
deviation, skewness and the “most-likely” sequence of exogenous variables. The pa-
rameters of these probability density functions reflect the technical staff historical
estimates as well as subjective and the informed view of sectorial experts.
Among the distinct probability density functions that are suitable to per-
form random draws are the Beta and the Split Normal. The latter is used intensively
in Blix and Sellin (17), Briton et.al (20) and Vega (130). These two types of distribu-
tions are useful because their parameters illustrate the distributional characteristics
that matter most in a density forecast; a central point; a measure of dispersion and
skewness.
Performing simulated histories of exogenous variables within the forecast
horizon allows to determine alternative trajectories of inflation. Evaluated at each
6In this definition, the subscript c denotes both central forecasts and assumed central values.
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point in time within the forecast horizon, the distinct inflation points originated in
the simulations can be hypothesised as coming from a generic probability function.
The determination of the explicit form of this inflation forecast probability distri-
bution function (pdf) resulting from this exercise is hindered by two facts (a) the
mapping from the exogenous variables to inflation imply a solution like [4-1] which
can be highly non-linear and (b) even if we manage to find the exact form of the
distribution; its communication to the policy makers would not be easy. A way to
circumvent the problem is to assume a parametric form for the distribution function
that can serve two purposes; be a good approximation to the true pdf and allow a
communication strategy that can easily be grasped by the policy maker. A good
candidate for the assumed pdf is the Split Normal, given that its parameters can
be easily communicated in terms of straightforward balance of risks.
Definition 2 A model-based parametric inflation density forecast is a se-
quence of parameters
{
Λ̂c,s
}H
s=t+1
describing a probability density function of the
inflation forecast at every point in time s.
The parameters involved in the above definition can be obtained by a like-
lihood estimation procedure assuming the Split Normal distribution and using the
simulated data.
Henceforth, I am going to concentrate on a relevant horizon H and drop
time subscripts. After S number of stochastic simulations on the exogenous vari-
ables are performed, I obtain a mapping from data conditional on the model pa-
rameters and the instrument setting to object ω(
{Xt}Sj=1 , Yt; Θ, It
)
→ ω (4-2)
The variable ω contains the elements upon which both, the econometrist and the
policy maker care about7. Namely, the inflation forecast at horizon H, and the
three parameters that underlie policy discussions. I group these three parameters
7Observe that the parameter Θ as well as the instrument may remain constant or vary exoge-
nously along the simulations.
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in the vector Λ = (m,σ2, γ), with m being the modal point8, σ2 the uncertainty
measure and γ the skewness of the distribution of the inflation forecast. These
three parameters precisely define the Split Normal SN (m,σ2, γ). This distribution
collapses into a Normal N (m,σ2) whenever the skewness parameter γ equals zero.
The γ parameter varies on the range 〈−1, 1〉 and is closely linked to the balance of
risks made at central banks (see Appendix B). Specifying ω in a compact way
ω = ({pi}Sj=1 ,Λ) (4-3)
I treat ω parameters in a Bayesian context9 and characterise its posterior probability
density conditional on all the information acquired after performing S simulations
of the model conditional on all the given factors Ω (observe that S itself is a condi-
tioning factor)
p(ω| Ω) = p(Λ| Ω)p({pi}Sj=1 | Λ,Ω) (4-4)
where
Ω is the given information set: Ω = {{Xt}Sj=1 , Yt; Θ, It}
p(Λ| Ω) is the prior density elicited by the policy maker, and
p
(
{pi}Sj=1 | Λ,Ω
)
is the probability of the simulated inflation forecast data
given the information Ω and the parameters of interest. The likelihood principle
implies that this probability is equivalent to the likelihood of the parameters given
the simulated data and the information set: L(Λ| {pi}Sj=1 ,Ω).
My interest is to draw probabilistic judgments of the inflation forecast distri-
bution, thus I need to find the posterior conditional distribution of the parameters.
This is achieved by making use of Bayes theorem
p(Λ| {pi}Sj=1 ,Ω) =
p(Λ| Ω)L(Λ | {pi}Sj=1 ,Ω)
p({pi}Sj=1 | Ω)
(4-5)
8When risks are asymmetric, there are three measures of tendency that central banks can look
at. In practice, central banks tend to pay more attention to modal points (See Goodhart (56) and
Vega (130))
9Namely, it is itself a random variable.
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Given that both, the prior distribution and the likelihood are known pa-
rameterised functions, the posterior distribution can be explicitly determined. Fur-
thermore, by holding constant a pair of parameters, I can determine the conditional
distribution of the remaining parameter.
4.1.2 Elicitation of the priors as the outcome of policy makers views
Upon learning the outcome of the model-based density forecast, policy-makers views
are formed. These views take into account other forms of uncertainties not included
in the forecast; model-uncertainty, measurement errors or any other type. It re-
mains an internal operational task the way to optimally extract these views and to
translate them into tractable distribution functions.
For my purpose, I assume that the first subjective view is that the three
parameters are independent random variables, so that the joint prior is
p(Λ| Ω) = p(σ2| Ω)p(γ| Ω)p(m| Ω) (4-6)
Prior for uncertainty parameter σ2
Following the literature (Bauwens et.al (8)), I assume that σ2 is driven by
the Inverted Gamma-2 distribution iG2(b, a). The parameters (a, b) are chosen by
the policy maker. This distribution has support 〈0,∞〉 and its parameters can be
specified using the two moments and the mode of the distribution as guidelines
E(σ2|.) ≡ b
a− 2 for a > 2
and
V (σ2|.) ≡ 2
a− 4
(
b
a− 2
)2
for a > 4
while the mode is
mode(σ2|.) ≡ b
a+ 2
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It can be observed that the mean is always higher than the mode, by taking
the estimated σ̂2c in Definition 2 as a reference point, possible values of b and a can
be evaluated by weighing the resulting mode, mean and variance.
Prior for skewness parameter γ
For the skewness parameter I need a distribution with bounded support. I
assume a slight transformation of a Beta distribution and name it as B˜(c, d). This
allows γ to vary in the interval 〈−1, 1〉. To do this, I make a transformation of a
random variable z lying on the interval 〈0, 1〉 with a Beta distribution B(c, d) (the
transformation applied is γ = 2z − 1). The first two moments are defined as
E(γ|Ω) ≡ c− d
c+ d
and
V (γ|Ω) ≡ 4cd
(c+ d+ 1) (c+ d)2
with mode
mode(γ|Ω) ≡ c− d
c+ d− 2
Prior for mode parameter m
I impose a non-informative uniform distribution for the mode m
p(m|am, bm) ∝ constant (4-7)
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4.1.3 The posterior distribution
Given the Split Normal likelihood assumption10, the kernel of the joint posterior
distribution of the three parameters of interest is
p (Λ| pit+H ,Ω) ∝
(
γ+1
2
)c−1 (1−γ
2
)d−1 (
σ2
)−(a+2)
2 e
( −b
2σ2
)
 (σ2)−12√
1−γ+√1+γ
N e
(
−1
2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
pit+H−m
σ
√
1−γ
)2
+
S∑
i=S1+1
(
pit+H−m
σ
√
1+γ
)2})
(4-8)
From this joint pdf, I obtain the posterior conditional distribution of σ2.
As expected, this distribution is also an Inverted Gamma-2
p
(
σ2| γ,m, pit+H ,Ω
)
∝
(
σ2
)−(a+N+2)
2 e(
−(ϑ(m,γ)+b)
2σ2
) (4-9)
where ϑ(m, γ) =
{
S1∑
i=1
(
(pit+H−m)2
1−γ
)
+
S∑
i=S1+1
(
(pit+H−m)2
1+γ
)}
The other two relevant conditional distributions are given by
p
(
m| γ, σ2, pit+H ,Ω
)
∝ e
(
−1
2σ2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1−γ)
)
+
S∑
i=S1+1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1+γ)
)})
(4-10)
and
p
(
γ|m ,σ2, pit+H ,Ω
)
∝
(
γ+1
2
)c−1 (1−γ
2
)d−1 ( 2√
1−γ+√1+γ
)S
e
 −1
2σ2
 S1∑i=1
 (pit+H−m)2
1−γ
+ S∑
i=S1+1
 (pit+H−m)2
1+γ


(4-11)
The conjugacy of the prior distribution of σ2 allows to express the
conditional moments from the posterior from an inverted gamma distribution
iG2(a+S
2
, 2
ϑ(m,γ)+b
). The moments are
E(σ2|.) ≡
a+S
2
2
ϑ(m,γ)+b
− 2 for
2
ϑ(m, γ) + b
> 2
10See Appendix [B] for details about this distribution.
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and
V (σ2|.) ≡ 22
ϑ(m,γ)+b
− 4
(
a+S
2
2
ϑ(m,γ)+b
− 2
)2
for
2
ϑ(m, γ) + b
> 4
while the mode is
mode(σ2|.) ≡
a+S
2
2
ϑ(m,γ)+b
+ 2
From this explicit representation, we observe that as the sample size in-
creases, the posterior mean and mode would collapse to the model-based estimates.
In that case, the prior view has a small effect on the posterior outcome. In an
econometric estimation environment, a larger sample size is always good because
it improves the model-based information. The context here is rather different. It
is based on the willingness of a Bayesian policy maker to learn about the proper-
ties of the inflation forecast from a general perspective instead of a non-Bayesian
econometrist who wants to learn the properties of its model-based forecast.
4.1.4 The choice of sample size as an information theoretic design prob-
lem
In the proposed methology, the sample size S is a choice variable as well. If a high
enough sample size is considered, the prior view of the policy makers becomes use-
less. On the other hand, if the sample size is small, then the model-based estimation
turns less accurate so that the simulation experiment becomes informationally poor.
Policy makers need to weigh the information provided by the model and
the prior beliefs they may hold. In practice, this process appears complex as it
is bound to the subjective beliefs of the policy makers coupled with out-of-model
information they might have.
Under this circumstance, the information-theoretic approach 11 common in
11This view was proposed by Lindley (85). Applications of Lindley’s approach are found for
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the field of “experimental design” seems plausible. What is the experiment the
policy maker performs? In my view, the experiment consists in updating the policy
makers prior beliefs about the inflation forecast modal point, uncertainty and risks
by means of a forecasting model provided by econometricians. The outcome of this
updating process depends crucially on the simulation sample size under evaluation.
The choice of sample size S is made so that policy makers maximise their expected
utility resulting from the experiment. In other words
S∗ = argmax
S
{KL(S)− λS} (4-12)
This expected utility of experimentation with sample size S depends on
two factors; a) the Kullback-Leibler (KL hereon) divergence between the posterior
and prior distribution of the parameters KL(S) and b) the linear loss function λS.
The KL number provides the value of the information provided by the forecasting
model under use12. The loss term is rationalised by the unwillingness to disregard
their own priors13. So, as the sample size increases, the prior of the policy maker
is downweighted and thus reduces the utility of a policy maker who considers her
priors are indeed somewhat important. In this case, the utility parameter λ is the
degree of importance of the prior in the overall utility function 14.
The KL divergence number is defined as
KL(S) =
∫
Λ
∫
Π
log
[
p(Λ|Π, S)
p(Λ)
]
p(Π,Λ|S)dΠdΛ (4-13)
Where Π = {pi}Sj=1 is the simulated inflation data of size S, p(Λ) is the
prior distribution of the parameters and p(Λ|Π, S) is the posterior distribution.
example in Ryan (114), Clyde (32), Parmigiani and Berry (100), Chaloner and Verdinelli (27) and
Muller and Parmigiani (95). Most of these applications belong to the design of clinical experiments.
12KL(S) is increasing in S and concave. See Lindley (85).
13These priors might indeed not be correct ex post and as studied by Bigio and Vega (16), they
are shaped by their fears and uncertainties about the driving forces in the economy.
14λ can also be interpreted as the inverse of policy makers credibility on the model.
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4.2 An example
In order to provide an example, I use a simple ad-hoc univariate model15 for quar-
terly inflation estimated using ordinary least squares 16. I run the inflation rate at
quarter t against the following regressors: the exchange rate depreciation at lag 3
(∆et−3), GDP growth at lag 2 (gt−2 ), the mean interbank interest rate at lag 1
(it−1), the mean three months Libor rate at lag 3 (i∗t−3) and the trade growth at lag
4 (∆tott−4).
pit = 0.69pit−1 +0.24∆et−1 +0.23gt−2 −0.30it−1 +0.55i∗t−3 +0.06∆tott−4 +εt
(9.23) (3.58) (3.06) (−1.95) (1.72) (1.70)
(4-14)
The estimation17 is carried out using data from the first quarter of 1994
to the second quarter of 2003. Except for lagged inflation, all the variables on the
right-hand side are considered as exogenous. Hence, to start the density forecast I
need to construct a baseline scenario and uncertainty and risk profiles for the set
of exogenous variables: (gt, it,∆et, i
∗
t ,∆tott). In particular, I assume the following
distributions
Exogenous variable Balance of risk Distribution Mode σ2
Libor rate upside 70% Split normal 3.57 1.2
Nominal exchange rate depreciation upside 55% Split normal 0.00 10.6
GDP growth upside 60% Split normal 3.90 8.3
Terms of trade growth neutral Normal 0.5 4.9
Table 4.1: Distributional assumptions for exogenous variables at the end of the forecast
horizon.
In Figure [4.1] I show the historical, central scenario and the 90 per cent
15The univariate model is used only to ease the exposition. In practice, structural models as
the ones developed in Luque and Vega (88) and Llosa et.al (86) for Peru should be used.
16I use data from Peru. The Central Bank of Peru has recently adopted the Inflation Targeting
framework (January 2002).
17In equation [4-14] the lag structure minimises the sum of squared residuals. As usual, the
t-values are in parenthesis.
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central prediction interval for the exogenous variables along the forecast periods.
The asymmetry as well as the uncertainty increases linearly until it reaches the
values specified in Table [4.1]. In each forecast period, I also consider random real-
izations of the unforecastable shock εt, drawn from a normal distribution N(0, 0.3).
This last feature is important for two reasons; first it makes the first-period-ahead
inflation forecast random given that all the exogenous determinants are predeter-
mined for this horizon. Second, it allows the inflation uncertainty to increase even
in the absence of uncertainty in the exogenous variables.
Figure 4.1: forecast interval and modal forecast.
To complete the conditioning factors, I also need to assume a particular
monetary policy setting within the forecast horizon. In this case, I consider a
constant-interest-rate forecast with the rate kept at 2.75 per cent during the forecast
period.
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The inflation density forecast is then achieved by estimating the parameters
of an assumed split normal distribution SN(m,σ2, γ) for the simulated sample of
size18 ST for each forecast period.
An important conclusion emerges from this exercise: Notwithstanding that
the exchange rate depreciation, GDP growth and the Libor rate all show consider-
able asymmetry19 (especially at the end of the forecast horizon). There is no build
up of asymmetry in both inflation measures; the quarterly and the year-on-year rate.
In Figure [4.2] I show the estimated densities at each of the eight forecast periods
along with the estimated parameters; mode m, σ2 and γ. The gamma parameter is
close to zero in all periods.
The reasons why the increasingly asymmetric nature of exogenous variables
does not pass on to inflation are twofold; the lag structure and the interplay be-
tween the variability versus asymmetric forces. Regarding the lag structure, as the
asymmetric exogenous variables affect quarterly inflation with some lags, then full
asymmetry is not transferred to inflation at the end of the forecast horizon. As of
the relation variability/asymmetry, it is know that when the variability of inflation
increases the asymmetric forces that affect inflation are dampened (see for example
Blix and Sellin 2000). Inflation variability does grow because the exogenous vari-
ability increases linearly and because the persistent nature of inflation (as it depends
strongly on its own lags) exacerbates all the sources of uncertainty in inflation, even
the one that corresponds to the inflation shock itself.
The estimated mode from the simulations are quite different from the one
computed using only the central scenario values of exogenous variables (the modes).
There is an upward bias (See Figure [4.3]) in both the quarterly inflation and the
year-on-year inflation. The reason is that at the end of the forecast horizon, the
18In this step, the sample size ST can be as large as possible. The objective here is to get the
most accurate distributional representation originated from the forecasting model alone.
19In Figure [4.3] in the appendix the estimated means differs from the modes of the asymmetric
exogenous variables. In Figure [4.4] the asymmetry parameter γ for the exogenous variables
becomes larger towards the end of the forecast horizon.
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simulated distribution is quite symmetric around the mean. The mean is the central
tendency that is preserved in both the point and the density forecast.
Once the results of the simulation are known, I proceed to introduce the
information provided by the policy maker. To do this, I concentrate in forecast
horizon H = 8. I need to assume a prior distribution for the set of parameters
Λ = (m,σ2, γ). I take the distributional assumptions outlined in Section 4.1.2.
Namely, the mode follows a uniform distribution; m ∼ U(mlow,mhigh) with param-
eters mlow = −0.22 and mhigh = 5.78 such that the distribution is centred in an
year-on-year inflation rate of 2.78 percent.
The uncertainty parameter follows an inverted gamma-2 distribution; σ2 ∼
iG2(b, a). In order to find the parameters, I can consider that the estimated σ̂
2 from
the simulation step is too low. Policy makers may consider that there are other
factors that necessarily drive forecast uncertainty to a higher level. For example
they can assume that Eprior(σ
2) = 1.95 and the modeprior(σ
2) = 1.8. This implies
the corresponding parameters (a, b) = (38, 72)
The asymmetry parameter follows a beta type of distribution considered
in the previous section; γ ∼ B˜(c, d). In this case, policy makers believe that the
inflation forecast at horizon H will have an upside risk, as opposed to the model-
based case which considers a slight downside risk. Let’s suppose that the mean
prior gamma is Eprior(γ) = 0.3 (which is close to a 60 percent upside risk) and that
they believe about this asymmetry quite strongly Vprior(γ) ≈ 0.006. This implies
parameter values (c, d) = (92.857, 50).
Before combining the prior information given by the policy maker, it is
necessary to establish the sample size to use in the Bayesian procedure. This sample
size is obtained from solving the problem in equation [4-12)]. The calculation of
the utility measure requires to get the KL divergence number via some numerical
integration procedure. In Appendix D, I follow Ryan (114) by using a MCMC
estimation. The optimal value S∗ depends on the parameter λ. A small λ about
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0.007 is related to a large sample size (about 164), a ”large” λ, around 0.017,
generates a sample size of about 33. Hence, I interpret the sample size as the
weight of confidence in the prior. In this example, I assume λ = 0.01. Therefore
the optimal sample size is S∗ = 120 (see Figure [4.7])
Next, I sample from the Bayesian conditional posterior distributions. The
corresponding mean values are shown in Table (4.2) and a graphical representation
of conditional posterior against prior distributions is shown in Figure [4.8]).
Prior Mean Model-based Estimation Posterior Mean
Mode m 2.78 3.03 2.75
Uncertainty σ2 1.95 0.83 0.78
Risk γ 0.30 -0.05 0.34
Table 4.2: Mean values of the parameters under the prior distribution, the ML estimation
and the posterior distributions.
The distributional means of the prior and posterior turn out to be very close
to each other except for the uncertainty parameter σ2. The model-based estimate
of uncertainty is low while the prior belief about this parameter is too high relative
to the model. Also, the model-based estimate of the asymmetry is slightly negative
(-0.05) as opposed to the prior belief which posits a strong upside risk (γ = 0.3). It
seems that the model strongly rejects the combination of high levels of uncertainty
and sizeable upside risks as defined by the prior. Thus, in terms of the posterior,
the prior view of the policy makers is taken into account for the modal and the risk
forecasts, yet it is not the case for the uncertainty parameter estimation. In fact,
the posterior calculation hints that a lower uncertainty seems necessary in order to
”make room” for a high value of asymmetry provided in the likelihood20.
20This particular result does not always hold. It depends on the relative prior variances of the
parameters. If policy makers are highly confident about their prior view of uncertainty, then the
distributional variance is in fact very low. Therefore, the resulting posterior might be closer to
this posterior.
116
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the understanding of how central banks do forecasts
in the context of monetary policy making. It posits attention to Bayesian policy
makers who hold or develop prior views on key features of the inflation density
forecast. The decision makers interact with the technical staff in charged of running
the macroeconomic model-based density forecast.
In reality, neither the prior views nor the model-based forecast are per
se true. Prior views are subject to human imperfection while models are always
false. However, policy makers in fact use both types of inputs to make quantitative
inference about their forecasts.
In the present approach, policy makers weigh both the prior view and the
information provided by the model via a utility function advocated in Information
Theory. The utility function considers the trade-off between the importance of
policy makers priors and the “faith” on the core forecasting model. If the model is
given full “faith” then priors are irrelevant and viceversa.
A further application of the approach developed in this chapter would be
to reverse engineer this density forecasting process to extract λ and thus to find
a metric on the amount of the importance of judgement relative to pure objective
model-based forecasts.
C1 Appendix: Inflation forecast : Prior distributions
C1.1 Prior for σ2
In the main text I assume that σ2 follows an Inverted Gamma 2 distribution with param-
eters (b, a)
p(σ2|.) =
(
Γ(a2 )
(
2
b
)a
2
)−1 (
σ2
)−(a+2)
2 e
(
− b
2σ2
)
(c1)
117
where
E(σ2|.) ≡ b
a− 2 for a > 2
and
V (σ2|.) ≡ 2
a− 4
(
b
a− 2
)2
for a > 4
while the mode is
mode(σ2|.) ≡ b
a+ 2
C1.2 Prior for γ
I start assuming that a random variable z follows a Beta distribution with parameters
(c, d)
g(z|c, d) = Γ(c+d)Γ(c)Γ(d)zc−1 (1− z)d−1 for 0 < z < 1
with
E(z|Ω) ≡ c
c+ d
and
V (z|Ω) ≡ cd
(c+ d+ 1) (c+ d)2
with mode
mode(z|Ω) ≡ c− 1
c+ d− 2
Then I define γ in terms of the following transformation
γ = 2z − 1
Hence, the prior distribution of γ can be expressed as
p(γ|.) = g(z(γ)|c, d)
∣∣∣∣ ddγ z
∣∣∣∣
As a result, the prior distribution for γ is
p(γ|.) = Γ(c+ d)
Γ(c)Γ(d)
[
1 + γ
2
]c−1 [1− γ
2
]d−1
for − 1 < γ < 1 (c2)
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C1.3 Prior for m
As for m, I assume a uniform, non-informative prior. The exact determination for this
prior is inconsequential for the Bayesian posterior sampling. However, it is used in the
sample size determination given that I require sampling from the priors. Hence, I assume
m ∼ Uniform(mlow,mhigh)
p(m|.) = 1
mhigh −mlow for mlow < m < mhigh (c3)
C2 Appendix: Model-based density simulation and estimation
C2.1 Fitting the simulated data
I define a Split Normal pdf for the data with parameters (m,σ2, γ) in the following way
f(x;m,σ2, γ) =
{ 2√
σ2(√1−γ+√1+γ)φ(
x−m√
σ2(1−γ)) if x < m
2√
σ2(√1−γ+√1+γ)φ(
x−m√
σ2(1+γ)
) otherwise
Where φ(z) = 1√
2pi
e−z2
Given a simulated sample {x}STs=1; I can sort the data in ascending order and split the
ordered data {x˜}STs=1 in two sub-samples
S1 = {x˜i | x˜i < m}
S2 = {x˜i | x˜i ≥ m}
Let S1 and ST − S1 be the number of elements of S1 and S2 respectively. Then the
likelihood of the sample is given by
L(x;m,σ2, γ) =
(
2/
√
2piσ2√
1−γ+√1+γ
)ST
e
(
−1
2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
x−m√
σ2(1−γ)
)2
+
ST∑
i=S1+1
(
x−m√
σ2(1+γ)
)2})
(c4)
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while the log-likelihood is
L(x;m,σ2, γ) = ST log
 2/(2piσ2)12√
1−γ+√1+γ
− 12 S1∑
i=1
(
x−m√
σ2(1−γ)
)2
− ...
1
2
ST∑
i=S1+1
(
x−m√
σ2(1+γ)
)2
and further expressed as
L(x;m,σ2, γ) = ST log
(
2/
√
2pi
)
− ST
2
log
(
σ2
)− ST log (√1− γ +√1 + γ)
− 1
2σ2
S1∑
i=1
(
x−m√
1− γ
)2
− 1
2σ2
ST∑
i=S1+1
(
x−m√
1 + γ
)2
Estimation of the parameters requires the computation of the firs order conditions of the
likelihood problem:
For the uncertainty parameter I have
∂
∂σ2
L(x;σ2, γ,m) = − ST
2σ2
+
1
2 (σ2)2
S1∑
i=1
(
x−m√
1− γ
)2
+
1
2 (σ2)2
ST∑
i=S1+1
(
x−m√
1 + γ
)2
= 0
σ̂2 =
1
ST (1− γ̂)
S1∑
i=1
(x− m̂)2 + 1
ST (1 + γ̂)
ST∑
i=S1+1
(x− m̂)2 (c5)
For the risk parameter I find
∂
∂γ
L(x;σ2, γ,m) = − ST /2√
1− γ +√1 + γ
(√
1− γ −√1 + γ√
1 + γ
√
1− γ
)
− 1
2σ2 (1− γ)2
S1∑
i=1
(x−m)2 + 1
2σ2 (1 + γ)2
ST∑
i=S1+1
(x−m)2
which collapses to the following equation in the estimators
ST∑
i=S1+1
(x− m̂)2
(1 + γ̂)2
−
S1∑
i=1
(x− m̂)2
(1− γ̂)2 =
σ̂2ST
√
1 + γ̂
√
1− γ̂
1
(√
1− γ̂ −
√
1 + γ̂√
1− γ̂ +
√
1 + γ̂
)
(c6)
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For the mode parameter I have the expression
∂
∂m
L(x;σ2, γ,m) =
S1∑
i=1
(x−m)
σ2 (1− γ)2 +
ST∑
i=S1+1
(x−m)
σ2 (1 + γ)2
= 0
S1∑
i=1
x−
S1∑
i=1
m
(1− γ)2 +
ST∑
i=S1+1
x−
ST∑
i=S1+1
m
(1 + γ)2
= 0
which is simplified as
S1∑
i=1
x
(1− γ̂)2 +
ST∑
i=S1+1
x
(1 + γ̂)2
=
[
S1
(1− γ̂)2 +
ST − S1
(1 + γ̂)2
]
m̂ (c7)
Equations [c5], [c6] and [c7] are solved to find the triple of MLE parameters Λ̂ =(
m̂, σ̂2, γ̂
)
.
C3 Appendix: The posterior distribution
C3.1 The joint posterior
The joint posterior distribution is given by
p (Λ| {pi} ,Ω) ∝
(
γ+1
2
)c−1 (
1−γ
2
)d−1 (
σ2
)−(a+2)
2 e
(
−b
2σ2
)
(
(σ2)−
1
2
√
1−γ+√1+γ
)ST
e
(
−1
2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
pii−m√
σ2(1−γ)
)2
+
S∗∑
i=S1+1
(
pii−m√
σ2(1+γ)
)2})
In the main text I have determined the conditional posterior distribution kernel of σ2 by
fixing the other two parameters
p
(
σ2| γ,m, {piH} ,Ω
)
∝
(
σ2
)−(a+S∗+2)
2 e
(
−ϑ(m,γ;S∗)+b
2σ2
)
(c8)
where ϑ(m, γ;S∗) =
{
S1∑
i=1
(
(pii−m)2
1−γ
)
+
S∗∑
i=1+S1
(
(pii−m)2
1+γ
)}
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The implied posterior distribution of σ2 is also a iG2 distribution with parameters:
(ϑ(m, γ;S∗) + b, a + S∗). From here, it is straightforward to determine the mean of
σ2 under the conditional posterior
E
(
σ2| .)
post
=
ϑ(m, γ;S∗) + b
a+ S∗ − 2
On the other hand, the prior mean was given by
E
(
σ2| .)
prior
=
b
a− 2
While the fitted estimation with simulated data according to equation [c5] gives
σ̂2| fit = ϑ(m, γ;S
∗)
S∗
If E
(
σ2| .)
prior
> σ̂2| fit , then E
(
σ2| .)
prior
> E
(
σ2| .)
post
> σ̂2| fit
Starting with the conditional: ba−2 >
ϑ(m,γ;S)
S :
(a) I post multiply and add the term b(a− 2) in both sides:
bS + b(a− 2) > (a− 2)ϑ(m, γ;S) + b(a− 2)
b (a+ S − 2) > (a− 2) (ϑ(m, γ;S) + b)
b
a−2 >
ϑ(m,γ;S)+b
a+S−2
(b) I post multiply and add the term ϑ(m, γ;S)S in both sides:
bS + ϑ(m, γ;S)S > (a− 2)ϑ(m, γ;S) + ϑ(m, γ;S)S
S (b+ ϑ(m, γ;S)) > ϑ(m, γ;S) (a− 2 + S)
b+ϑ(m,γ;S)
a−2+S >
ϑ(m,γ;S)
S
The basic result when E
(
σ2| .)
prior
> σ̂2| fit is:
b
a−2 >
b+ϑ(m,γ;S∗)
a−2+S∗ >
ϑ(m,γ;S∗)
S∗
As the simulated sample becomes large, the procedure implemented here downweights the
prior; and thus the simulated variance does not differ from the posterior.
The other two relevant conditional distributions are given by
p
(
m| γ, σ2, pit+H ,Ω
)
∝ e
(
−1
2σ2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1−γ)
)
+
S∑
i=S1+1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1+γ)
)})
(c9)
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and
p
(
γ|m ,σ2, pit+H ,Ω
)
∝
(
γ + 1
2
)c−1(1− γ
2
)d−1( 2√
1− γ +√1 + γ
)S
(c10)
e
 −1
2σ2
 S1∑i=1
 (pit+H−m)2
1−γ
+ S∑
i=S1+1
 (pit+H−m)2
1+γ


C3.2 Sampling from the posterior
In order to make inferences about the posterior distribution of the parameters, it is neces-
sary to obtain samples from the three posterior distributions. The posterior distribution
of σ2 is an inverted gamma-2 (equation [c8]) and thus, poses no problem. However, the
other two kernels (equations [c9] and [c10)] are of unknown form. This calls for a sam-
pling procedure commonly known as Metropolis-Hastings within Gibbs sampling. The
sampling algorithm takes the following steps:
1. Initialize the parameters at an arbitrary value
(
m0, σ
2
0, γ0
)
.
2. Generate a kth-draw σ2k ∼ p
(
σ2k−1| γk,mk, .
)
3. Metropolis step to get m update:
Consider the function from equation [c9]:
cm(m;σ2, γ) = e
(
−1
2σ2
{
S1∑
i=1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1−γ)
)
+
S∑
i=S1+1
(
(pit+H−m)2
(1+γ)
)})
(a) Calculate a function value: Mk−1 = cm(mk−1;σ2k, γk−1)
(b) Generate a candidate draw from: m∗k ∼ mk−1 + cN(0, 1); where c is an
appropriate constant.
(c) Calculate the corresponding function value: Mk = cm(m∗k;σ
2
k, γk−1)
(d) Calculate the ratio: ρ = min( MkMk−1 , 1)
(e) Draw a uniform random variable between zero and one ρu = Uniform(0, 1)
(f) if ρu < ρ, make the candidate m∗k draw be the selected draw mk. Otherwise
go back to [a.] and repeat the procedure.
4. Metropolis step to get γ update: Considering the function from equation [c9]
cγ(γ;σ2,m) ∝
(
γ+1
2
)c−1 (
1−γ
2
)d−1( 2√
1− γ +√1 + γ
)S
e
 −1
2σ2
 S1∑i=1
 (pit+H−m)2
1−γ
+ S∑
i=S1+1
 (pit+H−m)2
1+γ


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And repeat [a.] to [f.] as in Step 3.
After a number of draws, the sampling scheme is equivalent to sampling from the true
posterior distributions outlined above. In the example developed in the paper, the number
of total draws amounts to 50,000 from which, the first 5,000 were excluded.
C4 Appendix: The optimal design of the sample size
As stated in the main text, the optimal sample size design maximises the expected utility
S∗ = argmax
S∈D
{KL(S)− λS} (c11)
Where the KL divergence number is defined as
KL(S) =
∫
Λ
∫
Π
log
[
p(Λ|Π, S)
p(Λ)
]
p(Π,Λ|S)dΠdΛ
Where Π = {pi}Sj=1 is the simulated inflation data of size S, p(Λ) is the prior distribution
of the parameters and p(Λ|Π, S) is the posterior distribution.
Following Ryan (114), it is straightforward to show that the KL information number is
KL(S) =
∫ ∫
log [p(Π|Λ, S)] p(Π,Λ|S)dΠdΛ−
∫
log [p(Π|S)] p(Π|S)dΠ
Hence, this number can be estimated by a MCMC procedure that does not rely in sampling
from the posterior distribution of the parameters. The estimator is
K̂L(S) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
{log[p(Πi|Λi, S)]− log [p̂(Πi|S)]} (c12)
Where (Πi,Λi) for i = 1, ..., N is a sample from p(Π,Λ|S) and p̂(Πi|S) is an estimator
of the marginal density of the data p(Πi|S). The dependent pair (Πi, Λi) drawn from
p(Π,Λ|S) = p(Π|Λ, S)p(Λ), is obtained by first drawing Λi from the prior distribution
p(Λ) and then Πi from the conditional distribution p(Π|Λi, S).
The estimation of the marginal density of the data is obtained by an importance sampling
based estimator as in Ryan (114)
p̂(Πi|S) = 1
M
M∑
j=1
p(Πi|Λ∗ij , S) (c13)
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Where {Λ∗ij} for i = 1, ..., N and j = 1, ...,M are N samples of size M drawn from the
prior p(Λ) obtained independently of the N pairs (Πi,Λi) drawn before.
The sampling algorithm to get the estimator [c12] follows exactly that of Ryan (114)
1. Generate a large sample of size NΛ from p(Λ), {Λ, ...,ΛNΛ}.
2. Generate an index set for MCMC estimator [c12] as a size N ≤ NΛ random sample
without repetition of the integers 1 to NΛ. Call this sample {outi}Ni=1
3. Generate index sets for importance sampling estimator [c13] as N independent size
N ≤ NΛ random samples without repetition of the integers 1 to NΛ. Call these
samples {inij}Mj=1 for i = 1, ..., N .
4. For k = 1, ..., nd, let Sk represent nd designs to be compared. Generate one dataset
Πki from p(Π|Λouti , Sk) for each k = 1, ..., nd and each i = 1, ..., N .
5. For k = 1, ..., nd, compute
K̂L
M
(Sk) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
K̂L
M
i (Sk) (c14)
where
K̂L
M
i (Sk) = log[p(Πi|Λouti , Sk)]− log
 1
M
M∑
j=1
p(Πi|Λ∗ij , S)

To implement the estimation, I considered the following values: NΛ = 5000, N = 1000,
M = 100, and nd = 200. Also, I consider a sample size higher than 30 via: Sk =
(k − 1) + 30.
In figure [4.6], I depict the MCMC draws of KL together with a smoothed version of it.
The smoothed version is combined with the loss term in [c11] to get the utility function
shown in figure [4.7].
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Figure 4.2: Estimated SN pdf’s for the year-on-year inflation forecast.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of the gamma parameter.
128
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Year−on−year Inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarterly inflation Inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
2
4
6
8
10
GDP Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
15
Exchange rate depreciation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
1
2
3
4
5
Terms of trade growth
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.5
1
1.5
Libor rate
Figure 4.5: Evolution of the uncertainty parameter.
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Figure 4.6: The KL divergence number (a.k.a entropy). The scatter plot is the
estimation with monte carlo variation, the line is the smoothed version.
130
40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220
1.85
1.9
1.95
2
2.05
2.1
2.15
2.2
2.25
Sample size
U
til
ity
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CHAPTER 5
SKEWED FORWARD-LOOKING MONETARY POLICY
BEHAVIOUR
The purpose of this chapter is to empirically estimate forward-looking monetary
policy behaviour in the five countries in Latin America that have adopted the infla-
tion targeting regime so far (IT henceforth): Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru1.
In recent times, monetary policy in Latin America has been characterised
by the evolving pattern in the use of intermediate targets and policy instruments, as
a result, central banks and specially ITers2 have tended to use a controllable short
term nominal interest rate as their preferred policy instrument3. This has been
very important because it has allowed to have a better measure of monetary policy
stance and has opened the possibility to perform formal econometric analysis.
Regarding the management of the policy instrument, most central bankers
in the world either in developed or emerging-market countries, either ITers or non-
ITers; justify forward-looking monetary policy making.4. At the theoretical level,
inflation forecasts can be considered as intermediate targets in the implementation
1Monetary policy options in Latin America have in general converged to the three strategies
outlined in Mishkin and Savastano (92); full-dollarisation, monetary targeting and inflation tar-
geting (IT).
2See for example Armas and Grippa (4), Minella et.al (89), Landerretche et.al (81), Restrepo
(105) and Truman (128) for country-specific cases.
3Adoption of IT by developing countries is not the only reason. The changing structure of
their economies together with developments in interbank markets and financial institutions have
facilitated central banks to endorse interest rates instead of other instruments.
4A perusal of Inflation Reports and formal communication from web pages of various, hetero-
geneous central banks easily confirms that assertion.
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of forward-looking policy5. On the empirical side, Clarida et.al (30) and Orphanides
(98) initiated a research agenda devoted to the estimation of forward-looking interest
rate feedback rules.
However, there is one dimension of analysis that has had scant attention
in the empirical estimation of monetary policy reaction functions. As suggested
by Goodhart (57) and recently by Greenspan (60) and King (75), when policy
makers take decisions, they pay considerable attention to the risks in the foreseeable
future. It is not only the most likely or baseline forecasts that is important. The
low-probability, high-impact events and the nature of the shocks6 that shape the
probabilistic distribution of forecasts are also key.
In the discussion to FED Chairman Alan Greenspan’s “Risk and Uncer-
tainty in Monetary Policy”, during the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Eco-
nomic Association, Mervin King, governor of the Bank of England, reflects on the
risk management approach to central banking
Greenspan defines the [risk management] approach by saying that pol-
icy makers should look at a range of “risks” to output and inflation; and
give due consideration to those risks when setting policy. He argues that
policy makers cannot just rely on the forecasts from a structural model of
the economy when even deep parameters are drifting. They should also
use their judgement; compare current experiences with previous, simi-
lar episodes; and continually test and update a range of reduced-form
models, which should help give some insight into how the economy is
evolving.
This is the approach taken at the Bank of England, where the Mone-
tary Policy Committee takes into account the entire distribution of future
5See Svensson (121).
6Their persistent or transitory features and their qualification as supply or demand driven
shocks.
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outcomes for inflation and output when setting interest rates. A ”fan-
chart” for its forecasts of both inflation and output is published in the
quarterly Inflation Report.
This is also the case within Latin American ITers. The systematic inclusion
of balance of risks discussions within their Inflation Reports suggests that their views
and decisions are somehow shaped by the outlook of risks surrounding the inflation
forecast.
In light of these considerations, the aim of this chapter is to estimate
forward-looking behaviour encompassed in the dynamics of interest rates in re-
lation to measures of inflation forecasts. To this end, I define the lagged interest
rate and a predetermined inflation forecast as the conditioning variables that affect
the interest rate setting at any given time.
First, I am interested in the mean interest rate effect. In order to do so,
simple linear forward-looking interest rate rules are estimated by standard ordinary
least squares techniques at different possible forecast horizons.
Second, in order to have a broader information than that provided by the
mean OLS estimates, I perform the estimation of quantile effects; namely, the re-
sponse of the interest rate at the different quantiles of its conditioning distribu-
tion. This is done by estimating linear quantile regression models as documented
in Koenker (79). The quantile estimates provide a broader picture of interest rate
behaviour and can potentially shed light on the probabilistic nature of interest rate
responses against the backdrop of the myriad of risks Latin American ITers face.
Therefore, the technique applied in the chapter provides one way to extract
information from the data to characterise forward-looking behaviour under both the
spectrum of risks and the attitudes towards those risks policy makers have. This
is particularly important in Latin America, given the many risk factors affecting
baseline inflation forecasts.
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The chapter proceeds as follows, section 5.1 sets up the linear forward-
looking response regression, section 5.2 does so for the quantile regression model,
section 5.3 describes the data used in the estimations and section 5.5 concludes.
5.1 Mean forward-looking responses
The empirical literature on forward-looking interest rate rules have focused primar-
ily on developed countries; Clarida et.al (30) and Orphanides (98)7 showed for the
first time the relevance of policy driven by future expected outcomes. In the spe-
cific context of Latin America, several country specific studies like Restrepo (105),
Minella et.al (89), Truman (128) and Ramos and Torres (103) deal with the esti-
mation of forward-looking policy rules for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
The econometric approach for the estimation of this type of rules, follows
two directions. First the GMM methodology advocated in Clarida et.al (30) which
is followed by Restrepo (105) and Ramos and Torres (103). The second approach -
pioneered by Orphanides (98) - consists in using real-time forecasts available at the
time of every interest rate decision and it is used for example in Jansson and Vredin
(69), Kuttner (80) and Goodhart (58). For the Latin American case, Ramos and
Torres (103) use forecasts from surveys instead of own-central bank forecasts while
Minella et.al (89) construct estimates with central bank forecasts.
In this chapter I follow more closely this latter approach of treating fore-
casts directly as explanatory variables. As it will be explained in section 5.3, I use
monthly series. Also, given that it is practically impossible to obtain central banks’
own forecasts for the period under study, I rely instead on consensus forecasts of
private agents gathered by Consensus Economics. These forecasts, in the form of
monthly vintages, mimic the real-time data sets used for example in Orphanides
7The working paper versions appeared both in 1997.
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(98). However, it is important to reckon that these forecasts might not be appro-
priate because they might indeed differ from central banks’ own forecasts8. For the
time being, I need to assume that the data set at hand captures the fundamental
dynamics of central banks’ own forecasts.
In all the countries under study I use a relevant interbank rate as the mon-
etary policy operational target(See figure 5.1)9. This is not exactly true for Mexico
where the policy instrument is defined as the cumulative balance of commercial
banks’ current accounts at the Central Bank10. Nevertheless, according to Truman
(128), during the period under study the interbank rate is already a good indicator
of Banco de Mexico monetary policy stance.
Figure 5.1: Policy rates and estimated neutral interest rates.
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8It is reasonable to think that central banks react basically to their internal forecasts.
9In this chapter, the operational target is also the policy instrument as operational issues are
totally abstracted.
10Known as the ’corto’.
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As apposed to IT practice in advanced economies, Latin American IT still
displays different degrees of convergence. Some countries are still on the way or have
just converged to a stationary inflation target (See Figure 5.2), in such cases, the
policy horizon is not clearly discernible. Others, like Chile have explicitly announced
a fixed policy horizon of more than a year. Unfortunately, the data at hand allow
us to have complete times series only up to 13-months-ahead inflation forecasts11.
This will limit the results along the horizon dimension as responses to horizons more
than 13 months ahead can not be calculated. Yet, the data can already show some
important effects at available longer horizons.
Figure 5.2: Inflation rates and ex-ante targets.
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In this chapter I assume that the monthly interest rate behaves according
to the following equation
11 Including the month when the decision is taken.
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it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)
[
int + api
(
pift−1,t+h − piot,t+h
)]
+ εt (5-1)
Where it is the policy rate, pi
f
t−1,t+h is the year-on-year, h-months-ahead
inflation forecast made in the month prior the policy decision is taken, piot,t+h is the
numerical, ex-ante inflation target known at time t and to be achieved at time t+h,
int is the neutral short-term interest rate, and εt represents all other possible sources
of interest rate change12.
To be able to diminish the bias arising from simultaneous dependence,
interest rate decisions at time t depend on forecasts made before the decision (time
t− 1). However, those forecasts made at time t− 1 implicitly assume an expected
path of interest rates and a particular value of interest rates for period t that is highly
correlated with period t−1 interest rates13. Therefore I postulate a relatively strong
assumption of exogeneity of last-period forecasts to the current and future interest
rate decisions.
According to equation [5-1] I can calculate the mean interest rate decision
conditional on information available at each decision step
E[it | Ωt] = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)
[
int + api
(
pift−1,t+h − piot,t+h
)]
(5-2)
Where Ωt is the information set policy makers have before any time-t in-
terest rate decision. This set is comprised by the lagged interest rate, the neutral
interest rate and the deviations of predetermined, last-period inflation forecast from
the planned target14. I assume that E[εt | Ωt] = 0.
12These sources of interest rate variations can be serially correlated.
13See Kim and Nelson (74). There, it is argued that to for the exercise to be clean, the forecasts
must assume a constant interest rate, to avoid simultaneous equation bias.
14I use de term “planned” target because in some circumstances such as Brazil, targets have
been adjusted ex-post. See Minella et.al (89).
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5.2 Quantile forward-looking responses
The key element in standard rule estimations of [5-2] is the use of linear regres-
sions and the least squares method to estimate what I call the mean response of
the instrument. If the estimated errors are normal, the mean response is a good
descriptor and not much else can be said. However, if the errors are not gaussian,
Koenker and Bassett (77) show that some features can be extracted from applying
quantile regressions.
In order to setup the quantile regression framework, the model in [5-1] can
be transformed in:
i˜t = ρ˜it−1 + αpi
f
t−1,t+h + εt (5-3)
Where I have transformed the variables in i˜t = it − int and i˜t−1 = it−1 − int
as interest rate deviations from their neutral values, and α = (1− ρ) api together
with pift−1,t+h = pi
f
t−1,t+h − piot,t+h denoting the sensitivity of interest rates and the
inflation deviations from target respectively.
The quantile regression model considers:
i˜t = ρ (γ) i˜t−1 + α (γ)pi
f
t−1,t+h + εγt (5-4)
Where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the orders upon quantiles are calculated (for ex-
ample, when γ = 0.5 I calculate median effects). The distribution of εγt is not know,
it is only assumed that the conditional quantile of the error term is Qγ (εγt | Ωt) = 0.
Then, the conditional γ-quantile response is
Qγ
(˜
it | i˜t−1, pift−1,t+h
)
= ρ (γ) i˜t−1 + α (γ)pi
f
t−1,t+h (5-5)
Koenker (79) show that the parameters of the regression model for any
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γ ∈ [0, 1] can be estimated by minimising the sum of sample quantile regression
functions15
min
ρ(γ),α(γ)
{
1
T
T∑
t=0
qγ(εγt)εγt
}
(5-6)
Where qγ(εγt) is the quantile regression weight function given by qγ(εγt) =
γ − I(εγt<0) (note that I(εγt<0) is the standard indicator function). For example, in
the median case γ = 1
2
then q0.5 (εγt) is either
1
2
or −1
2
depending on the sign of εγt.
In that case, deviation above or below εγt are weighted similarly. In all other cases
within the space [0, 1], deviations are weighted asymmetrically.
The minimisation and hence the estimation of the parameters of interest
relies on linear programming methods outlined first in Koenker and Bassett (77)16.
In order to get confidence intervals, the standard errors can be obtained by bootstrap
methods.
The quantile regression approach outlined here is potentially useful for as-
sessing monetary policy behaviour. It can shed light on the response of interest
rates at the lower and upper ends of the distribution of the inflation forecast.
For example, during the period of analysis I might find that for a particular
ITer, interest rates might react strongly at the upper end of the distribution (at the
higher quantiles) but less strongly at the lower end of the distribution (at the lower
quantiles). If the distribution of inflation forecasts have been such that the upper
end of the distribution have been outside permissible ranges but the lower end have
been mostly closed to the target then the above finding is compatible with a central
bank trying to curve upside risks. This is the asymmetric-risks interpretation related
to the risk management approach quoted in the introductory section.
15As explained in Koenker and Bassett (77); Koenker (79), this is a parallel to the ordinary
least squares minimisation where the aim is to minimise the sum of squared functions.
16See Koenker (79) for details and more references of time series applications and quantile
autoregressions.
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Another possible interpretation is that the above behaviour might have
been the result of an asymmetric loss function of a central bank that, given overall
balanced risks, have reacted more to upper end parts of the forecast distribution
than to the lower parts. Hence central bank behaviour can be driven by asymmetric
risks, asymmetric losses or a combination of both. Unfortunately, given the available
data I can not identify the sources of such a behaviour, only that the particular
behaviour has been present throughout the historical sample.
5.3 The data
Using the nominal interest rate series, I construct ex-post real interest rate series
which are then decomposed in trend and cycle. The trend is used as a proxy for
time-varying neutral real interest rates which are then summed to corresponding
inflation targets to obtain neutral nominal interest rate series to be used in the
regressions.
Regarding the consensus forecast, the surveys only contain forecast for the
current and next year-end inflation rates17. The survey reports are released on the
second half of every month and therefore the current month is always part of the
forecast. Given observed inflation rates within the year, the current end-year infla-
tion forecast imply a residual inflation for the rest of the current year. Additionally
using next year-end forecasts, it is possible to construct h-month implied forecasts.
Given the pattern of the surveys, it is only possible to obtain complete times series
of 13-months ahead implied inflation forecast.
The data set covers the period until November 2005. For the regressions, I
consider periods starting in 2000 for Brazil, mid-2001 for Chile and Colombia and
2002 in Mexico and Peru.
17See figures 5.3 and 5.4 where these series are plotted. Minor interpolation is done there to
complete missing data.
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Figure 5.3: Current year-end consensus forecasts: Dotted lines are the actual data
and continuous lines are interpolated data for missing observations.
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Mean responses
On figure 5.5 I observe the different responses of the systematic part of interest rates
to deviations of inflation forecasts for horizons 0 to 12 months ahead together with
their one-standard deviation confidence interval. If the mean estimate statistically
exceeds unity then I have some evidence that the stabilising Taylor principle applies.
I observe that the responses increase as the forecast horizons rise in the
case of Brazil, Chile and Mexico, reaching values of near or more than one for the
12-month ahead forecasts. These results at the end-horizons are in line with those
reported in Minella et.al (89) for Brazil, and Restrepo (105) for Chile and Ramos
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Figure 5.4: Next year-end consensus forecasts: Dotted lines are the actual data and
continuous lines are interpolated data for missing observations.
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and Torres (103) for Mexico.
In the case of Colombia the results show a very mild and statistically lower-
than-one response of interest rate at the higher-end horizons. Taken at face value,
this would indicate that monetary policy in Colombia might not have been respond-
ing enough to stabilise inflation. However, I should warn that these results might
reflect the fact that the consensus forecast data for Colombia might be ill-suited for
the case at hand. Also, it might reflect the failure to adequately capture monetary
policy stance throughout the whole sample.
In the case of Peru, the responses to consensus forecasts are statistically
significant and close to unity up to about 7 months ahead inflation forecasts. For
longer horizons the statistical significance vanishes. In this case, the results suggest
that the monetary policy horizon in Peru has been lower than a year. This result
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Figure 5.5: Mean responses to h-period ahead inflation forecasts.
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might reflect the fact that - during the period of analysis - the policy target in Peru
was set on a calendar year-end basis and not o a fixed horizon of a year or more
which is the approximate monetary control lag in Peru 18.
As in the Colombian case, however I warn that the result might be just the
mirror of an inadequate forecast series and that the use of the own-inflation forecast
might change the results in a significant way.
What are the lessons to be learned from these pieces of evidence? First the
chapter tends to confirm previous findings of forward-looking behaviour for Brazil,
Chile and Mexico. Second, it opens the question of the proper characterisation of
monetary policy in Colombia and Peru within the sample; robustness, additional
explanatory variables, etc.
18See Luque and Vega (88) and Llosa et.al (86) for details about Peruvian data and monetary
policy.
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5.4.2 Quantile responses
Figure 5.6 depicts 5 panels showing the quantile responses of interest rates to one-
year-ahead inflation forecasts together with the mean responses and their respective
95 percent confidence intervals. For the case of Peru I have considered 7 months
ahead inflation forecasts because this is the relevant horizon reflected in the data.
For example, a 0.9 percentile effect (the responses on the right hand side
of the panels) shows how the interest rate responds to inflation forecast deviations
that are higher than the 90 percent of all forecast deviations, namely the response
of the interest rates at the upper tail of the inflation forecast deviation distribution.
Conversely, the 0.1 percentile effect shows the responses at the lower tail. In other
words, the effects at the edges of the panels show how interest rates would respond
under extreme expected inflation deviations. If the forecast distributions are skewed
to the right on average then a central bank might react statistically more, equal or
less than the mean response.
In a completely symmetric world, I would expect the responses at all points
of the distribution to be very close to the mean responses and statistically the same.
When a response is low at the lower tail and high at the upper tail such
as the case of Brazil, Chile and Mexico I can interpret that - provided that the
monetary policy loss functions are symmetric - the inflation risks during the sam-
ple might have been to the upside and that monetary policy have in fact reacted
aggressively against those risks, even more than the median effect would suggest.
For the case of Peru, policy responses at the upper tails of the inflation
forecast distribution have been lower than the mean responses. This is an indication
that the Central Bank of Peru have tended not to strongly respond to upside risks
to their inflation forecasts. With such a low policy horizon (7 months), upside
risk balances reflect inflationary factors to which it is not desirable to respond
aggressively.
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Figure 5.6: Quantile responses to relevant forecast horizons.
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All in all, these results point to the fact that symmetry is not a feature of
policy behaviour within Latin American ITers. Rather, skewed risks and particular
responses to them tend to deny the standard quadratic loss functions used in the
literature about optimal policy rules.
5.5 Conclusion
I have performed mean and quantile response estimations of forward-looking mon-
etary policy behaviour for the five ITers in Latin America.
Using the mean response estimation I have found that monetary policy
behaviour in these countries is forward-looking. Moreover, the use of a control lag
of more than a year suggested in the results for Brazil, Chile and Mexico is akin
to the practice of central banks in developed countries. Possible data problems or
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possible shorter control lags characterise the Colombian and Peruvian case.
The quantile regression estimates give us some key directions of the risks
surrounding monetary policy decisions in these countries. I have interpreted that
Brazil, Chile and Mexico have faced upside risks to inflation during their recent mon-
etary policy history and that these upside risks have somewhat prompted stronger
interest rate responses19. I find some weak evidence that Peru is likely to have
faced upside risk to which the authorities did not reacted in the expected fashion,
possibly due to the short policy horizon in place.
Further research is necessary in order to relate the above findings to institu-
tional features of each ITer. For example, the way the central bank policy mandate
is defined, the type of IT design or the macroeconomic structure of the country
might all shape the specific way monetary policy is conducted.
The above econometric assessment of forward-looking behaviour is positive.
An avenue of future research is to analyse the interplay between optimal policy under
skewed risks conditional on a typical economic structure of Latin American inflation
targeters.
19The fact that the skewness of the inflation forecast distribution might affect the interest rate
setting in a forward-looking central bank is explained for example in Goodhart (57).
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CHAPTER 6
THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION TARGETING ON INFLATION
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the behaviour of inflation dynamics brought
about by the adoption of IT. I do so by studying three measures that distinguish in-
flation dynamics: mean, variance and persistence. Key interesting questions emerge
from the study of these measures.
First, IT has been adopted by countries either to credibly disinflate (or con-
verge) or, as asserted by some authors, to lock-in the gains obtained from episodes
of disinflation. Would countries have done better or worse had they adopted any
other regime?
Second, it is generally stated that inflation uncertainty results from factors
exogenous to the scope of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (terms
of trade or supply shocks, for instance) as well as from monetary policy shocks.
In this sense, inflation can be made less uncertain up to the limits set out by the
amount of exogenous uncertainty. Modern monetary policy practice, whether IT or
not, hinges precisely on making monetary policy more predictable and hence less
uncertain. Once again, a fair question for a country that adopted IT is whether
inflation uncertainty has fallen more or less in comparison to the counterfactual
situation of not having adopted IT.
Last, the theory of IT emphasises that the overall features of the framework
are built upon the pillar of credibility. Credibility is understood as the ability the
central bank has to anchor medium to long run expectations, to avoid expectation
traps that may render persistently high or low inflation rates. On the other hand,
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“flexible” IT implies that shocks that drive inflation away from the target should
revert at a pace that does not harm real activity. Hence, the speed of adjustment
seems to depend on the degree of flexibility1. Too fast an adjustment is equivalent to
a strict IT, likely in situations whereby the central bank needs to gain or strengthen
credibility. When the adjustment is slow, a more flexible IT is in place. In the fast-
adjustment case, undue real volatility might emerge whereas in the slow-adjustment
case either credibility is strong enough that the central bank can reap some benefits
of flexibility, or the nominal anchor is lost and the inflation falls to the expectation
trap.
Thus, the effects of IT adoption on persistence are ambiguous. More per-
sistence can result from successful flexible ITers or unsuccessful ITers not gaining
credibility. Once more, what does an empirical evaluation of IT over persistence
tell about the adopting ITers?
In recent years, a growing body of literature has provided insights on the
empirical assessment of IT. Corbo et al. (35), for instance, compare policies and
outcomes in fully-fledged IT countries to two groups, potential ITers and non-ITers.
They find that sacrifice ratios were lower in ITers, that IT countries have reduced
inflation forecast errors and that inflation persistence has declined strongly among
ITers.
Johnson (70), by comparing five ITers to six non-ITers, all of them in indus-
trialised economies, finds that the period after the announcement of IT is associated
with a statistically significant reduction in the level of expected inflation. Also, he
finds that IT has not reduced absolute average forecast errors in targeting countries
relative to those in non-targeting countries. However, ITers did avoid even larger
forecast errors than those that would have occurred in the absence of IT.
On the other hand, Neumann and Von Hagen (97) consider a group of six
industrial IT countries and three non-IT countries and perform an event study to
1See Svensson (124).
150
quantify the response of inflation and long-run as well as short-run interest rates to
a supply shocks (increases in the world oil price in 1978 - 1979 and in 1998 - 19992).
They find that the effect of IT is not significantly different from zero for average
inflation, but it is for interest rates, meaning a gain in credibility among ITers .
Pe´tursson (102) analyses a bigger sample (twenty-one ITers) that includes
developing economies. He evaluates the performance of a set of macroeconomic
outcomes using a dummy variable for pre and post IT periods on a country basis
and finds that IT has been beneficial to reduce the level, persistence and variability
of inflation3. However, the technique offered by this study, does not tackle the
fundamental question of relative performance. Its contribution hinges in giving
a clear and robust account for the evidence of the absolute benefits of IT and
corroborates previous findings on this line.
Levin et.al (83) study inflation persistence using five industrial ITers which
are compared to seven industrial non-ITers. The study performs univariate regres-
sions on inflation for each country and finds that inflation persistence is estimated
to be quite low within ITers whereas the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected
for non-ITers. Levin and Piger (84), on the other hand, in a similar empirical
framework with twelve industrial countries allow for structural breaks and finds
that inflation in general exhibits low persistence4. They also suggest that IT does
not seem to have had a large impact on long-term expected inflation for a group of
eleven emerging market economies.
Finally, Ball and Sheridan (6) provides evidence on the irrelevance of IT.
They look at seven OECD countries that adopted IT in the early 90’s and thirteen
countries that did not. They claim that ITers that reduced higher-than-average
2This type of shock creates a dilemma because it implies more inflation coupled with a downturn
of economic activity.
3There are other studies that provide mixed evidence about inflation persistence. Benati (10)
and Levin et.al (83) find that inflation has become less persistent within the OECD and specially
IT countries.
4These results confirm those of Benati (10) that studies inflation dynamics in twenty OECD
countries.
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inflation rates towards equilibrium levels were merely reflecting regression to the
mean and not a proper effect of IT. Once they control for regression to the mean,
they conclude that IT did not improve macroeconomic performance. In their words,
“Just as short people on average have children who are taller than they are, coun-
tries with unusually high and unstable inflation tend to see these problems diminish,
regardless of whether they adopt inflation targeting”.
In my view, rather than challenging the previous evidence and beliefs about
IT effects, the crucial point of the claim made in Ball and Sheridan (6) is method-
ological. If there is an ITer with poor performance before IT, then it should be
compared with a non-ITer with equally poor initial performance. Otherwise, the
targeting effect would be overstated. The methodology in this chapter hinges pre-
cisely on this matter of comparability.
Following Johnson (70) and Ball and Sheridan (6) the chapter uses a
difference-in-difference estimator approach to evaluate the effects on key measures
of inflation dynamics resulting from IT adoption. As I argue later, the previous
studies on this issue may suffer from sample selection bias (a few industrialised
countries, for instance) and, importantly, select counterfactuals for the ITers in an
arbitrary fashion. The contribution is twofold: first, I use all the twenty-three IT
experiences so far, the widest possible control group of non-ITers (86 countries) and
different possible dates of IT adoption. With this, I understand IT as an alterna-
tive monetary policy framework worldwide, for both industrialised and developing
economies. Second, I interpret the IT adoption as a “natural experiment”, so I seek
to reestablish the conditions of a randomised experiment where the IT adoption
mimics a treatment. This naturally leads us to perform propensity score matching
as an alternative to the widely used regression approach. In a nutshell, I seek to
overcome the aforementioned methodological limitations by letting the data select
the controls for ITers.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 briefly describes
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the propensity score and matching techniques for evaluation, section 6.2 discusses
some empirical issues regarding the robustness of the results and presents the in-
flation outcomes to be evaluated, section 6.3 shows the main findings while section
6.4 concludes. Appendix D details the empirical estimation.
6.1 Methodology
As mentioned, the chapter uses microeconometric techniques usually applied in
non-experimental contexts, borrowed from the programme evaluation literature.
To be consistent with this literature, in this section I refer to the adoption of IT
as treatment, to the ITers as the treated group and to the non-ITers as the control
group.
6.1.1 The fundamental problem
Let D be a binary indicator that equals one if a country has adopted IT and zero
otherwise. Also, let Y 1t denote the value of a certain outcome in period t if the
country has adopted the IT regime and Y 0t if not. Given a set of observable country
attributes X, the average effect of being an ITer on Yt is
5
ξ = E
[
(Y 1t − Y 0t ) | X,D = 1
]
= E
[
Y 1t | X,D = 1
]− E [Y 0t | X,D = 1] (6-1)
It is clear from 6-1 that I face an identification problem since E[Y 0t | X,D = 1] is
not observable. It is convenient to rewrite 6-1 in a slightly different way, closer to
what I actually use in the empirical work. Suppose that IT was adopted in period
k. Then, for t > k > t′, 6-1 is equivalent to
ξ = E
[
(Y 1t − Y 0t′ ) | X,D = 1
]− E [(Y 0t − Y 0t′ ) | X,D = 1] (6-2)
5The quantity ξ refers to what is defined in the literature as the average treatment effect on
the treated, i.e the average effect of IT only across those countries who adopted the regime.
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This way of representing ξ allows us to exploit the panel data nature of the sample,
and hence to control for fixed factors that could be correlated with the outcomes
(i.e. most developed countries having less volatile inflation rates).
A common approach to estimate the expectation E[(Y 0t − Y 0t′ ) | X,D =
1] is to replace it with the observable average outcome in the untreated state
E[(Y 0t − Y 0t′ ) | X,D = 0]6. However, this could result in biased estimates of ξ
from two sources7. The first arises from the presence of ITers in the sample that
are not comparable with non-ITers and vice versa. The second is due to different
distributions of X between the treated and the control groups, which is usual in non-
randomised samples (like a dataset of countries). Fortunately, matching methods
deal with these shortcomings.
6.1.2 Matching methods
The idea behind matching techniques is to eliminate the aforementioned biases by
pairing ITers with non-ITers that have similar observed characteristics. The goal is
to estimate a suitable counterfactual for each ITer, to reestablish the conditions of
a randomised experiment (that is, random assignment of X ) when no such data are
available. Under these circumstances, the difference between the outcome of the
treated and that of a matched counterfactual can be attributed to the treatment.
The propensity score
Usually, determining along which dimension to match the countries or what type
of weighting scheme to use is a difficult task. Rosenbaum and Rubin (110) reduce
the dimensionality of this problem by suggesting that the match can be performed
6See, for instance, Johnson (70) and Ball and Sheridan (6).
7See Heckman et al. (65).
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on the basis of a single index that summarises all the information from the observ-
able covariates. This index, the propensity score, is the probability of treatment
conditional on observable characteristics,
p(X) = E [D | X] = Pr (D = 1 | X) (6-3)
and should satisfy the balancing hypothesis, which states that observations with the
same propensity score must have the same distribution of X independently of the
treatment status8. Hence, equation 6-1 can be rewritten as
ξ = E
[
(Y 1t − Y 0t′ ) | p(X), D = 1
]− E [(Y 0t − Y 0t′ ) | p(X), D = 1] (6-4)
The non-comparability bias can be eliminated by only considering coun-
tries within the common support, the intersection on the real line of the supports
of the distributions {p(X) | D = 1} and {p(X) | D = 0}. The bias from different
distributions of X is eliminated by reweighing the non-ITer observations.
Estimating the propensity score is straightforward, as any probabilistic
model suits 6-3. For instance, I can adopt the parametric form Pr (Di = 1 | Xi) =
F (h(Xi)) where F (.) is the logistic cumulative distribution (a logit). However, two
points are to be handle with care. First, the estimation requires choosing a set of
conditioning variables X that are not influenced by the adoption of the IT regime.
Otherwise, the matching estimator will not correctly measure the treatment effect,
because it will capture the (endogenous) changes in the distribution of X induced
by the IT adoption. For this reason, the X variables should measure country at-
tributes before the treatment9. Second, the model selection, i.e. the form of h(Xi),
can be used to test the balancing hypothesis. Dehejia and Wahba (37) suggest using
a polynomial according to the following steps:
8Rosenbaum and Rubin (110) show that the conditions D ⊥ {Y 1, Y 0} | X and 0 < p(X) < 1
together (strong ignorability of the treatment) are sufficient to identify the treatment effect. In
practice, I require a weaker and testable condition of ignorability for identification: conditional
mean independence, E[Y 0 | X,D] = E[Y 0 | X] and E[Y 1 | X,D] = E[Y 1 | X].
9However, even these variables could be influenced by the programme through the effects of
expectations.
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• Start with a parsimonious logit specification (i.e. h(Xi) linear)
• Stratify all observations on the common support such that estimated propensity
scores within a stratum for treated and control countries are close. For example,
start by dividing observations into strata of equal score range (0− 0.2, . . . , 0.8− 1).
• For each interval, test whether the averages of X of treated and control units do not
differ. If covariates are balanced between these groups for all strata, the specification
satisfies the balancing hypothesis10. If the test fails in one interval, divide it into
smaller strata and reevaluate.
• If a covariate is not balanced for many strata, a less parsimonious specification of
h(Xi) is needed. This can be achieved by adding interaction and/or higher-order
terms of the covariate.
It is important to emphasise that the role of the propensity score is to reduce
the dimensionality of the matching, it does not necessarily convey a behavioural
interpretation. Indeed, the logit regressions do not seek to find the determinants
that made a central bank adopt an IT regime, but to characterise and summarise the
economic state in which the ITers began to implement the regime. The difference
is subtle but allows us to control for variables that although are useful to define the
profile of a particular economy (importantly, relative to others), are not theoretically
included in the central bank’s decision to change the monetary policy regime11.
The matched estimator
Given the propensity score, there are various methods available for finding a coun-
terfactual for ITer i12. Following Heckman et al. (64) and Heckman et al. (65),
I can compute a consistent estimator of the counterfactual by means of a kernel
weighted average of outcomes. This approach not only has good statistical proper-
ties but is also a convenient way to work with a sample of countries, as it could be
difficult to find an actual non-ITer for each ITer. Let C denote the set of non-ITer
10Actually, the weaker version of mean conditional independence. See footnote 8.
11See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (93) for an attempt to interpret a cross sectional logit of the
IT adoption in behavioural terms.
12See Smith and Todd (119) for a review and examples.
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countries whose propensity scores are over the region of the common support. The
counterfactual of the outcome Y 0i,t is
Y˜ 0i,t =
∑
j∈CKb(pj − pi)Y 0j,t∑
j∈CKb(pj − pi)
(6-5)
whereKb(z) = K
(
z
b
)
is a kernel function (with bandwidth parameter b) that weights
the outcome of country i inversely proportionally to the distance between its propen-
sity score value (pi) and the one of the non-ITer j (pj).
Having found the matched pairs of ITers and non-ITers, the treatment effect
estimator for country i in period t can be written as
ξˆi,t =
(
Y 1i,t −
1
k − 1
k−1∑
τ=1
Y 0i,τ
)
−
(
Y˜ 0i,t −
1
k − 1
k−1∑
τ=1
Y˜ 0i,τ
)
(6-6)
where the pre-treatment outcome Y 0t′ has been replaced by the time averages of Y
0
i,τ
and Y˜ 0i,τ before the treatment
13. The estimator 6-6 has no analytical variance, so
standard errors are to be computed by bootstrapping (i.e. resampling the observa-
tions of the control group). Finally, the average of all possible ξˆi,t constitutes an
unbiased estimator of 6-2,
ξˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
1
Ti
Ti∑
t=1
ξˆi,t
)
(6-7)
where N is the number of ITers in the sample an Ti is the number of years ITer i
has been conducting its monetary policy under an IT regime.
6.2 Empirical issues
Before presenting the propensity score estimations and the “inflation outcomes” to
be used in the evaluation, it is convenient to briefly discuss some issues regarding
the dates the various central banks adopted their IT regime, i.e the period when
treatment occurred.
13Heckman et al. (65) and Smith and Todd (119) suggest using a weighted average of the pre-
treatment observations instead of a sole observation to control for possible outliers or trend effects.
In 6-6 I have used a simple average (equal weights).
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6.2.1 Adoption dates
In a number of cases the exact IT adoption timing is unclear: authors and central
banks use different criteria. To address this ambiguity and for the sake of robust-
ness, I use two possible adoption dates for each country. First, I consider dates
when countries started some form of IT (soft IT), typically by simply announcing
numerical targets for inflation or by stating that they were switching to IT. On the
other hand, I use dates of fully-fledged IT adoption, namely, an explicit IT adoption
as publicised by central banks and implying numerical targets for inflation together
with the absence of nominal anchors other than the inflation target14.
This approach contrasts with previous studies as it considers that many
developing-country ITers used a soft version of IT as a strategy to reduce inflation
from two-digit to international levels15; once inflation reached a stable low level,
their central banks would reinforce the regime, by abandoning other nominal anchors
and committing exclusively to target inflation. For example, Chile may appear as
an early IT adopter (1991) in other studies but it ran exchange rate regimes not
compatible with fully-fledged IT until 1999. For Peru, authors such as Corbo et
al. (35) use a soft IT adoption date (1994), when the central bank announced an
inflation target consistent with a money growth operational target, while Levin et.al
(83) use its fully-fledged date (2002).
The year of IT adoption for developed economies is less controversial. In
New Zealand for instance, the beginning of IT can be dated as far as 1988 when a
numerical target for inflation was announced in the Government budget statement.
Or, following Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (93), 1990 when the first Policy Targets
Agreement between the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand was published, specifying numerical targets for inflation and the
dates by which they were to be achieved. In 1991, a target range of 0 to 2 percent
14This information is available from the various central bank’s web sites.
15See Fraga et al. (48) for a comprehensive survey of IT in developing countries.
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for 1993 was announced16.
In the case of Sweden, I follow Ball and Sheridan (6) for my fully-fledged
classification given that the first announced inflation target was 2 for 1995 even
though the Riksbank announced its shift to IT during 1993. For Canada, the
first target range was announced in 1991. In 1993, a range of 1 to 3 percent was
established for 1994 onwards.
In Table 6.1, I compare adoption dates among five different studies and
provide my two possible adoption dates. Column “Class. 1” refers to the soft
IT adoption dates while “Class. 2” accounts for fully-fledged IT adoption. In 6
cases I have more than a three-year difference between both dates: Chile (8 years),
Colombia (4 years), Israel (5 years), Mexico (4 years), Peru (8 years) and Philippines
(7 years). In others, such as Australia and the UK, both classifications coincide.
6.2.2 Propensity score estimations
In order to estimate 6-3, I built a yearly dataset for 109 countries containing a set
of variables that broadly define an economy (X ). The sources were the Penn World
Table (PWT version 6.0) for GDP per capita and national accounts data, the IFS
for international reserves, money and credit markets data and Romer and Romer
(109) for exchange rate regimes17.
The variables entered in the regression are the averages of the five years prior
to the IT adoption for ITers. To check for robustness, for non-ITers I use either
the average since 1990 up to 2004 or the 5 years previous to 1996 (for Classification
1) or 1998 (for Classification 2)18. As described earlier, I tested for the balancing
hypothesis and selected the most parsimonious specification.
16The upper bound of this range was changed to 3 percent in the 1996 Policy Target Agreement.
17I also considered social indicators from the World Bank and other sources for central bank
staff and geographical controls. These variables were not significative in the regressions.
18These are the average adoption dates in each classification.
159
In Table 6.3, I show the variables whose coefficients were statistically sig-
nificant in the four estimated models: from the PWT, Investment to GDP, exports
plus imports to GDP (namely, openness ratio) and the share of world GDP (GDP
for a particular country to the sum of GDPs of the 109 countries in the database);
from the IFS, the fiscal balance to GDP, inflation and its coefficient of variation
(inflation volatility) and the money to GDP ratio; finally, the average number of
years that a country was classified as freely floating by Romer and Romer (109).
Figure 6.1 displays the density of the propensity score for ITers and non-
ITers derived for each of the estimated models. It can be seen that the densities
for model (1) are close to those of model (3); similarly, model (4) resembles (2).
For this reason, I will work with the first two specifications, where the differences
between the propensities scores are driven by the alternative IT adoptions dates,
and not by variations in the control group.
6.2.3 Inflation outcomes
A shortcoming of working with a wide control group is the low availability of data.
Even though the Consumer Price Index (CPI) time series are readily available for
most of the countries, this is not true with some interesting variables. Such is the
case for inflation expectations (from surveys) or forecasts errors (from polls) that are
directly influenced by IT adoption19 or cross-sectional higher moments (skewness
and kurtosis) of the CPI distribution.
Hence, the outcomes I use are quantities that can be extracted from con-
ventional CPI data that broadly characterise inflation dynamics: level, variation
and persistence. I built a yearly dataset from quarterly CPI information from the
IMF’s database (IFS), computed the counterfactuals and estimated the ITs effects
19See Johnson (70) for an application to a sample of selected countries.
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as in 6-6 and 6-720,21. For each year t the level of inflation is defined as the mean of
the annualised quarterly inflation rates of years t and t− 1. The same logic applies
to the standard deviation of inflation.
The interesting debate on measuring inflation persistence22 can be sum-
marised in the equation
pit − µt = ρ(pit−1 − µt−1) +
p∑
τ=1
βτ∆(pit−τ − µt−τ ) + t (6-8)
that is a reparameterisation of a simple AR(p) process for (pit−µt), the deviation of
inflation (pit) from its mean (µt). A common practice is to set µt = µ and estimate
the parameter ρ, which equals the sum of all the autoregressive coefficients in the
original AR(p) representation23. The closer ρ is to one, the more persistent the
inflation.
However, Robalo-Marques (106) has pointed out that if the true process
in 6-8 has a time-varying mean, imposing µt = µ leads to misleading conclusions.
Particularly, a series that quickly reverts to a time-varying mean may be estimated
as highly persistent (ρ close to one) if it is assumed to revert to an imposed constant
level. To control for this undesirable effect, he suggests estimating µt as a smooth
trend of pit. Considering this, I use two measures of inflation persistence: the
estimated ρ with µt = µ and with µt approximated by the HP filter
24. To compute
these quantities I use rolling windows with between 10 and 15 years of quarterly
data25.
20As a baseline I consider the pre-treatment period to be the average of the five years before the
IT adoption (k in equation 6-6), as I did in the propensity score estimations. I also tried different
definitions, though the results were not sensitive to this assumption.
21It is important to note that the number of years after IT (Ti in equation 6-7) varies as IT
adoption dates do. For Classification 1 [2] there are
∑N
i=1 Ti = 175 [132] post-IT observations.
22See Robalo-Marques (106) for a survey. This author also shows that the approach followed
here to measure persistence, even tough having some limitations, seems to the most reliable among
simple alternatives.
23It is well known that the OLS estimator of ρ is biased when ρ ' 1. An alternative (and
popular) estimator, that is adopted here, is proposed in Andrews and Chen (3).
24I use a smoothing parameter of λ = 1600. Different choices of λ do not qualitatively change
the results.
25The lag length in 6-8, p, was selected to minimise the Schwarz criterion.
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6.3 The effects of inflation targeting
In Table 6.2, I present the estimated average effects of IT for all ITers, for the group
of industrialised countries as well as developing ones. I report effects on inflation
dynamics according to the two alternative classifications of IT adoption. In the
spirit of the mean-regression hypothesis of Ball and Sheridan (6), I also include the
results obtained by controlling for initial (pre-treatment) conditions26.
The first key result is that IT has significantly reduced mean inflation in
all the cases. In general, I find that the benefits of soft IT adoption are stronger
than those of fully-fledged IT adoption. This was expected due to high-inflation
countries adopting IT to stabilise (the dates in Classification 1). Also, the benefits
on developing countries have been significantly stronger than those on industrialised
ones, which confirms previous findings in Bernanke et al. (14), Corbo et al. (35),
Neumann and Von Hagen (97) and Pe´tursson (102). The results also suggest that
regression to the mean is indeed an important phenomenon, since the effects of IT
tend to be smaller once I control for initial conditions. However, by considering a
substantially wider treatment and control groups than the ones in Ball and Sheridan
(6), I find that there is no sufficient evidence to discard the benefits of IT: IT matters
for mean inflation in both industrial and developing countries alike.
As mentioned in Faust and Henderson (46), “Common wisdom and conven-
tional models suggest that best-practice policy can be summarised in terms of two
goals: first, get mean inflation right; second, get the variance of inflation right”. The
finding regarding mean inflation supports the idea that IT in fact helps achieving
the first goal. What about the second goal? During the period of analysis, inflation
has been falling worldwide, and together, the variance of inflation has been decreas-
ing everywhere as well27. The second finding precisely indicates that the observed
26To control for initial conditions, as in Ball and Sheridan (6), I perform estimations of average
treatment effects on the treated by performing the regression Yi,t − Yi,t′ = α+ βYi,t′ + ei,t.
27See Pe´tursson (102).
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fall in the variance of inflation has been particularly strong within ITers, such that
the treatment effect has been that of a marked reduction in inflation volatility. The
pattern of this effect across country groups and IT classifications is similar to the
one found for the level of inflation. Neumann and Von Hagen (97) and Corbo et al.
(35) also provide evidence suggesting that IT has contributed to the fall in inflation
volatility28.
What can we say about IT effects on inflation persistence? As mentioned,
there is no a straightforward theoretical prediction of the effects of IT on persistence.
Adoption of IT can be linked to either lower or higher inflation persistence, it all
hinges on two opposing effects: how fast central banks allow inflation to revert back
to its mean after a shock and how price formation changes if expectations become
more anchored. Studies like Levin et.al (83) show that persistence is lower in ITers
than that in non-ITers whereas Ball and Sheridan (6) show there is no evidence
that ITers achieve lower inflation persistence29.
I find that the results depend on the measure of persistence (ρ) used. If
I consider a constant unconditional mean in the inflation process (µt = µ) I find
that IT increases persistence, though the estimates are not statistically significant
and different from zero. Contrarily, if I allow for a time varying mean inflation
(µt = HP) I find that IT does reduce the persistence parameter. Interestingly, some
sort of mean-regression is present under Classification 1 (soft IT): once I control
for the initial persistence, the fall in ρ disappears. However, under Classification 2
(fully-fledged IT) the fall in ρ is significant even after controlling for mean-regression
(which seem to exist in industrialised economies).
This last effect, although different from zero, is at most modest. The half
28Johnson (70) and Ball and Sheridan (6) suggest that IT increases inflation uncertainty. The
finding in Johnson (70) in fact refers to volatility of expected inflation from surveys, a variable
related to observed inflation volatility but with a dynamics of its own.
29Time series studies on persistence for industrial countries like Benati (10), Levin and Piger
(84) or Robalo-Marques (106) point to the conclusion that high inflation persistence is not a robust
feature of inflation processes in the euro-area.
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life of a shock to inflation is, roughly speaking, τ ≈ − ln(2)/ ln(ρ)30. The change in
ρ implied by the results varies around −0.04; hence, considering an initial ρ = 0.8531
the change in τ is just one quarter. All in all, the evidence on the effect of IT on
inflation persistence, if any, is not as categorical as the one associated with the
reduction in mean and volatility.
6.4 Conclusion
The increasing popularity of IT as a framework for conducting monetary policy
calls for the evaluation of its benefits in comparison to alternative schemes. In
this chapter I have combined data of IT adoption and inflation dynamics with
programme evaluation techniques to assess the dimensions in which IT is a beneficial
regime. The central findings support the idea that the adoption of IT, either in
its soft or explicit form, delivers the theoretically promised outcomes: low mean
inflation (around a fixed target or within a target range) and low inflation volatility.
I also find that IT has reduced the persistence of inflation in developing
countries. Given that IT is understood to be flexible, the reduction in persistence
is likely to be the effect of the anchoring of expectations to a defined nominal
level. Nevertheless, the small magnitude of the reduction is such that it prevents
us from categorically concluding in favour of IT in this particular dimension of the
inflation dynamics. In the future, it would be useful to contrast these results with
alternative measures of persistence. Also, a promising area for further research
is to formalise the theoretical link between IT, inflation persistence and long-run
expectations (credibility), which can guide subsequent empirical efforts.
The interpretation I gave to IT adoption, that of a “natural experiment”,
allowed us to use powerful evaluation tools normally applied in microeconometrics,
30This formula is exact if the estimated model is an AR(1).
31This is a generous value. The sample mean of the computed ρ after de-trending is just below
0.40.
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where the odds to identify policy effects are by far higher than in macroeconomics.
I also reckon that the study of the response of other macroeconomic variables (for
instance, the business cycles and interest rates) to IT is essential in order to having a
complete appraisal of the effects of the IT regime. Hence future research can explore
further, within the IT adoption evaluation, the advantages of these techniques on a
wider variety of macro indicators.
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Table 6.1: Inflation targeters and dates of adoption †
Corbo Fracasso Fraga Levin Pe´tursson Ball & Class. Class.
et al. et al. et al. et al. (2004) Sheridan 1 2
(2002) (2003) (2003) (2004) (2004)
Australia 1994 1994 1993 1993 1994 1994 1994
Brazil 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999
Canada 1991 1991 1991 1991 1992(94) 1991 1994
Chile 1991 1991 1991 1991 1990 1991 1999
Colombia 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1995 1999
Czech Republic 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
Finland ‡ 1993 1994 1993 1993
Hungary 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Iceland 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Israel 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1997
Mexico 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1995 1999
New Zealand 1990 1988 1990 1990 1990(93) 1990 1991
Norway 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Peru 1994 2002 1994 2002 2002 1994 2002
Philippines 2002 2002 1995 2002
Poland 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
South Africa 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
South Korea 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
Spain ‡ 1995 1994(95) 1994 1995
Sweden 1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 1993 1995
Switzerland 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Thailand 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
United Kingdom 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1992 1992
† Blank cells mean the authors did not provide a clear reference of the date of IT adoption.
‡ Finland and Spain abandoned inflation targeting and adopted the Euro in 1999.
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Table 6.2: Average treatment effect of Inflation Targeting †
All Industrialized Developing
ITers countries countries
Classification 1 Difference in means
Level –4.802 (0.440) –3.335 (0.627) –6.320 (0.631)
Standard Deviation –2.099 (0.323) –1.546 (0.468) –2.671 (0.452)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.027 (0.042) 0.031 (0.068) 0.024 (0.050)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.028 (0.026) –0.092 (0.023) –0.039 (0.011)
Classification 2 Difference in means
Level –2.863 (0.235) –1.327 (0.334) –5.382 (0.297)
Standard Deviation –1.551 (0.318) –1.103 (0.386) –2.286 (0.557)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.027 (0.032) 0.003 (0.047) 0.066 (0.036)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.016 (0.024) –0.061 (0.018) –0.058 (0.012)
Classification 1 Regression, controls for initial conditions
Level –3.874 (0.745) –2.804 (0.868) –4.907 (1.269)
Standard Deviation –1.863 (0.413) –0.988 (0.568) –2.708 (0.657)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.030 (0.039) 0.012 (0.057) 0.049 (0.058)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.015 (0.031) –0.006 (0.022) –0.023 (0.024)
Classification 2 Regression, controls for initial conditions
Level –2.621 (0.312) –1.603 (0.421) –3.242 (0.337)
Standard Deviation –1.798 (0.308) –1.284 (0.383) –2.112 (0.478)
Persistence (µt = µ) 0.043 (0.023) 0.012 (0.035) 0.094 (0.035)
Persistence (µt = HP) –0.047 (0.021) –0.033 (0.016) –0.055 (0.016)
† Figures in parenthesis are bootstrapped standard errors (5000 replications).
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Table 6.3: Propensity score estimation, logit regressions †
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Classification for ITers Class. 1 Class. 2 Class. 1 Class. 2
Classification for non-ITers > 1990 > 1990 Class. 1 Class. 2
Investment to GDP 0.337 (0.099) 0.250 (0.073) 0.402 (0.111) 0.282 (0.076)
Openness ratio –0.057 (0.012) –0.042 (0.013) –0.010 (0.027) –0.065 (0.019)
Share of world GDP –0.591 (0.199) –0.342 (0.161) –0.712 (0.313) –0.437 (0.244)
Fiscal balance to GDP 0.291 (0.166) 0.147 (0.103) 0.325 (0.150) 0.159 (0.120)
CPI Inflation 0.428 (0.133) 0.254 (0.099) 0.351 (0.126) 0.242 (0.097)
Inflation volatility –5.206 (1.926) –3.599 (1.543) –4.523 (1.957) –2.929 (1.752)
Money to GDP 0.033 (0.015) 0.027 (0.013) 0.051 (0.021) 0.028 (0.015)
Exchange rate regime –0.232 (0.079) –0.154 (0.061) –0.207 (0.079) –0.141 (0.055)
Observations 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R2 0.6114 0.4704 0.6066 0.4940
LR stat, χ2(8) 65.95 50.74 65.43 53.28
Common support region [0.036, 0.998] [0.037, 0.994] [0.030, 0.993] [0.015, 0.995]
non-ITers in common support 28 31 30 43
† Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors.
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D Appendix: Propensity score estimations
I present some details on the propensity score estimations under various definitions
of IT adoption dates. It is important to recall that the role of the propensity score
is to reduce the dimensionality of the matching, it does not necessarily convey a
behavioral interpretation. Indeed, the logit regressions below do not seek to find the
determinants that made a central bank adopt an IT regime, but to characterize and
summarize the economic state in which the ITers began to implement the regime.
The difference is subtle but allows us to control for variables that although are useful
to define the profile of a particular economy (importantly, relatively to others), are
not theoretically included in the central bank’s decision to change the monetary
policy regime32.
I built a yearly dataset for 109 countries containing a set of variables that
broadly define an economy. The sources were the Penn World Table (PWT version
6.0) for GDP per capita and national accounts data, the IFS for international re-
serves, money and credit markets data, Romer and Romer (109) for exchange rate
regime, the World Bank for social indicators and other sources for central bank staff
and geographical controls.
The variables entered in the regression are the averages of the five years
previous to the IT adoption for ITers. To check for robustness, for non-ITers I
use either the average since 1990 up to 2004 or the 5 years previous to 1996 (for
Classification 1) or 1998 (for Classification 2)33. As described in the main text of the
chapter, I tested for the balancing hypothesis and selected the most parsimonious
specification.
In Table 6.3, above we show the variables whose coefficients were statisti-
cally significant in the four estimated models: from the PWT, Investment to GDP,
32See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (93) for an attempt to interpret a cross sectional logit of the
IT adoption in behavioral terms.
33These are the average adoption dates in each classification.
169
Figure 6.1: Propensity score densities by IT adoption date.
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exports plus imports to GDP (namely, openness ratio) and the share of world GDP
(GDP for a particular country to the sum of GDPs of the 109 countries in the
database); from the IFS, the fiscal balance to GDP, inflation and its coefficient
of variation (inflation volatility) and the money to GDP ratio; finally, the average
number of years that a country was classified as freely floating by Romer and Romer
(109).
Figure 6.1 displays the density of the propensity score for ITers and non-
ITers derived for each of the estimated models. It can be seen that the densities for
model (1) are close to those of model (3); similarly, model (4) resembles (2). For this
reason, we work with the first two specifications in the text, where the differences
between the propensities scores are driven by the alternative IT adoptions dates,
and not by variations in the control group.
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